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Abstract 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the problems of describing and analysing music that is 
composed for, and presented from, a fixed medium, and diffused over 
loudspeakers with minimal intervention, especially where such music 
resembles everyday sounds as much as it does traditional musical material. It 
is argued that most existing theories of acousmatic music are closely tied to 
prescriptive rather than descriptive concerns, and concentrate upon intrinsic 
aspects of acousmatic music to the detriment of its extrinsic potential. In 
contrast to such approaches a method of description based upon an ecological 
theory of listening which accounts for the relationship between structured 
information and the perception of events is proposed. This descriptive 
approach is used as the basis for analysing acousmatic pieces, revealing a 
complex interpretative relationship between listener, piece and environment. 
Such an approach, it is argued, accounts for those aspects of acousmatic music 
excluded by most current approaches, but more importantly provides a 
theoretical framework. within which descriptions may be arrived at which 
avoid the prescriptive bias of exisiting theories. The perspective provided by 
this analytical approach is reinterpreted through a critical approach to 
aesthetics, showing how acousmatic music can be seen as both autonomous 
and mimetic and how the dialectic between these two aspects is potentially 
critical of our relationship with the world. The relationship between musical 
techniques, materials and technology is discussed in response to this 
perspective showing how acousmatic music might be regarded as part of a 
broader aesthetic context. In conclusion, it is argued that acousmatic music 
does not merely challenge the view that music is primarily self-referential, but 
also that it reaffirms the possibility that music may be both intrinsically and 
extrinsically significant. 
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Summary 
Summary 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 offers a critique of 
existing theories which purport to form the basis for the description of 
acousmatic music. It is concluded that there is a need for a descriptive, 
perceptual theory of acousmatic music, a theory which is able to respond not 
only to the intrinsic structures concentrated on by traditional notation and 
music theory but also to the extrinsic structures within which acousmatic 
works are situated. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of work in ecological acoustics which, it is 
argued, provides a theoretical framework within which the relationship 
between the work and its surroundings might be explored. This framework is 
extended to apply to the perception of cultural, social and aesthetic aspects of 
these surroundings, and a preliminary musical analysis is offered which 
applies this theoretical approach. 
Chapter 3 develops and extends the theoretical position developed in Chapter 
2 through a detailed analysis of Mi Bgmol by Yves Daoust. A number of 
shorter analyses are also provided to further illustrate the application of theory 
to analytical practice. 
Chapter 4 forms both a conclusion to the preceding chapters and a cultural 
critique of the theoretical position they develop. A number of observations are 
drawn regarding acousmatic music's position within contemporary culture and 
some general conclusions are reached regarding the relationships between 
composition and listening, and between perceptual and musical research. 
ýý. ý- ý- 
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Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 
Towards a perceptual theory of acousmatic 
music 
1.0 Introduction 
Consider a form of music which is presented through loudspeakers to an 
audience from an analog or digital tape-recording. This music may contain 
sounds that have recognisably musical sources, but may equally present 
recognisable sources that are beyond the bounds of traditional vocal and 
instrumental technology. We are as likely to hear the sounds of a bird, or of a 
factory as we are the sounds of a violin. Consider also that the technology 
involved transcends the mere reproduction of sounds. Techniques of synthesis 
and sound processing are employed which may present us with sounds that are 
unfamiliar and that may defy clear source attribution. Consider that this form 
of music may present us with familiar musical events: chords, melodies and 
rhythms which are easily reconcilable with other forms of music, but may 
equally present us with events which cannot be classified within such a 
traditional taxonomy. 
This thesis considers such a music, and will attempt to reconcile such 
departures from familiar frames of musical reference with the frame of 
reference provided by our everyday experiences. As such it will concentrate 
not upon those events which conform to our musical expectations, but those 
that challenge them. In doing so an attempt will be made to make sense of 
such a music, not in terms of our musical perceptions, but in terms of 
perception as a whole. Although much of the music considered might be 
explored from a traditional standpoint, through the existing tools of musical 
research, it is where these tools seem inadequate that this thesis will focus. It 
is not proposed that such 'a music cannot be viewed from existing 
9 
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perspectives, rather that it is more revealing to approach it afresh. Taking such 
an approach will not only be shown to be appropriate to the music at hand, 
despite its exclusion of traditional models, but will also be shown to provide a 
theoretical standpoint that may be turned back upon music as a whole. Hence, 
no apology is made for limiting the musical examples to the more extreme 
instances of this music. The rationale is not to conceal examples which may 
be assessed in more conventional terms, but to stress those examples which 
defy such methods. This thesis is concerned with music, above all, and as will 
be demonstrated, the very nature of music is at issue here. 
1.1 Perceptual descriptions, pedagogy and critique 
1.1.0 Describing acousmatic music 
This thesis will attempt to show that a fuller understanding of acousmatic 
musics can only be achieved through situating the genre within a wider 
perceptual context. This context must reflect social and ideological issues, but 
must also be grounded within a broad view of auditory perception. Rather than 
assuming that acousmatic music can be understood from the perspective of 
conventional music theory, or from existing theories of musical perception, 
this thesis will work upwards, so to speak, from the most general and primary 
aspects of auditory perception towards social, aesthetic and cultural issues. 
The reasoning behind this grounding in `everyday' perception, rather than in 
specialised `musical' forms of perception, will be dealt with in this and the 
following chapter. In this chapter, the need for a descriptive and perceptual 
1 The term acousmatic music is here partly interchangeable with the term musique concrete as 
originally intended by Schaeffer and reiterated by Michel Chion (1993). Acousmatic music is 
music that is recorded and then diffused without combination with live electronics or live 
performers; it exists only on tape (whether analog or digital) or as a fixed set of instructions to 
a computer. The term acousmatic is preferred to concrete as it emphasises the way in which 
the `real' acoustic source is assumed to be hidden from the audience. Acousmatic music does 
not exclude the use of synthesis or sound processing; but these processes must be employed in 
the making of a fixed artefact that is then diffused, rather than employed during performance. 
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theory of acousmatic music will be assessed and a number of methodological 
problems identified that have been largely ignored or sidelined by existing 
approaches. These problems will be discussed and a working hypothesis for 
describing acousmatic music will be advanced. In the following chapter, an 
approach to perception will be investigated which seems to provide a broad 
perceptual framework within which to situate the perception of acousmatic 
sounds in accordance with this working hypothesis. 
Although pedagogical concerns will be addressed in the first of these 
sub-sections, it should be stressed that the theory is not intended to be 
prescriptive. The aim here is not to constrain the methods used in composition 
or performance of acousmatic music, but to show that a descriptive theory of 
the kind offered in this thesis offers a basis for communication between the 
compositional community, the teaching community, music theorists, 
perceptual theorists, cultural theorists and listeners. 
Inevitably, any descriptive theory may affect compositional practice; 
methods of analysis can always be applied in reverse, so to speak, as methods 
of composition. Moreover, any attempt to offer an alternative description of 
musical practice may subtly alter that practice, regardless of whether 
practitioners are conscious of such changes. Merely describing acousmatic 
sounds or pieces in an alternative fashion may alter their usage. However, 
unlike Schaeffer's prescriptive theory (1966; also see Chion, 1983) which 
deliberately attempts to constrain and motivate particular compositional 
techniques according to a particular method of description, a purely 
descriptive theory will address different concerns. Rather than providing a 
blueprint for producing new pieces of music, such a theory must concern itself 
with how to produce better descriptions of existing music. Moreover, such 
descriptions, although they may lead to a critique of existing practice, will not 
provide any recommended method for translating such criticism into 
compositional activity. 
11 
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1.1.1 Pedagogy 
Ways of describing sounds for musical usage are important to the musician. If 
one is to practise or teach composition one must have a language for 
verbalising the techniques and resulting perceptual effects of electroacoustics. 
As Keane (1986) notes: 
"The most important tool for establishing an aesthetic of 
electroacoustic music is language. We must have words to 
express and explain what we do as much as we must engage in 
doing. " 
(Keane, 1986, p. 118) 
One can only communicate so much by example; eventually one wishes to 
explain why something is wrong, why this sound behaves as it does, and so 
on. Although Keane demands "language" in order to establish an aesthetic, his 
views strongly reflect upon the communication of musical practice between 
composers and between composer and student. This use of the term 
"language" is rather different from that of Schaeffer (1966), for whom a 
musical language is presupposed: musical structure is seen as being similar to 
linguistic structure and the concern is to define a "language of electroacoustic 
music" (see Emmerson, 1986). This concern with the structural similarities 
between music and natural language, and the belief that such similarities are a 
priori and self-evident, mirrors the linguistic approaches to traditional music 
taken for example by Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) and should be treated 
with scepticism (see Clarke, 1989). 
In this case, Keane (1986) argues that "language" is important as a 
descriptive tool in a communicational sense; a method of communicating 
musical practice. This is of considerable importance for the teaching of 
acousmätic music. Although teaching by example is often regarded as the 
most successful method of passing on a practical skill, some form of language 
is necessary for clarifying and justifying a particular compositional decision in 
a pedagogical setting. Here, the particular language in which such descriptions 
are expressed is not seen as critical, but the point to be noted is that some form 
12 
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of descriptive language is required, and that the basis upon which such 
descriptions are made is a primary concern. 
This thesis will attempt to base such descriptions upon the perception 
of acousmatic music. It has been argued that acousmatic music seems to 
demand an attention to listening that is unequalled in contemporary musical 
composition (e. g. Schaeffer, 1966; Delalande, 1986; Smalley, 1986). The 
conventional composer may draw upon traditions of orchestration, harmony 
and counterpoint and the like, which allow him or her to predict how a 
particular configuration of musical events will behave without having to listen 
to the aural result. Moreover, the use of an accepted notation allows the 
process of composition to become as much a literate as an aural practice. Such 
traditions enable composers to discuss their methods within an existing 
descriptive language which is both widely accepted and linked to a 
conventional notated form. Listening is obviously important to composers of 
all kinds of music, but may be supplemented by a pre-existing terminology 
and method of notation where these exist. Despite the efforts of Schaeffer 
(1966), whose painstaking solfPge of classificatory terms for electroacoustic 
sounds, and the theoretical writings of such as Smalley (1986; 1992) and 
Wishart (1985; 1986), both of whom offer descriptive discourses, the 
acousmatic composer cannot fall back upon a body of tradition in the same 
way as an instrumental or vocal composer. The potentially infinite aural 
results of analog and digital synthesis and manipulation of sound have no 
accepted predictive theory or notation. Although the resulting reliance upon 
the ear as the final arbiter of compositional decisions may be laudable as a 
corrective tendency for the overly literate methodology of a technique such as 
integral serialism (see Chion, 1983, p. 40) this reliance makes the 
communication of musical ideas very much a matter of illustration by 
example. This perhaps explains in part the tendency of electroacoustic 
composers to cluster around small, specialist research institutes and academic 
13 
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departments2 where musical ideas can be reliably transmitted through a 
largely oral (and aural) culture. Schaeffer's treatise (1966) is a notable 
exception to this model, though it remains part of such a compositional 
subculture: it is yet to be translated from French into any other language and 
its approach reflects the isolated philosophy of a particular institution's 
practical research- the Groupe de Recherches Musicales. Its polemical 
rejection of both notation and the more narrative aspects of sound offer a 
specialised and hence limited approach to describing, or more accurately, 
prescribing acousmatic music. 
By contrast, the proposal of this thesis is that the radically aural nature 
of acousmatic music may only be retained within a descriptive model that is 
based upon research in perception. If a level of auditory perception can be 
identified that provides a grounding for describing relevant attributes of 
electroacoustic sounds, both in isolation and combination, then the resulting 
descriptions might offer a relatively neutral method of discussing 
compositions and compositional practice quite unlike the highly personal 
discourses presently available (e. g. Schaeffer, 1966; Wishart, 1985; 1986; 
Smalley, 1986; 1992). Attention to perception affords us some knowledge of 
which attributes of sound may be perceived by the listener; and as an aural 
practice, acousmatic composition is as much about listening as it is about 
abstract technical manipulations of sound. Hence, by studying perception one 
might arrive at descriptions that correspond to what is heard by the composer, 
and hence, provide a method of describing why particular sounds lead to 
particular compositional decisions. Moreover, if such perceptually motivated 
descriptions are based upon general properties of human auditory perception 
2 One must note that the technological demands of electroacoustic composition also motivate 
such geographical clustering. The sheer expense of such technology often demands shared 
usage and state or charitable funding on a scale that severely limits the isolated composer's 
access to the required facilities. However, this is not a sufficient condition for such a notable 
reliance upon institutional support. Many composers can afford their own equipment, aided by 
the burgeoning usage of digital technology in popular music and the related availability and 
affordability of such usable (if not always ideal) technology. 
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they may avoid the tendency towards over-specialised and private languages 
of description that obscure and mystify practice rather than providing a broad 
basis for communication. 
1.1.2 Critique 
Just as finding appropriate perceptual descriptions of acousmatic music may 
inform pedagogical practice, such descriptions may foster critical practice. It 
is extremely difficult to form a critical discourse without first defining the 
objects of study. Likewise, the choice of descriptive methodology to a large 
extent defines the relevance of a critique. The objections introduced above, 
with regard to the problems of communicating about acousmatic music from 
within the framework provided by composers themselves, are equally 
pertinent here. There is a danger that a critique based upon the assumptions of 
practitioners will merely reflect the concerns of those practitioners and ignore 
the differences between compositional and listening praxes. A perceptual 
description which is grounded outside of compositional concerns, yet is 
applicable to such concerns in its generality of reference, in which the 
perceptions of both composers and listeners form different, yet 
commensurable domains, is vital here. Through such descriptions there comes 
the possibility of a critique of acousmatic music that transcends the limitations 
of descriptions generated by compositional inquiry. Just as broadly-grounded 
perceptual descriptions may benefit pedagogy, so they may also provide the 
basis for a critique which reflects more than the concerns of composers. 
Without such descriptions, aesthetic discourse remains bounded within the 
particular concerns of compositional praxis. 
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1.2 Notation and theory: analytical problems 
1.2.0 Analysis of acousmatic music 
Keane's concern with descriptive language (1986) reflects a central problem 
in the analysis of acousmatic music. Despite the adoption of some aspects of 
traditional musical practice within acousmatic music, such as serial or neo- 
tonal pitch orderings, conventional rhythmic structures and the imitation of 
instrumental timbres, the genre does not require that such traditional skills be 
applied. Acousmatic music has certain fundamental differences from other 
forms of music, differences that pose unusual analytical problems. These 
problems must be addressed if we are to describe acousmatic music in its own 
terms, rather than in terms of other musical traditions. 
The three major differences between acousmatic music and traditional 
western art music that will be addressed here are those of notation, theory and 
material. The first two of these have been touched upon above in relation to 
communication and critique and will be discussed in detail in sections 1.2.1 
and 1.2.2. The changes in materials employed by acousmatic composers will 
be discussed both with reference to notation and theory within these two 
sections, and in more philosophical terms in section 1.3. These differences can 
be shown to pose a considerable challenge to the music analyst. Moreover, the 
analytical discourse that this thesis will develop to cope with this challenge 
itself challenges conventional views of musical structure, musical meaning 
and aesthetics. Here, these challenges will be introduced and examined in 
relation to a number of existing approaches to analysis and notation. 
1.2.1 Notation and acousmatic music 
Notation serves two broad purposes in traditional western art music. It may 
prescribe the actions of performers, acting as a set of more or less strict 
constraints upon performance variables. In conjunction with the more general 
16 
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constraints provided by a performer's particular musical background and the 
stylistic or interpretative constraints of a particular tradition of performance 
practice, notation provides a medium through which a composer may attempt 
to determine what is to be played, when, and in what manner. As such, a score 
in staff notation, for example, is a message, with a sender (the composer) and 
an addressee (the performer(s)). Within this communicational, or pragmatic 
interpretation (see Eco, 1979, p. 53) one is encouraged to view the score as a 
coded message which represents the intentions of the composer in a clear and 
unambiguous fashion whilst avoiding speculative interpretations of 
documentary evidence. The score represents a set of instructions that can be 
correctly or incorrectly interpreted by the performer, and can be said to 
describe those aspects of the music that the composer requires from the 
performers. 
However, scores are regarded as descriptive in a much stronger sense 
than this. It is possible to analyse a musical score as if it were a representation 
of the piece itself. Staff notation provides the music analyst with a ready 
made, visual parsing of what one might hear when the piece is performed. 
Pitch is represented in discrete semitone steps, temporal structure in terms of a 
strictly multiplicative hierarchy of pulses; and articulation marks, 
orchestration instructions and miscellaneous directions combine to provide the 
analyst with a clear description of the piece. Moreover, notation provides a 
means for describing the results of analysis itself; Schenkerian analysis 
manages to describe analytical results in an extended version of the notation 
used in a score; a description of a description. Of course, as Nattiez stresses 
(1990), the score is but one source of information about a piece of music; 
acoustic analysis, psychological data, historical documents, the discourse of 
performers, listeners and composers all provide the analyst with different 
descriptions of the piece. However, the tendency to, I view the score Ias a 
privileged and , verifiable objective source of information about the 'piece 
17 
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remains. There seems to be a strong and implicit link between the prescriptive 
and descriptive roles of the score in musicology and music analysis. For 
example, Nattiez' tripartition of musical discourse (Nattiez, 1990) regards the 
score not only as a document of poietic relevance, but as a representation that 
in some sense provides the data for a neutral level of discourse3. The score, 
due to its prescriptive intention, provides a trace of pertinent musical 
structures; for example we are asked to assume that because the division of 
pitch into discrete steps is necessary from a prescriptive standpoint it must be 
relevant to a neutral pitch analysis. The score is seen to carry the trace of a 
particular culture's musical concerns (Nattiez, 1990). Hence, we may perform 
a structural analysis on the score and claim some form of neutrality, however 
specious this may be. 
One begins to suspect that the seemingly post-structuralist concern 
with obliterating the concept of "communication" between sender and 
addressee is but a ruse. Assuming the neutrality of the score simply restates 
the role of score as "message" in different terminology. The reliance upon the 
score in Nattiez' writings and analyses (e. g. Nattiez, 1982; 1990) even 
strengthens this reification by proposing that the score is a message that can be 
positivistically decoded to form a neutral structural description, a niveau 
neutre. Eco's treatise on the theory of codes (Eco, 1979, pp. 48-150) helps to 
disentangle this obfuscation: within his perspective the score would be a set of 
expression units which are produced and interpreted according to culturally 
convened systems of syntax and semantics (see also Saussure, 1983, for a 
similar formulation in terms of signifier and signified). These systems of 
agreement (syntactic and semantic) endow a code with its function allowing 
expression units to become units of content; without such systems a code 
3 The terms poietic, neutral and esthesic are here and elsewhere used in the sense proposed by 
Nattiez (1990): loosely speaking, poiesis refers to the production of the piece, esthesis to its ' 
reception. The neutral level of a piece is that which may be analysed independently from the 
concerns of production or reception: Nattiez argues that the score provides such a neutral 
object for prescriptively notated art music. 
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could not operate at all. Moreover, they entail a degree of freedom. When a 
performer interprets a score he or she does not simply decode that score 
according to a fixed set of rules; otherwise all performances of a given score 
would be identical. Instead the performer interprets the score, often producing 
unforeseen results. 
In a rather different way, the study of performance expression in music 
psychology denies the reification of the score as a complete descriptive 
document in its insistence that the performance does not reproduce the 
indications in the score and that these differences are not merely due to 
inaccuracy but are strongly related to the structure of the music (see e. g. 
Clarke, 1988). To reify the score as the only basis for a neutral analysis is just 
as much a perversion of a poietic factor as the reification of a single 
performer's interpretation would be. The score is too underspecified a 
document, the single performance too overspecified. 
Such an entanglement of the descriptive and prescriptive roles of the 
score in music analysis leads to even more confusion when acousmatic music 
is approached. The study of acousmatic music shows the absurdity of the 
explicit or implicit reification of notation in western music theory. The links 
between description and prescription, tenuous enough for staff-notated music, 
disintegrate here. Strangely, this disintegration seems to have been ignored by 
most theorists dealing with acousmatic music, as will be shown in a series of 
examples. Moreover, such a disintegration will be shown to highlight both the 
reification of the score as an analytical object and to demand alternative 
analytical techniques that may be relevant not only to acousmatic music but 
also to other music, whether notated or not. First, however, this disintegration 
should be examined in depth. 
As already noted above (see section 1.1.1, above) acousmatic music 
has often been regarded as an aural practice. Delalande (1986, p. 158) notes 
that such non-literate practices "sont realisees pour 1'ecoute et par l'ecoute". 
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Notation does have a variety of roles within acousmatic music, but due to the 
reduced or absent prescriptive score within the tradition, a rather different 
relationship between prescriptive and descriptive scores is made plain. 
Although scores for acousmatic pieces exist in a variety of forms there is no 
form of notation, either prescriptive or descriptive, that approaches the 
ubiquity and acceptance of staff notation. In order to explain why this should 
be so it is necessary to examine the various kinds of prescriptive and 
descriptive scores that have been employed within the genre. 
Unlike traditional instrumental or vocal music the electroacoustic 
composer is most often required to provide instructions for a machine rather 
than a human interpreter. Even outside the practice of computer music it is 
possible to regard an analog or digital recording as a form of code, to be 
decoded by a tape machine. Although such `scores' may contain an element of 
indeterminacy this kind of `score' is quite different from the culturally 
convened and underspecified code that a human performer is required to 
interpret. As discussed above, a human performer interprets a score, adding 
timbral, temporal and pitch inflections that reflect a cultural system of 
agreements between the expression units of a score and their content as 
determinants of a performance. The digital or analog code read by a computer 
or tape machine does not allow for this arbitrary relationship between 
expression and content; the relationship between code and performance is 
fixed according to a specific and inflexible standard. Moreover, such a code is 
not usually transparent to a human observer, designed, as it is, to be read by a 
machine. Such prescriptive scores are hence to be distinguished from staff 
notation in two major ways: they do not allow for a high degree of 
interpretation, and they are not designed to be read by humans. Obviously 
some programming languages (such as LISP) are more readable by humans, 
but in general such languages are primarily an interface between human and 
machine, not between human and human. - In the case of digital and analog 
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representations of sound, the gap between these and staff notated scores is 
huge; they bear the same resemblance to the music that the grooves of a 
gramophone record do to the sound produced by a needle in the groove. 
Other, more familiar prescriptive forms of notation are utilised in the 
electroacoustic field. Diffusion scores, which act as an aide memoire for the 
sound projectionist, and scores which attempt to synchronise traditional 
instrumental and vocal performance with a computer-generated or recorded 
piece, are much closer to the role played by staff notation. Such scores are 
intended for human interpretation and hence must represent aspects of the 
music that are perceptually and pragmatically relevant. However, no accepted 
cultural conventions exist to delimit such scores, except in the case of 
synchronisation scores which utilise aspects of staff notation. Even here, such 
staff notation is generally used to specify the conventionally notated vocal or 
instrumental part or aspects of the acousmatic part that can be notated in such 
a way. Much of the music is notated in an ad hoc visual representation that 
follows the general pitch outline on the x-axis and time on the y-axis. 
Hence, the perceived relationship between description and prescription 
afforded by staff notation does not apply here. Those aspects of 
electroacoustic music that are notated are either notated in such a way that 
human interpretation is not a necessary end, and even where human 
interpretation is intended there is no standard form of representation. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the acousmatic piece, which exists 
as a single master tape to be performed without traditional instruments, does 
not require a prescriptive score for its realisation. Such a score may be used 
by a sound projectionist, but this score does not have the same cultural status 
as that of a staff-notated piece. Diffusing a tape-piece without such a score is 
not the same as performing a piano piece from memory. Diffusion scores tend 
to be highly personal, and do not require a cultural code which would allow 
the score to be read by another sound-projectionist. They perform the same 
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function that a performer's annotations of a staff-notated score might; they 
guide those aspects of a performance that are relatively flexible, rather than 
define those that are immutable. Hence, the prescriptive scores that exist for 
electroacoustic pieces do not offer any general method for describing 
acousmatic music. They cannot perform the same role in music analysis that a 
traditional score performs. Within the traditional music-analytical model the 
analyst's use of a prescriptive score as a description of the piece is regarded as 
validated by the traditional and agreed relationship between score and 
performance, whether or not one wishes to question the validity of this 
relationship. 
Such a breakdown between prescription and description might suggest 
the need to develop one of a number of possible models of descriptive 
notation for acousmatic music. The absence of a strong prescriptive- 
descriptive link forces such models to devise novel visual representations 
which attempt to capture relevant aspects of pieces. The only criteria by which 
such relevance can be judged is whether the notation describes the music 
`well': efficient prescription is no longer an issue. Three examples will be 
offered of such descriptive scores which will show a cross section of possible 
approaches and highlight their individual limitations and the overall 
difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory descriptive notation. Each example 
seems to attempt to provide a surrogate for the descriptive validity offered by 
staff notation. As such each chooses a different replacement for the 
prescriptive validation offered by staff notation. 
The first example comes from Cogan's New Images of Musical Sound 
(1984) which presents analyses based upon "spectrum photos" or sonograms. 
Sonograms represent the distribution of spectral energy from an acoustic 
source across frequency and time as a two dimensional visual plot. On these 
plots the horizontal axis represents elapsed time (from left to right), while the 
vertical axis represents frequency (from low to high). Energy (amplitude) is 
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represented by the brightness of the trace (or alternatively the colour). Such 
descriptions resemble staff-notation in their assignment of parameters to axes, 
but this should not conceal the entirely different nature of the information 
displayed. 
Cogan bases a discussion of Fall by Risset (music example 1.1) upon 
a sonogram of the piece (see figure 1.1; Cogan, 1984, pp. 108-112). He claims 
that: 
"Prior to the development of spectrum photos, it was very 
difficult to describe, and understand the kinds of spatial, 
temporal, and sonic 
- 
in a word structural 
- 
relationships and 
transformations that are now apparent in "Fall. " Photo 16 [Cogan's sonogram] sheds light on all these elements- 
revealing, for example, the growing deceleration and "spacing 
out" of the sonic features in time. This deceleration is so 
gradual and independent of previous conventions of notated 
musical rhythm that it has hardly been noticeable. " 
(Cogan, 1984, p. 111) 
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Figure 1.1 Cogan's spectrum photo of "Fall" (Cogan, 1984, p. 109 
It is significant that Cogan stresses the differences between this and traditional 
notation and that he claims that this affords a better description of the piece's 
musical structure. This belief reflects both the visual and poietic obsessions 
that can be traced to a view that the score offers an objective document by 
which the validity of analytical claims may be judged. Here, it is important to 
note that although the 'sonogram displays a spectral description, rather than 
one based upon a traditional conception of pitch, it corresponds in many other 
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ways to a surrogate prescriptive score. Just as staff notation is dominated by 
the need to express pitch and time within a particular framework, the 
sonogram expresses the kind of information that the composer desires to 
transmit to his `player' (in this case an IBM computer). Obviously the 
sonogram is not the form in which this information is given to the computer. 
However, the spectral description focuses upon those aspects of the sounds 
regarded as important by the composer and the program. The particular aural 
effect achieved in this piece, that of an `infinite' fall, is specified by a 
particular spectral configuration (Risset, 1969) which is described very clearly 
by the sonogram. Moreover, the sonogram describes the kind of instructions 
required by an additive synthesis algorithm (such as the one used by Risset); 
frequency components, amplitude and time. Hence, the sonogram describes 
two things: how the aural effect was achieved by the composer and the 
spectral structure of the piece. In fact the score is even more like a prescriptive 
score in this way: it gives us information that would allow us to resynthesize a 
similar effect. Although sonograms provide descriptions of an acousmatic 
sound they do so in a way not dissimilar from staff notation. They assume that 
the functional analysis of sound is more important than its perceptual 
dimensions4; structure is seen as a description of how something is made, not 
as something that is perceived. The sonogram itself tells us nothing about why 
the spectral description offered produces a particular perceptual result; the 
"barber-pole" (Cogan, 1984, p. 108) visual description would not to a naive 
observer suggest a continuous fall. The sonogram reifies spectral information, 
tempting us to believe that the important information in the piece is somehow 
hidden from the ear. In terms of a functional or poietic analysis this is 
4 The distinction between "functional" and "perceptual" forms of analysis is derived from the 
work of Delalande (1986). A functional analysis is directed towards those aspects of a piece 
that are to do with its composition, whilst a perceptual analysis is directed towards those 
aspects that are relevant to the listener. These categories roughly correspond to the poietic and 
esthesic levels of Nattiez' tripartition of music-analytical discourse (Nattiez, 1990) but do not 
assume a neutral level of discourse. Delalande's views on the interactions of these two forms 
of analysis are referred to on p. 33, this thesis. 
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justified, but it tells us nothing about perception; it assumes that the perceptual 
phenomenon (a continuous fall) is a priori factual and that all that remains is 
to analyse this `fall' in a functional fashion; to ask `how was it made? '. Such 
an analysis reduces the piece to its construction and is in some ways self- 
defeating. Risset himself has explained how this effect is achieved; the visual 
representation merely reinforces the view that the structure is `given' by the 
composer and that the role of the analyst is to discover or display such 
structures. The work of the analyst is reduced to validation: he or she validates 
the actions of the composer by displaying features that can be assessed in 
traditional terms. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a sonogram of this kind 
will lead to an accurate description of this poietic level, since spectral 
information is not always important to the composer. Sonograms 
simultaneously masquerade as both poietic and neutral analyses. They purport 
to be neutral in that they are based upon a mechanical acoustic analysis, yet 
they also provide a specious surrogate for the prescriptive score- a trace of 
the composer's actions or intentions. Risset's actions as a composer are 
represented, but in such a way as to suggest that these actions represent the 
`structure' of the piece. 
It is no accident that Cogan implicitly compares Risset's achievement 
in this movement to that of Mozart's Confutatis Maledictis from the Requiem; 
the whole project described by the book seems to be to identify and accentuate 
the way in which visual representations of music can be found that allow such 
comparisons to be drawn between literate and non-literate practices. The 
sonogram should not be seen as any general solution to problems in the 
analysis or description of acousmatic music. It serves a particular end, but in 
doing so obscures the very differences achieved by electroacoustic techniques 
that make notation so difficult to achieve: the avoidance of conventional 
rhythmic, timbral and harmonic techniques. The important point to note here 
is that the listener and the ear are regarded with suspicion, and must be 
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validated by acoustic and documentary evidence. The fall is regarded not as a 
perceptual reality, but an illusion, the analysis not as an exploration of what 
we hear and what it means but of what can be seen and what that means. The 
object of analysis becomes not the piece but a surrogate score; the sonogram. 
This leads to the same functional and visual reifications implied, perhaps more 
justifiably, by the traditional prescriptive score. 
The second example of a descriptive notation shares many features 
with a sonogram, yet more explicitly draws upon a poietic body of evidence. 
Ligeti'sArtikulation (music example 1.2) is unusual in that it is available as a 
recording accompanied by a supposedly "aural" score (Ligeti/Wehinger, 
1970; an extract is shown in figure 1.2). However, it does so in such a way as 
to present listening as an adjunct to direct knowledge of the composer's 
working methods and intentions. As such it fixes the piece in a way that a 
sonogram cannot; its reification is far more unyielding. The object of analysis 
is not the aural character of the piece. On the contrary, it is a poietic analysis 
masquerading as an esthesic analysis; function masquerading as perception. 
Again, it is enlightening to discuss the claims made for such a score. In 
the preface, Erhard Karkoschka suggests that: 
"The first aim of the aural score... is to present the listener with 
basic information that will greatly simplify his further 
examination of the music and, it is hoped, will spur him on to 
doing so. " 
(Ligeti/Wehinger, 1970, pp. 5-6) 
In Karkoschka's view an aural score such as Wehinger's should be seen as a 
way of guiding the listener with visual information which does not impose a 
traditional notational grid upon the music; instead the music is notated in a 
fashion that is both an analysis and a "sketch for listening", one that allows 
"no reference to visual fancies" and refers "strictly to the music that already 
exists" (Karkoschka: in Ligeti/Wehinger, 1970, p. 5). 
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Figure 1.2 Page 1 of Wehinger's score of Artikulation (L igeti/Wehinger, 1970, p. 46) 
Is this then to be a score based upon aural perception of a piece, an aural 
description, or a certain analysis, with its own hidden agendas and placing of 
constraints upon the listener, an aural prescription? In fact Wehinger's score is 
a complex mixture of both; it purports to be both an analysis and a score. As 
such it radically conflates perceptual description with a functional and poietic 
analysis. Although Wehinger claims that "technical working instructions" or a 
"realization score" are quite different propositions to an "aural score" or 
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description and quite correctly notes the absence of performance scores as 
such (Ligeti/Wehinger, 1970), the aural score presented fails to maintain any 
clear boundaries between "realization score" and "aural score". 
Wehinger explicitly divides his analysis into four sections entitled 
"Artikulation" (a description of Ligeti's working methods; reproduction of 
sketches, Ligeti's own view of the piece) "The aural score" (the method of 
arriving at the score), "Using the aural score" and "The recording" (an 
annotated set of examples and the complete work). The aural score itself is 
prefaced by a diagram of a frequency analysis used in the score's construction. 
On the surface, it seems as if Wehinger's score is derived in a manner similar 
to that of Cogan's "spectrum photos" (see above). A frequency analysis is 
performed that forms the basis of a visual representation. Undoubtedly, the 
visual score is more informative and less misleading, due to Wehinger's 
combination of such an acoustic analysis with a purely aural approach and the 
visual differentiation of component sounds in the analysis. However, the aural 
score by itself, and in combination with the other sections, provides a 
functional reification far in excess of that achieved by Cogan in his analysis of 
Fall (see above). 
This reification occurs in the following way. First, Wehinger chooses 
to differentiate between sounds in the piece on the basis of acoustic 
descriptions; he divides the piece into noise, harmonic and subharmonic 
spectra, and unfiltered and filtered impulses. These categories are further 
subdivided into filter characteristics or pitchedness (for noise), proportion of 
noise (harmonic and subharmonic spectra) and pitch (for filtered impulses). 
These categories and sub-categories of sound are expressed in the score with 
the horizontal axis representing time and the vertical pitch; loudness is 
represented by the size of each symbol (or the broadness of the teeth of the 
comb representing a spectrum). Without entering into a precise summary of 
Wehinger's symbolic system it is clear that an acoustic description has been 
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modified according to a set of pragmatic considerations aimed at clearly and 
unambiguously representing the following parameters: pitch, time, 
harmonicity, loudness, stereo positioning, and envelope. Moreover, whereas a 
sonogram makes no concessions to the parsing of sounds into discrete units 
that may or may not be distinguishable on the basis of a purely spectral 
description, Wehinger's score, by virtue of its aural validation of acoustic 
parameters divides the piece up into aural units that could be said to represent 
auditory streams, the perceptual units available to a listener (see McAdams 
and Bregman, 1979). However, these choices of unit are based upon the 
assumption that the chosen parameters are those that are to be valued in the 
music. Moreover, the parameters chosen correspond well to the means of 
production employed by the composer: oscillators, filters, noise and impulse 
generators, along with spectral, pitch, amplitude and time information. Hence, 
the result is an interpretation of the sound according to a spectral description, 
expressed in a pseudo-conventional manner, categorised according to the 
actual source, all validated by a flexible admixture of documentary and aural 
evidence. Instead of an aural score, we are presented with a score that 
combines a number of different evidential sources dominated by the 
assumption that the causes of the sounds, as related by the composer and 
validated by spectral analysis, are the kinds of information needed to 
transform a spectral description into a visual guide for the listener. As such, 
the choice of analytical units and the bases upon which sounds are distributed 
between these units conflates a number of issues in a seemingly illuminating 
and pragmatic fashion. This conflation leads us to approach the score as if it is 
an "accurate" and relatively complete description of the piece. However, this 
accuracy and completeness is misleading: by conflating perceptual, acoustic 
and poietic measures of pertinence Wehinger presents us with a description 
that appeals on all fronts but satisfies none. One is led into the temptation to 
accept the score as a document of similar status to that of the prescriptive, 
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staff-notated score, which itself conflates perceptual, poietic and `acoustic' 
descriptions5. This kind of temptation has led Nattiez (1990, pp. 80-81) to 
misinterpret the value of Wehinger's score as an analytical document; by 
analysing such an analysis does one arrive at a neutral analysis comparable 
with that based upon a prescriptive score? This question will be addressed 
below in section 1.2.2. 
The next problem with Wehinger's score is its sheer aesthetic appeal. 
It is undoubtedly one of the most often reproduced documents from the 
electroacoustic domain due to this visual appeal. This can only intensify the 
piece's reification in the score. The piece becomes inseparable from the score; 
we are prevented from analysing the piece as an aural phenomenon. This is all 
the more damaging when the visual reification is itself based upon such a 
conflation of analytical evidence. The score is appealing and seemingly 
veridical, and as such it prevents the listener from exploring the piece in 
pseudo-neutral fashion. Rather than providing a useful guide for the listener 
the score becomes a surrogate notational verification of the aural character of 
the music. Just as the staff-notated score can be used to verify the existence of 
a heard structure, it is tempting to view Wehinger's score as being more `real' 
or `objective' than the piece itself. However, the aural score does not generate 
multiple performances in the same way as a staff-notated score; it does not 
precede performance. The desire to fix the acousmatic work, an aural artefact, 
by creating a score as a guide for the listener reaches its apotheosis here, and 
Wehinger's score merely expresses the implicit mistrust of aural data in 
western `serious' music culture and its reliance upon literate verification and 
prescription. 
5 Although staff-notation does not entail an acoustic analysis per se the distinction between 
perceptual and acoustic descriptions is still valuable here; the score notates pitch and time 
segmentations that may not be perceived by a listener. A classic example of this is the score to 
Ligeti's Atmospheres where the score prescribes (and describes) a set of complex rhythmic 
and frequency instructions which are not directly perceived by the listener. . 
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One final limitation of Wehinger's score should be noted. If a general 
notation for acousmatic works is to be developed, this score provides no 
model which could be generalised to other pieces. Its concentration upon 
poietic and acoustic analysis becomes fixed within the notational devices 
used. The division of sounds into "noise", "spectra" and "impulses" of various 
kinds may be appropriate here, but would hardly be appropriate for a piece in 
which source identification or a narrative structure seemed more important. 
Thus Wehinger's score offers no solution to the more general problems of 
notating acousmatic music. Rather, it provides an analysis of a particular 
piece, stressing those features deemed relevant by the analyst. 
The last example of an acousmatic `score' presents a radical attempt to 
solve notational problems. It results, however, in a similar functional, or 
poietic reification to that achieved by Cogan and Wehinger (see above). 
Trevor Wishart has often stressed the role of electroacoustic music in breaking 
down the literate domination of aural experience: the tendency to notate, 
prescribe and to divide musical continua into a notatable lattice of discrete 
values (Wishart, 1978; 1985). Rather than refer to his own documentation of 
Red Bird as a score, Wishart proposes that it is "a document" (Wishart, 1978). 
It is worthwhile to quote at length from his introduction to this "document": 
"RED BIRD aims, among other things, to use the dynamic- 
relational structuring of music (and speech) AS AURAL 
EXPERIENCE, to comment upon the linear-analytic-causal 
mode of thought and its consequences. 
This verbal document is therefore only a commentary 
on what is an essentially and irreducibly musical experience. 
No explanation, either in terms of `what the symbols mean' or 
`how the sounds are put together' in a one to one 
correspondence with the sequence of sounds in the piece, will 
be offered. 
In particular the notion that to understand how the 
sounds are put together constitutes understanding the music is a 
fallacy propagated through the visually-distanced logic of some 
avant-garde music. 
It is important to emphasise the distinction between the 
musical process, and the process of composition. The visually- 
based constructivist aesthetic equates the perception through 
sound of the organisation of notes on paper with experiencing 
the musical process. In most music, in fact, the process of 
composition (as opposed to the ordering principle which seems 
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to underlie the resulting organisation of notes on paper, or 
sounds on tape) is hidden from view, while the musical process 
is something which arises from the organisation of sounds (via 
notes on paper in the case of scored music). 
The second half of this document will deal with the 
process of composition itself, for those who may be interested 
from a practical point of view. For those, however, who merely 
wish to avoid dealing with the material at face-value, this 
document will not reveal what the music "really is". 
Finally, this is not a complete visual re-representation 
of RED BIRD because there could be no such thing. A piece of 
music moves and operates as a dynamic aural experience. This 
document only indicates certain routes towards an appreciation 
of that experience. 
Music is not translatable. " (Wishart, 1978, p. 1) 
On the surface then, Wishart seems to intend a listener's and practitioner's 
guide similar to that of Wehinger (see above), but avoiding the latter's 
reification of notation. However, the result of Wishart's document is much the 
same as that of Wehinger's, perhaps more explicitly poietic, but nevertheless a 
functional reification. The composer's philosophy, structural analysis and 
working methods do become more than a commentary. Simply avoiding the 
form of standard notation, a note-for-note prescription or description, does not 
make Wishart's document any less a reification of certain aspects of the piece. 
In fact the precise narrative and methodological analyses provided by the 
composer cannot be read as anything but an example of "visually-distanced" 
(Wishart, 1978) logic. Through damning all "one-to-one" notation, Wishart 
attacks any effort to describe Red Bird in detail; since translation is forbidden, 
only a paraphrase, or a description of method becomes appropriate. Wishart 
aligns himself with those who regard acousmatic music as radically aural and 
quite rightly points out the lack of a prescriptive score upon which to base 
description. However, he goes further than this: literate musical culture itself 
is taken to task. It is seen as representing a false image of both compositional 
thought and aural experience. Hence, all notation is to be mistrusted. 
Unfortunately, in Wishart's hands this philosophical position leads to a 
ludicrous situation: rejecting the reification implicit in notation Wishart 
simultaneously presents us with a detailed 'set of poietic analyses which 
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present an equally dubious reification. Without dwelling upon Wishart's score 
the most important point to note is that like Cogan and Wehinger (see above), 
it presents an analysis concerned with composition masquerading as 
perception. Moreover, although it chooses to stress certain unusual features of 
the piece, such as its narrative structure and ideology, it does so only in 
relation to the concerns of the composer. 
These three solutions take as their model the traditional model of 
notation as an explicitly prescriptive code which implicitly describes the 
music. Their solutions to the absence of a prescriptive notation upon which to 
base description note the inappropriateness of traditional, and paradoxically 
prescriptive, notational devices but retain them as a trace. Cogan's spectrum 
photos (Cogan, 1984) replace the discrete division of pitch and notate the 
spectral composition of sounds over time, yet retain the trace of the staff in 
their pitch-time axes, and retain the trace of the score's role as the arbiter of 
structural analyses. Equally, Cogan manages to present us with a view of 
structure that implicitly reifies poiesis in its concentration upon spectral 
analysis. Wehinger's "aural score" (Wehinger/Ligeti, 1970) again retains the 
trace of the staff, and despite its perceptual veracity simultaneously 
emphasises the trace of the composer's actions in its classification of sound 
material in a fashion that recalls the use of the score as a document which 
represents the `message' of the composer. Finally, Wishart's "document" 
(Wishart, 1978), in reacting against the domination of aural experience by 
notation, again preserves the trace of the traditional score. The composer's 
interpretation of structural and methodological matters is presented in 
documentary form; the artist's `message', normally to be found in a 
prescriptive score as an implicit feature, is given a surrogate and explicit 
existence in the `document'. 
These efforts at providing a notation for acousmatic pieces are 
hindered by their retention of a traditional view of notation. They preserve the 
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notion that a score provides a link with the actions of the composer. Hence, 
despite the documentary value of such scores as information that may allow 
the listener or analyst access to poiesis, they provide descriptions that conflate 
esthesis with poiesis, denying the very aurality claimed for acousmatic music. 
What is needed is a description of acousmatic music that reflects this aurality 
by redressing the balance between identifying those structures that may be 
heard and interpreted without knowledge of the composer's actions and those 
that require or reflect poietic evidence. Moreover, why should a score of a 
piece conceived "pour 1'ecoute et par 1'ecoute" (Delalande, 1986) be 
necessary? Such a score can have a pragmatic value in the practice of sound 
diffusion, but seems quite inappropriate as a description of an aural practice. 
Surely an aural tradition demands a descriptive language that is commensurate 
with what may be heard, rather than what is revealed by spectral analysis or 
the composer's documentation. The three examples describe the music as if 
understanding how something is made can fully explain our experience of that 
event. This is both reductionist and positivist: notation here serves to reduce 
experience to what can be visually displayed and to the specious intentions of 
an absent composer, and to identify description with the verification of 
experience through comparison with a fixed `object'- the score. 
However, one should not reject notation merely because notational 
models tend to reproduce the traditional model of notation. Description of 
music, its translation into verbal, symbolic, textual or other media is not 
doomed to failure, as implied by Wishart's claim that "Music is not 
translatable" (Wishart, 1978, p. 1). Such a view inevitably leads to a musical 
solipsism that is of no benefit to developing a greater understanding of 
musical culture. How else but by such translations can one begin to make 
sense of any phenomenon? As Rorty claims (Rorty, 1980) the difficulty of 
translation between different types of discourse should not be ,a cause for 
despair. Rather, such difficulty is the basis for all interpretation; an attempt 
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must be made to translate between discourses if we are not to consign 
ourselves to the radical fragmentation of specialised languages. In this case the 
danger is an ever-present one: the supposed `incomprehensibility' of much 
contemporary musical practice cannot be tackled by remaining within the 
discourse of the specialist composer. This does not mean that the views of 
composers should not be heeded. Rather, it is important that an attempt is 
made to reconcile the aural experiences of the listener with the techniques 
used to create pieces. If this is to occur, the kinds of description presented in 
this section must be complemented by descriptions based upon aural 
perception6. This argument resembles that of Delalande (1986), who stresses 
the fact that it is not enough to concentrate upon "functional" analyses 
(analyses fonctionelles), those that analyse how things are made: "perceptual 
analyses" (analyses perceptives) must be developed to arrive at any notion of 
how compositional practice relates to aural experience. 
1.2.2 Theory and acousmatic music 
This leads neatly onto questions of music theory. In order to analyse a piece of 
music, analysts must decide what `object' they wish to analyse. More 
specifically, they must decide how they wish to divide this `object' up into 
units. This latter decision applies equally to all analyses, whether they propose 
that such units combine to form an organic whole, or whether they propose 
that no such higher order structural interpretation is appropriate, or whether 
some combination of these ideologies is fitting. Notation, in its reified form, 
forms one source for such an object and its division. Nattiez has claimed 
(Nattiez, 1990 and see this chapter, p. 16) that the score is a source from 
which essentially "neutral" analyses may be performed, and that the discrete 
units provided by notation may take on an essentially neutral status by virtue 
of their cultural contingency. For an aural tradition such as acousmatic music, 
6 See, however, section 1.2.3. Aural perception is not the only kind of perception that may be 
relevant to the description of acousmatic music. 
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unless a score exists, such an approach may not be taken. Moreover, as argued 
above, existing acousmatic scores contain too many hidden agendas to be 
regarded as in any way `neutral', despite Nattiez' claims to the contrary 
(Nattiez, 1990, pp. 81-82). Hence, for acousmatic music, theoretical 
constructs, especially those based upon some view of auditory perception, are 
often seen as providing a basis for determining what the analytical object is 
and how it should be analysed, reflecting the aural ideology of much 
acousmatic practice. In order to show that, as with notation, many such 
theoretical constructs contain the implicit and arguably inappropriate 
application of traditional assumptions, a number of examples will be 
discussed. It will be seen that even where radical or non-traditional theories 
are developed, these fail to meet the challenges inherent in acousmatic music 
to the full. 
The examples fall into two groups. The first is represented by the 
theoretical writings of Pierre Schaeffer, as presented in his Traite des objets 
musicaux (Schaeffer, 1966). Schaeffer's ideas will be used to demonstrate the 
distance between proposing theoretical constructs as the basis for description 
and prescription. Although strongly reflecting the non-literate concerns of an 
aural compositional culture, Schaeffer's program will be read here as an effort 
to prescribe musical discourse, rather than as the basis for the kinds of 
perceptual descriptions that might benefit less "functional" analytical 
endeavours (see Delalande, 1986; also the last paragraph, section 1.2.1). The 
second group of writings similarly stresses perception as the basis for building 
descriptions of electroacoustic music. This approach may be generically 
described as timbral and is exemplified by the development of Schoenberg's 
concept of "Klangfarbenmelodie" (Schoenberg, 1973, p. 421) into a 
controllable and perceptually relevant musical parameter. As with the work of 
Schaeffer (1966), this branch of electroacoustic research will be shown to 
reflect a number of implicitly functional and prescriptive concerns which limit 
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its relevance to developing a truly descriptive method for performing 
perceptual analyses. Surprisingly, despite the surface differences between 
these two approaches to perceptual research, both will be shown (in their 
rather different ways) to share a concern not only with "functional analysis" 
(Delalande, 1986), but also to share other features- most markedly a 
concentration upon musical structure as a self-referential construct, and a 
reductionist view of listening. 
Within the field of electroacoustic music, the two terms objet sonore 
and ecoute reduite (Schaeffer, 1966) have had a particular importance in 
delineating an aural approach to compositional theory. However their original 
place within a larger and highly prescriptive endeavour to propose a recherche 
musicale (Schaeffer, 1966) limit their usefulness as analytical concepts. Their 
original use points towards the development of new compositional listening 
strategies and commensurately radical structures based upon these, rather than 
any attempt to propose a method for describing how these structures will be 
perceived by an ordinary listener. Schaeffer himself stresses the various kinds 
of aural experiences available to listeners in his etymological and structuralist 
notion of les quatres ecoutes (Schaeffer, 1966, pp. 103-128). He distinguishes 
between the indexical mode of listening, concerned with the identification of 
the sources of sounds, the events that are responsible for the emission of sound 
(ecouter), and listening as a symbolic mode, to do with sounds as signs, the 
relationship of sounds as signifiers to signifieds that are extra-sonores 
(comprendre). Similarly, he identifies two other modes of listening which do 
not refer beyond a sound itself; Ouir, the naive reception of a sound's 
occurrence, and entendre, the attention to certain qualities of a sound itself, 
without reference to its source or significance. 
Schaeffer, however proposes a program of musical research which 
aims to develop the everyday (banale), active, yet non-referential listening of 
entendre into a specialised (praticienne), semiotic system, equivalent to pre- 
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existing musical and linguistic systems in its relational and abstract nature, yet 
wholly different in its basis in the development of "natural" listening 
(Schaeffer, 1966, especially pp. 360-385). Unlike ecoute traditionelle, the 
traditional musical model, where a "repertoire of timbres" (ecouter) and a 
system of musical values (comprendre) lead to the types of listening 
appropriate to a traditional sound-world, la recherche musicale is to be based 
upon the development of a system of musical values and structures based 
upon a return to the sound itself, mostly through the type of listening 
Schaeffer identifies as entendre. For this reversal of musical practice 
Schaeffer proposes a radical and specialised form of listening: l'ecoute 
reduite, or reduced listening (Schaeffer, 1966, pp. 261-279,349-359) in order 
that familiar sources and semiotic systems should not play any part in this 
research. This reduction is based upon the philosophical notion of 
"bracketing" derived from Husserl. The objet sonore as an in-itself is to be 
discovered by placing signification and causes in brackets, so to speak. In 
this sense, Schaeffer's approach proposes that acousmatic music should be 
structured according to an intrinsic model of musical discourse. The basis of 
his research is that a musical language may be constructed which is 
independent from sounds' extrinsic properties. His solfege is not just based 
upon the rejection of sounds' relationships with musical systems, but on a 
deeper rejection of their relationship with the world. It is in this sense that 
Schaeffer recapitulates the intrinsic biases of music theory (see section 1.3). 
There are a number of reasons why this model for musical research 
cannot provide a satisfactory basis for delineating the kinds of objects and 
structures of interest to the music analyst7. Schaeffer's model is intentionally 
7 This is not to suggest that Schaeffer's ideas per se have no relevance to the analyst. His 
discussions of the relationship of listening to culture and nature, his perspicacious accounts of 
the problems inherent within traditional views of listening and musical discourse (Schaeffer, 
1966) have been instrumental in defining the challenges posed by the acousmatic and have 
been instrumental in shaping this thesis. However, this should not allow one to ignore the 
dangers of confusing the descriptive parts of his treatise with those that are prescriptive. 
Similarly, one should not accept the mistrust of extrinsic reference in his account of musical 
activity without question (see section 1.3). 
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prescriptive and must lead to functional rather than perceptual analyses. Why 
is this so? Surely la recherche musicale provides the analyst with a ready- 
made, aural method for identifying pertinent units and for identifying their 
structural relationships within a piece of music? On the contrary, this would be 
the case if one assumes that the only aspect the analyst focuses upon is 
entendre and ouir and is willing to ignore the everyday, musical or linguistic 
references presented to us by sounds. There is no reason to assume that 
listeners adopt such a radically dislocated position towards the sounds of an 
acousmatic piece, and hence no reason why a perceptual analysis should 
follow any of Schaeffer's prescriptions. Moreover, one must question whether 
such a radical empiricism is possible for any listener, whether composer or 
not. Even if the `bracketing' of sounds is successfully practised within the 
poietic domain one must be careful to distinguish between the intentions and 
practices of composers and the perceptions of the listener, whether from a 
poststructuralist mistrust of the role of the author in delimiting meaning (e. g. 
Eco, 1979; Barthes, 1977a), or from the perspective of Nattiez (1990) who 
stresses the very different types of analytical endeavour available to the music 
analyst. Reduced listening may provide an insight into poiesis, but has limited 
relevance to esthesic analysis. Nattiez does propose that neutral analyses 
should reflect the cultural concerns of a musical tradition which suggests that 
Schaeffer's theories could be used to develop a relevant analysis of the neutral 
level. For this to make sense, however, one would first have to demonstrate 
that Schaeffer's theories have the status of representing an identifiable musical 
practice: an extremely difficult endeavour, if possible at all. Moreover, even if 
this were possible, the conflation of the poietic and neutral levels would be as 
pernicious here as it is for Nattiez' discussion of the role of notation in the 
analysis of aural traditions (see 1.2.1). Hence, it is instructive to refer again to 
Delalande's distinction between "analyses fonctionelles" and "analyses 
perceptives" (Delalande, 1986). A functional analysis might need to take 
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account of `reduced listening', but not a perceptual analysis. Reduced 
listening is a theoretical construct through which Schaeffer attempts to 
prescribe musical practice, and as such is precisely the kind of prescriptive 
account of acousmatic music which perceptual descriptions should be aiming 
to question, regardless of whether such descriptions are intended as forming 
the basis for perceptual verification of compositional strategies8. 
Whereas Schaeffer (1966) attempts to define new methods of 
description which challenge traditional music-theoretical assumptions, 
especially in his desire to develop a new system of musical relationships from 
attention to a "bracketed" objet sonore, a parallel strand of perceptual research 
has aimed to address the theoretical problems of electroacoustic techniques 
from within existing views of musical structure. Here, the manipulation of 
timbre is seen as paramount, a concern that implicitly maintains the traditional 
distinctions between pitch, rhythm and instrumentation. Timbre is seen as a 
parameter, a quantifiable aspect of sound. Hence, timbral research focuses 
upon discovering ways in which electroacoustic techniques can be harnessed 
to produce timbral structures that are similar to those of pitch and rhythm, but 
distinct from them. Although such a view acknowledges the new potentials 
inherent in electroacoustic techniques, especially in the broadening of the 
sonic palette, this development maintains the view that a parameterisation of 
timbre can be achieved which allows the practice of orchestration to develop 
into a carrier of abstract musical structures. Research within this context can 
be seen to develop Schoenberg's analogy between melodies articulated by 
pitch and sound colour: 
"... our attention to tone colours is becoming more and more 
active, is moving closer and closer to the possibility of 
describing and organising them. At the same time, probably to 
restrictive theories as well. For the present we judge the artistic 
effect of these relationships only by feeling. How all that 
relates to the essence of natural sound we do not know, perhaps 
8 Such a prescriptive role for perceptual research is not an aim of the present thesis. However, 
some theorists, including Delalande (1986, also see Lerdahl, 1988) regard this as one of the 
primary goals of perceptual research. 
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we can hardly guess at it; but we do write progressions of tone 
colours without a worry, and they do somehow satisfy a sense 
of beauty. What system underlies these progressions?... Now, if 
it is possible to create patterns out of tone colours that are 
differentiated according to pitch, patterns we call `melodies', 
... 
then it must be possible to make such progressions out of the 
tone colours (themselves). 
.. 
progressions whose relations with 
one another work with a kind of logic entirely equivalent to 
that logic which satisfies us in the melody of pitches. " 
(Schoenberg, 1973, p. 421. emphasis added) 
The aim of discovering a system through which timbral progressions may be 
controlled and predicted contains within it the view that timbre can be 
organised according to the same structural principles as pitch. Hence, research 
of this kind has attempted to show that timbre, like musical pitch, can be 
organised on the basis of a discrete division of a linear continuum (or a 
number of such continua). The absence of a system through which this may be 
achieved has led to a number of perceptually motivated studies that have 
aimed to quantify the relationships between different timbres, relationships 
previously regarded as qualitative. 
Grey (1977; see also Grey and Gordon, 1978) carried out a number of 
studies which aimed to identify the perceived relationships between a number 
of instrumental timbres and the acoustic correlates of these relationships. 
According to the multidimensional analysis of listeners' similarity judgements 
the timbres of these synthesised instruments can be reduced to three 
perceptual dimensions which correspond roughly to three acoustic 
dimensions: spectral energy distribution, spectral envelope and the presence of 
high frequency components during the attack (Grey, 1977). McAdams (1993) 
characterises these three dimensions as brightness, spectral flux and presence 
of attack transients. Although most subsequent research of this kind has 
stressed the abstract nature of these three dimensions (e. g. Wessel, 1979; 
McAdams and Cunibile, 1992) it is important to note that Grey provides an 
alternative description of the last two dimensions: in this plane the 
instrumental sounds are clustered according to their instrumental families 
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(Grey, 1977, p. 1274). This implies that one cannot consider these two 
dimensions independently from their instrumental origins, especially since 
only instrumental sounds were analysed. Moreover, Kendall and Carterette 
(1991) stress that the multidimensional approach cannot tell us anything about 
the perceptual relationships between points in the multidimensional space that 
do not correspond to the calculated positions of sounds used within a 
particular study. One cannot, therefore assume that moving along one or other 
dimension will produce a continuum of `perceived brightness' or `spectral 
flux'; only discontinuous successions of the sounds used in a particular study 
which fall in a straight line can be expected to behave in such a way. Hence, 
such work does not support a notion of timbre as an abstract quality, unrelated 
to instrumental source; and the dimensions isolated have no necessary 
relevance to sounds that have not been judged in a similarity task. 
The multidimensional approach to timbre has led to the notion of using 
movement in "timbre space" as a predictable and structurally salient musical 
parameter. Hence, Wessel (1979) has attempted to show that the 
multidimensional map of the `distances' between timbres can be used to 
generate perceptually equivalent timbral vectors. Such timbral vectors may be 
transposed to form perceptually equivalent relationships between any pair of 
points within the timbre space. In this way the pitch analogy is taken to its 
logical conclusion. Just as in a multidimensional pitch space a perceptually 
veracious representation of the distance between two pitches (or chords) can 
be calculated, so may the distance between two timbres be calculated. This 
raises the possibility that pitch and timbre may be manipulated in much the 
same way; according to relationships of equivalent transpositions between 
discrete values, along a number of dimensions. Extending such a notion to the 
infinite possibilities of timbral synthesis and manipulation afforded by 
electroacoustic music is problematic, however. Although attempts have been 
made to determine whether equivalent transformations can be found between 
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two known timbres and two non-instrumental (hybrid) timbres these remain 
inconclusive (see McAdams and Cunibile, 1992; McAdams, 1993). It is one 
thing to show that the cor anglais-oboe vector is analogous to that of `cello-Eb 
clarinet; it is quite a different proposition that a vector between two non- 
instrumental timbres may be found that matches this transposition. Similarly, 
the discrete nature of the points within timbre space does not necessarily 
suggest that intermediate points upon such vectors can be assigned any 
quantitative value; Kendall and Carterette (1991) note the danger of assuming 
that a multidimensional space may be used in this way, as discussed above. 
Nevertheless, such research implies that timbre could be used to form 
relationships of distance and transposition, suggesting that, like pitch, timbre 
may be structured according to equal and equivalent divisions along a number 
of dimensions. 
Theorists such as Slawson (1985) and Lerdahl (1987) have approached 
timbre in a similar fashion, regarding it as a parameter which suggests 
analogous musical structures to those of pitch. Slawson's work (1985), 
although largely independent from the rigorous empirical approach of Grey 
(1977) and Wessel (1979) is based upon a similar notion of a timbral space 
and will not be discussed at length here except to note its reliance upon a 
specious and limiting reliance on the mapping between steady-state vowel 
spectra and instrumental or synthetic tones. However, Lerdahl's work 
illustrates the dangers of assuming that timbre may be regarded as analogous 
to pitch. Lerdahl (1987) proposes that despite a number of significant 
differences between timbre and pitch, the former may be organised 
hierarchically, using "steps", "leaps", "neighbouring functions" and "passing 
functions". Lerdahl proposes that timbre can not only be arranged in scalar 
form, but that such scales are directional, leading to progressions between 
more or less "dissonant" timbres. Hence, a movement from a less dissonant to 
a more dissonant timbre would give a right branching tree structure while the 
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converse results in a left-branching structure, dissonance defined in this case 
by the amount of vibrato and the harmonicity of the timbre9. Such a view of 
timbral structure explicitly attempts to map Lerdahl's conception of pitch 
structure (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983) onto timbre; here Lerdahl attempts to 
complete the programme of research suggested by Schoenberg (see quote 
above). Despite Lerdahl's concern with perceptual and cognitive salience 
(Lerdahl, 1988), no empirical evidence is offered; only anecdotal evidence is 
used to support his synthesis experiments. Timbre is reduced to only those 
aspects that may be organised hierarchically (Lerdahl, 1987), following 
Lerdahl's preoccupation with well-formed hierarchical structures (see also 
Lerdahl, 1988). 
Although Lerdahl's research is an extreme case of imposing traditional 
assumptions upon timbre, and is explicitly prescriptive and functional, the 
explicit appeals he makes are quite clearly to be found within all timbral 
research. Why should timbre be regarded as a parameter of the same kind as 
pitch and rhythm? The very distinctions between such parameters are 
undermined by the nature of electroacoustic techniques; as Smalley (1986) 
notes, it is more sensible to regard the fine grained analysis, manipulation and 
synthesis of sounds as a motivation for doing away with such discrete musical 
categories. The spectral composition of a sound over time, its 
spectromorphology, subsumes the categories of pitch and rhythm in such a 
way as to make them unnecessary. Moreover, the assumption that timbre is 
analogous to pitch and rhythm perpetuates the ideology of musical structure as 
a self-referential system. Timbre, in this way, becomes divorced from its 
acoustic source to become another abstract parameter. 
Such a dislocation of musical parameters cannot form the basis for 
developing a truly perceptual and descriptive analysis of an electroacoustic 
9 Vibrato is regarded as more dissonant at extremes, whereas harmonicity is a linear scale 
where dissonance is inversely proportional to harmonicity (Lerdahl, 1987). 
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piece. Like Schaeffer's work (see above), it reifies the "functional"10 and 
abstract at the expense of the "perceptual" and the extramusical, and fails to 
take account of sound's iconic and indexical significance for the listener. 
Although the empirical research claims perceptual and cognitive validity for 
such constructs as "timbre space" (Wessel, 1979), such validity is, as will be 
shown (see Chapter 2 and section 1.3), specious when one considers the 
assumptions that underlie such research and its application. A perceptual 
approach, however empirical, should not be allowed to verify or prescribe 
musical norms if it fails to account for its implicit music-theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of music and musical experience. The major 
assumption made here, that timbre is an intrinsic structural component should 
not be accepted as a basis for perceptual research, and ultimately, for 
perceptual descriptions without serious misgivings, especially noting the 
cautionary advice of Kendall and Carterette (1991) and Grey's own 
recognition of the source-related nature of at least two of the supposedly 
abstract dimensions of timbre. Moreover, such research has concentrated upon 
instrument-type sounds; one must question the applicability of such research 
to the multiplicity of sound types used in acousmatic music. 
Unlike Schaeffer's work, its expansion of traditional music-theoretic 
approaches to the analysis of electroacoustic sounds and its reductionism, 
manifested in its twin obsessions with scaling and the separability of musical 
parameters, provides an additional set of assumptions that should be 
challenged. Acousmatic music, it is implied, is not only to be approached as if 
10 It may seem odd that a number of perceptual theories of timbre are grouped together here 
as "functional". It must be remembered that the distinction between functional and perceptual 
analyses is at issue here, not between functional and perceptual approaches. The approach, for 
example, of Wessel (1979), is to carry out research which reflects compositional aims; the 
control of timbre by composers. What is at issue in this case is to control timbre in a way 
which reflects the perceptual salience of timbral similarities. However, such an approach 
assumes a priori that the compositional and theoretical assumption that timbre is an 
independent structural variable has perceptual relevance to the listener in a realistic musical 
situation (see Chapter 2 and section 1.3 for discussions of timbral research vis-a-vis realism in 
perceptual research). The implicitly and explicitly functional aims of such research, expressed 
as implicit music-theoretical assumptions, severely limit its application to the formation of 
perceptual analyses. 
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it were wholly intrinsic in its structure, it is also to be approached as if such 
intrinsic structures mirror those of traditional music theory. An analysis based 
upon such a view of musical structure must ignore the role of "timbre" as 
evidence for instrumental causation, pre-existing cultural signification, and 
social mediation. Moreover, it neatly sidelines the collapse of separate musical 
parameters noted as inherent within electroacoustic techniques by Smalley 
(1986) and Wishart (1985). Empirical studies of auditory similarity will be 
returned to in the next chapter, including those that focus upon so-called non- 
musical sounds. 
In summary, two major approaches to the theory of electroacoustic 
sounds have been discussed. Each has been shown to betray a number of 
unwarranted assumptions regarding the pertinent musical structures of 
electroacoustic music. Both, to differing extents, impose traditional views of 
musical discourse upon electroacoustic music without questioning their 
appropriateness. First, it is assumed that perceptual research should reflect 
functional motivations, as opposed to purely perceptual concerns. This is true 
even of the seemingly perceptual approach from which "timbre space" (e. g. 
Wessel, 1979) is derived; the parameterisation of timbre reflects the desire for 
compositional control, a desire which is expressed in the reductionist 
experimental methodology applied to timbral research. Second, these 
approaches assume that only abstract and intrinsic musical structures are at 
issue; sounds are assumed to function as expression units within a purely 
musical system, without reference to extramusical considerations. 
This thesis, concerned as it is with placing the acousmatic within a 
broad context of auditory perception must question such assumptions. Within 
such a broad context the assumption of structural autonomy and a functional 
perspective cannot simply be assumed. To assume a priori that electroacoustic 
sounds are perceived as abstract units, and that functional music-theoretic 
constructs have any relevance to the naive listener is to assume that such 
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descriptive frameworks are implicit within the perceptual systems or cognitive 
representations of such a listener. Whether or not such assumptions are valid 
remains open to question. Here, through examining these assumptions within 
a broader context, from outside music, so to speak, a perspective will be 
gained that places "musical" discourse within its "everyday" context. Only 
through taking account of the context afforded by the everyday environment 
can one understand the immanent structure of acousmatic works. 
1.2.3 Summary: perception, description and analysis 
Both in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 a number of assumptions can be seen to have 
been drawn from traditional music theory. Although perceptual issues are 
addressed by many notational and theoretical approaches, perception is seen 
as operating within the boundaries provided by a traditional view of musical 
discourse. This position is exemplified by the retention of prescriptive models 
in notation, where it is assumed that the structure of a work is something that 
the composer communicates to the listener: here certain aspects of structure 
may not be available to the listener (e. g. the spectral structure of an aural 
illusion cf. Cogan's discussion of Fall, see section 1.2.1). Descriptions based 
upon the notion that a score is the final arbiter of aural experience relegate 
auditory perception, the only experience of the acousmatic work itself, to a 
position secondary to some visual representation or analysis. Perception is 
here mistrusted and hence requires verification: it is to be compared to the 
intentions of the composer, or to some notatable aspect of the piece. The 
analyst's perceptions may play a role in producing such a score, but these are 
generally mediated by pragmatic notational considerations, documentary 
knowledge of the composer's intentions or some form of spectral analysis. 
Similarly, approaches to the theory of acousmatic music (see section 1.2.2) 
fail to do more than overlay perceptual concerns upon traditional music 
theory. The concern here is not what is perceived by a listener, but which 
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abstract and intrinsic structures may be perceived (Schaeffer, 1966) or 
controlled (Wessel, 1979) by the composer. Both notationally and 
theoretically motivated attempts to describe electroacoustic music in 
perceptual terms founder upon the functional, or prescriptive concerns 
adopted. Such research is motivated by the need to constrain notation or 
composition in perceptually motivated ways; `perception' is seen as a limit 
upon pre-existing models, rather than the basis upon which such models 
should be built. Here, such assumptions will be rejected in order to develop 
methods of describing the acousmatic work that do not assume traditional 
notational or theoretical models. Moreover, rather than merely rejecting such 
assumptions, an attempt will be made to describe acousmatic music from the 
standpoint of the perceptions of the listener. This approach can be seen to 
offer the following benefits: 
1. Pragmatic: to identify pertinent units and structural relationships 
2. Perceptual: to develop a theory that corresponds to the listener's 
experiences 
3. To produce a perceptual analysis as opposed to a functional analysis 
To perform any kind of structural analysis of acousmatic music 
requires that a definition of pertinence be developed. Without such a 
definition it is impossible to delineate the criteria upon which a work is to be 
divided into significant units. Hence, segmentation or "discretization" 
(Nattiez, 1990, pp. 80-81) requires a definition of pertinence. Even where such 
a definition is left implicit, rather than stated explicitly, a decision must be 
made as to what units form the basis of an analysis. For notated music, notes, 
motifs, phrases, chords, voices and so on may be identified in the score or 
through listening and may form the pertinent units of an analysis. Although 
such units may be identified without the use of notation the strong links 
between prescriptive notation, musical practice and accepted descriptions of 
music allow for the score to be treated as a document which verifies aural 
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experience (see section 1.1.1); moreover, notation is seen as a trace of 
historically valid and musically pertinent divisions of the acoustic continuum 
(Nattiez, 1990, pp. 80-81). In combination with music theoretical definitions 
of structural units, notated units can be said to have a degree of perceptual 
relevance. However, the pertinent units of acousmatic music cannot be defined 
in this way. Unless one accepts the dubious assumptions of existing notational 
or theoretical positions vis-a-vis the acousmatic (see sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2) 
there is no existing theoretical or notational definition of pertinence 
appropriate for analysing electroacoustic music. Some effort is necessary to 
define which acoustic changes are relevant and which are not. Here, rather 
than adopting a functional definition of pertinence, one that has compositional 
relevance, an effort will be made to define pertinence according to the listener. 
Two motivations can be cited for developing a perceptually-based, 
listener-oriented definition of pertinence. Firstly, such a definition allows 
analyses to be performed that respect the aural nature of acousmatic practice. 
Secondly, it ensures that such analyses escape from merely serving to `reveal' 
compositional intentions. These motivations extend to any attempt to perform 
structural analyses of acousmatic works. Whereas an analysis of a notated 
work might focus on the repetition of notated units (e. g. Nattiez, 1982) an 
analysis of an acousmatic work must define not only what the smallest units 
are, but which relationships pertain between them. 
The notion that acousmatic music is composed for the ear and by the 
ear (Delalande, 1986) has been offered above as the grounds for rejecting 
theoretical definitions of pertinence that ignore perception. This notion 
deserves additional discussion. To propose that an aural practice requires 
aural analysis would be to repeat the functional reification so strongly 
criticised above in relation to the notation and theory of acousmatic music. 
Consider a listener at a concert of tape-pieces; such a listener is presented with 
sounds through a number of loudspeakers and must form some interpretation 
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of these sounds. One issue this thesis aims to address is how might one 
attempt to describe such an interpretation, based upon aural experience alone. 
However, the premise that only aural experience is relevant in such an 
interpretation is not accepted. Other modes of perception may be brought to 
bear on the acousmatic work. For example, the visual perception that no live 
performers are producing the sounds heard may be vital to our understanding 
of the acousmatic. Hence, rather than blindly following such a functionally 
motivated premise, perception in general must be considered in forming 
descriptions of the acousmatic work, though auditory perception of course 
occupies a peculiarly important position. 
1.3 Extrinsic and intrinsic: reclaiming mimesis 
1.3.0 Material in acousmatic music 
A number of pedagogical, notational and theoretical concerns have been 
addressed up to this point. However, the acousmatic work presents another, 
and perhaps more important, challenge to the analyst. When one considers the 
material of electroacoustic music one immediately confronts material that is 
not traditionally considered as music at all. Electroacoustic techniques have 
led to the inclusion of non-instrumental, non-vocal sounds obtained from the 
everyday environment, and the synthesis and manipulation of instrumental, 
vocal, everyday and wholly original sounds. Although such a broadening of 
the notion of musical material has a long history, either in terms of the 
imitation of `extramusical' events, or the inclusion of novel sound sources, 
electroacoustic techniques have brought such inclusions into the foreground of 
musical discourse. Many such sounds have recognisable sources, and even 
where such sources are hidden, surrogate sources may be perceived and may 
be relevant to theory (Smalley, 1986). 
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Such tendencies require a new attention to the concept of mimesis. 11 
Acousmatic music often draws upon the sounds of the world in a direct, 
unmediated fashion, in contrast to the highly mediated, structured world of 
traditional musical material. It will be argued that even where attempts are 
made to conceal this mimetic resurgence, such mimetic practices are often 
highly significant. More importantly, this mimetic aspect of acousmatic music 
will be shown to be significant not only in terms of pure theory, but also in 
terms of the listener's perception of the work. Just as the acousmatic work 
requires one to reassess the roles of music theory and notation in building 
perceptual descriptions, so it also demands a fresh examination of the roles of 
intrinsic and extrinsic reference in such descriptions. As observed in section 
1.2, both timbral and Schaefferian perspectives preserve a view of musical 
structure that is abstract and self-referential. Here, this notion will be 
challenged, firstly in relation to musical discourse in general, then in relation 
to acousmatic music. Acousmatic music reveals and highlights the ever- 
present tension between intrinsic and extrinsic frames of reference within 
music, and moreover, produces a radical shift in the relative importance of 
these two polarities. This demands attention to the perceived origins of sounds 
employed within the acousmatic work, an attention denied within traditional 
frames of musical reference just as it is denied within most current approaches 
to the structure of acousmatic music. 
1.3.1 Intrinsic and extrinsic structure 
In linguistics it is customary to distinguish between syntax and semantics, 
between the rules which govern whether a sentence is grammatical, and those 
which govern the way in which sentences refer to, or signify conceptual or 
real-world entities. This division between grammaticality and reference is 
11 Mimesis is here used in the broad sense offered by Emmerson (1986) who does not 
distinguish between the representation of nature and the representation of other non-musical 
artefacts. Another definition, which subsumes this one, but has a number of important 
differences will be introduced and discussed in Chapter 6. 
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highlighted in the work of Chomsky (e. g. 1957) where syntax is examined 
independently of semantic concerns. Attempts to apply linguistic models to 
musical structure often point out the absence of such a distinction within 
music, which is seen as primarily self-referential. In fact the major difference 
between language and music is seen as its abstractedness from the everyday 
world. This ideology is summed up by Monelle (1992): 
"It is clear that music... is a self-regulating system of 
transformations... It is, perhaps, more apparent in music than 
elsewhere that significance inheres in relations, not in things. A 
single note is meaningless, but intervals, patterns, changes in 
volume, tempo and timbre, and above all rhythms are the prime 
bearers of musical significance. This is to speak of musical 
significance in its most fundamental sense, not in the lexical 
sense which still pervades Saussure and has passed over into 
some writers on music. " (Monelle, 1992, p. 58) 
Hence, structural approaches tend to stress the priority of intrinsic reference in 
music at the expense of extrinsic reference. Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983), 
for example, concentrate upon a set of rules to describe the hierarchical 
relationships between elements in a musical work, Narmour (e. g. 1977) and 
Meyer (1967; 1973) upon the way in which certain musical patterns imply 
structural completions, and Nattiez (e. g. 1982) upon the ways in which the 
repetition of musical units can be seen as analogous to the paradigmatic axis 
of distributional linguistic analysis. 
This concentration upon music as a closed system is not isolated to 
current structural research. Most analytical procedures emphasise the nature of 
music as a self-referential system, whether in terms of voice-leading, interval 
content, or motivic structure. Acousmatic music directly challenges this 
reification of intrinsic structure in its use of everyday sounds and in its 
avoidance of traditional musical structures. First, however, it is necessary to 
present a critique of the ideology underlying the concentration upon intrinsic 
structure in music theory. Through this critique it will become clear that 
acousmatic music is unusual in its concentration upon mimesis yet should also 
be viewed as an important step in the reclamation of an ever-present, yet too 
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often ignored, aspect of musical structure. The following sections will outline 
the theoretical background to the polarisation and reification of abstract 
structure in music, and outline some alternatives to this dominant position. 
1.3.2 The ideology of absolute music: the reification of syntax 
"The ideas which a composer expresses are of a purely musical 
nature... " (Hanslick, 1974, p. 35) 
"Apart from a few onomatopoetic themes... music has no literal 
meaning. " (Langer, 1956, p. 232) 
Despite the commonly held belief that music `communicates', and that it may 
communicate emotional states and concepts and hence refer to the everyday 
world, such a view is not always shared by music theorists and aestheticians. 
In the last section some specific theoretical approaches were shown to 
maintain a belief in the primacy of intrinsic reference, and in this section, two 
aesthetic approaches will be briefly examined that illustrate the ideological 
background to such theoretical solipsism. 
Hanslick (1974) and Langer (1956) propose that music is in the main 
unable to refer to the world. According to such a proposition, the mimetic 
aspect of music is relegated to the position of an incidental supplement to 
music's intrinsic workings. Hanslick (1974) attempts to dispel the view that 
music has any emotional content per se or that music might represent 
emotions. Langer (1953; 1956), in a similar fashion denies the role of 
conventional extramusical meanings; she claims that music, unlike language, 
has no culturally fixed denotations. For both of these authors, the intrinsic 
connections between musical sounds form the basis of musical meaning: 
"Music has a subject-i. e. a musical subject, which is no less a 
divine spark than the beautiful of any other art. Yet, only by 
steadfastly denying the existence of any other "subject" in 
music, is it possible to save its "true subject. " The indefinite 
emotions which at best underlie the other kind of subject, do 
not explain its spiritual force... the untrammelled working of the 
human mind on material susceptible of intellectual 
manipulation. " (Hanslick, 1974, p. 173) 
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"Why then, is it (music) not a language of feeling...? Because 
its elements are not words-independent associative symbols 
with reference fixed by convention. Only as an articulate form 
is it found to fit anything; and since there is no meaning 
assigned to any of its parts, it lacks one of the basic 
characteristics of language-fixed association, and therewith a 
single unequivocal reference. " (Langer, 1953, p. 31) 
Neither Langer nor Hanslick deny the way in which music resembles the play 
of emotions; both recognise the emotive aspect of music, yet they insist that 
this aspect is the result of the similarity between the intrinsic structures of 
music and the structure of our emotive experiences. Here, Langer's debt to 
Hanslick becomes explicit: just as the latter suggests that music's similarity to 
emotional experience is at the level of music's "dynamic properties" 
expressed through "sound and motion" (Hanslick, 1974, p. 35), Langer 
suggests that music's emotive significance lies in its similarity to our 
experience of temporal flow and volume ä la Bergson. The sounds of music 
seem to move and interrelate in a way that is congruent to the elements of our 
inner experiences (Langer, 1953). In this way, a musical aesthetic is proposed 
which preserves the ideology of musical `purity', yet allows for music's 
emotional impact. The autonomy of musical structure is hence shown to be 
valid without a denial of the connections between musical and everyday 
experience, essential to explain why music occupies such a prominent place in 
our experiences. Indeed, Langer claims that it is precisely because of such 
autonomy that music is able to articulate aspects of our experience that cannot 
be expressed through language. In this way, the purity of music, its syntactical 
nature, becomes linked to the notion that music escapes from conventional, 
culturally circumscribed modes of reference. 
Acousmatic music challenges this ideology at its root. Here, musical 
units often consist of sounds which have pre-existing, `referential' meanings. 
Are we then to deny the, musicality of such extrinsic reference? On the 
contrary; extrinsic significance is as "vital" a force in musical structure as the 
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that of music's intrinsic coherence. In order to show this, it is necessary to 
challenge the assertion that meaning in music relies upon a metaphorical 
relationship between abstract musical structures and the world. 
1.3.3 Mimesis as metaphor 
Composers, scientists and aestheticians tend to suggest that sounds `behave' 
as if they had mass, velocity and the like. Helmholtz (1954) for example, 
suggests that pitch relationships can be described in terms of a spatial 
analogue, and that this analogy explains the ability of music to "express": 
"Such a close analogy consequently exists in all essential 
relations between the musical scale and space, that even 
alteration of pitch has a readily recognized and unmistakable 
resemblance to motion in space, and is often metaphorically 
termed the ascending or descending motion or progression of a 
part. Hence, again, it becomes possible for motion in music to 
imitate the peculiar characteristics of motive forces in space, 
that is to form an image of the various impulses and forces 
which lie at the root of motion. And on this, I believe, 
essentially depends the power of music to picture emotion" 
(Helmholtz, 1954, p. 370) 
Such a view of musical motion as an analogical or metaphorical construct is 
vital to understanding the fuller implications of music as an autonomous yet 
meaningful form. Whilst Hanslick and Langer propose that it is musical 
structures themselves that resemble our everyday experiences neither proposes 
a theory that would explain why musical structures may be so wholly different 
from and yet expressive of non-musical experience. As Scruton notes, the 
logical conclusion of Hanslick's approach is that music itself cannot express 
anything at all: 
"It would seem to follow that an artistic medium which, like 
music, can neither represent objects nor convey specific 
thoughts about them is logically debarred from expressing 
emotion" (Scruton, 1983, p. 58) 
If one is to argue along these lines then the belief that music expresses 
emotions and refers to events in the world, that it is meaningful in a 
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conventional sense, must be explained in some way. If, like Langer, one 
wishes to argue that musical structures resemble inner experiences, albeit in a 
non-referential, non-discursive fashion, then one is bound to explain how such 
resemblance is achieved. Such explanations are hinted at in both the writings 
of Hanslick and Langer in their reliance on the notion of musical space and 
musical motion. 
"... the elements of music are not tones of such and such pitch, 
duration and loudness, nor chords and measured beats; they 
are, like all artistic elements, something virtual, created only 
for perception. Edouard Hanslick denoted them 
rightly:... 'sounding forms in motion"' (Langer, 1959, p. 107) 
If, as Langer argues, musical motion and space merely resemble physical 
motion and space (Langer, 1959, p. 108), how is this resemblance achieved? 
For Scruton (1983) this question is crucial; if music cannot represent extrinsic 
events, whether emotions or objects, then what allows such semblance to 
occur? His solution, that such semblance occurs by virtue of metaphor, adopts 
a position similar to that of Helmholtz as quoted above. Musical structures do 
not move in space, yet the listener attributes such properties to the music, an 
intentional act: 
"Of course, we hear a chord as a single musical object: but that 
is the result of our musical understanding. It is not a feature of 
the 'spatial' distribution of sounds. Hence, in order to construe 
musical 'space' as analogous to physical space, we have to 
construe it, not materially, but intentionally, in terms of that 
very capacity for musical understanding we are trying to 
explain. It is a phenomenal fact about auditory space that it 
possesses the topological feature of orientation; but it is not a 
fact about sound, construed independently of the musical 
experiences of which it is the (material) object. " 
(Scruton, 1983, p. 83) 
This explains how sounds are simultaneously non-expressive yet construed as 
expressive: just as sounds may be described as low and high, a metaphorical 
movement from low to high could be heard as a gesture with some form of 
emotional content. The important feature of this view is that musical meaning 
is not merely an attribute of sound but of the metaphorical structures the 
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listener imposes upon sound. Hence, within this perspective, if music is in any 
way mimetic it achieves this through a process of metaphor: the resemblance 
between music and the world (real or emotional) is not accidental nor 
inexplicable, nor is it physical. It is important to note that Scruton, although 
giving an explanation of why a non-representational art-form might lead to 
metaphorical understanding, is only required to develop this theory as a 
method of escaping from the notion that music is at once wholly autonomous 
yet meaningful. As will be shown in the next section, however, music is not 
autonomous in the narrow sense assumed by Scruton, and maintains a 
relationship with the world that is rather more direct than assumed as the basis 
for his metaphorical view of musical expression. 
1.3.4 Beyond metaphor 
In view of such a deep-seated opposition to the idea of the extrinsic 
significance of musical sounds, it is not surprising that the role of mimesis in 
acousmatic music has been underestimated by many theorists and analysts 
(see section 1.2). If the only kinds of musical objects, motions and spaces are 
metaphorical, then it is tempting to treat the mimetic aspect of music as 
peripheral. The object of musical study, within such a view, is music itself, not 
its relationship to the world. The study of acousmatic music follows the same 
paradigms as are applied to traditional musical forms. For example, it is no 
accident that Schaeffer, in his attempts to reduce listening to an abstracted 
solfege (Schaeffer, 1966), uses such a traditional term to describe the basis of 
the musical `language' to which he aspired. Despite the aural basis of his 
project, it is based upon the same denial of mimesis as part of musical 
discourse that can be found in the writings of Hanslick. Schaeffer, to his 
credit, does not deny the relationship between sounds and their sources, nor 
the pre-existing conventions which dominate our everyday contact with the 
acoustic environment. In this sense, however, it is all the more remarkable that 
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such extrinsic factors are excluded from his ideal of musical research. 
Similarly, the timbral research exemplified by Wessel (1979) and McAdams 
and Cunibile (1992) (see section 1.2.2) resembles the paradigms of research in 
tonality; "timbre space" like the pitch spaces and tonal maps of Shepard 
(1982) and Krumhansl (1983) depicts relationships between sounds without 
reference to their extrinsic significance. Such a reductive process is a 
recognised and valid scientific procedure, but it illustrates clearly the notion 
that it is the abstract nature of timbre, its value as a parameter, that should 
form the basis of musical research, rather than its role in identifying sources. 
Such research is not inappropriate in all circumstances, but the perspective 
illustrates the aversion to mimesis that is a defining feature of Western 
musical culture. 
This aversion is in clear contradiction with the interest in mimesis 
displayed in the practices and explanatory discourses of many composers in 
the acousmatic field. Rather than viewing the pre-existent significance of 
sounds as an extra-musical concern, many composers see such matters as 
fundamental to the structure of their works. Moreover, the relationship 
between such `found' meanings and the more abstract, or intrinsic, structure of 
their works is seen as a major issue. Rather than seeing mimesis as a force 
external to musical discourse, such commentators regard it as a fundamental 
aspect of their works' structures. This view, rather than being a radical 
departure within musical practice can be seen as having a hidden, yet ever- 
present history within Western art music. The notion that musical works have 
more than a metaphorical relationship to the external world, despite the 
dominance of self-referential views of musical structure, has been addressed 
in a number of ways in recent writing. Agawu (1991), for example, has 
observed the simultaneous operation of intrinsic and extrinsic forms of 
semiosis in the classical period; here, he argues, reference to rhetorical topics, 
an extrinsic body of culturally convened knowledge, exists side-by-side with 
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the intrinsic structures provided by the `syntax' of voice-leading analyses. 
Indeed these two forms of significance are capable of dialogue in their 
potential for both parallel and conflicting organisation. Interestingly, however, 
the intrinsic structures are endowed by Agawu with greater importance 
through their potential for escaping from the historically mediated conventions 
which afflict the understanding of extrinsic codes. Whereas rhetorical topics 
no longer retain their immediacy for the listener, it is argued that the 
syntactical structures of the classical period are largely independent of such 
historical decay. Whatever the truth of this assertion, contemporary documents 
suggest that for audiences during the classical period, extrinsic reference 
played a large part in defining musical meaning. Whether the extrinsic 
references made by acousmatic music are as historically mediate should not be 
assumed from the outset. If one wishes to form a perceptual description of 
acousmatic music one must be wary of basing one's analytical framework 
upon the notion that intrinsic structures are less subject to historical mediation 
and hence of more value. It may be true that for the music of the classical 
period rhetorical topics have lost their immediacy; but it does not follow that 
this is a consequence of their extrinsic nature per se. What is certain is that the 
extrinsic references of acousmatic music must be examined within their own 
cultural and perceptual milieu if one is to avoid the danger of applying 
inappropriate analytical tools, based upon a particular historical process which 
has no necessary relevance. Agawu's research suggests, regardless of such 
limitations of genre, that coded, arbitrary relationships between sounds and 
their `content' can form a vital part of musical understanding. 
Such work shows that `narrative' structures, based upon culturally 
convened extra-musical codes, may have a hidden history. Musical sounds 
may have a coded and arbitrary relationship with extra-musical units of 
content, and like all arbitrary signs, will be subject to diachronic changes 
resulting in their erosion over time. However, following this semiotic 
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approach it is clear that not all types of sign are equally subject to diachronic 
change. Taking Peirce's three types of sign, icons, indices and symbols 
(Peirce, 1991, pp. 239-24012), it is clear that indexical and iconic forms of 
semiosis may be equally important in defining extrinsic reference in music. 
For example, music may indexically signify the effort of the body that 
performs it, or bear some iconic resemblance to prosody in speech or emotive 
bodily gestures (see e. g. Clynes; 1977; Lidov, 198713; Clarke, 1993). Whereas 
a symbolic system (as advanced by Saussure, 1983) rests upon the arbitrary 
relationships between units within a culturally convened system, iconic and 
indexical signs are not limited by such constraints. The perception of 
indexical, or causal, links between sounds and our surroundings will form the 
basis of the main arguments of this thesis. Note that it is in indexical 
signification that writers such as Monelle reconcile music's non- 
representational yet meaningful paradox (see e. g. Monelle, 1992, pp. 193- 
21914). In Chapter 2, the perceptual basis for such relationships will be 
examined, and will be shown to be compatible with a culturally mediate view 
of meaning and aesthetic perception. Signification through resemblance, 
through iconic signs, leads back to a metaphorical view of the relationship 
between sound and motion in space (see section 1.3.4). This kind of reference 
may be important in explaining some aspects of musical meaning relevant to 
acousmatic music, but it is the possibility of directly perceiving causal 
relationships between sounds and the environment which will be shown to 
define the types of mimesis central to a broader understanding of the 
acousmatic. Metaphorical relationships will form part of this explanation, but 
12 An icon signifies through its resemblance to an object, an index through its causal 
relationship with an object and a symbol by virtue of cultural convention. 
13 In this paper, Lidov claims, for example, that "Anterior to its status as a sign, music is an 
action on and of the body" (p. 69) and that "In acquiring signs, sensations and impulses 
formed in and of the body transcend it to become mind" (p. 71). 14 In a recent presentation to the Royal Musical Association entitled "Expression and 
indexicality" (King's College, London University, 1995) Monelle suggested that music's 
expressivity rested upon its status as an index of `intersubjectivity', of which the `object' was 
music, and the `interpretant' emotion. 
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do not help us to escape from the view that music's resemblance to anything 
but itself is supplied by the listener, as argued by Scruton (1983; see above 
section 1.3.4). This thesis will attempt to locate the meaning of acousmatic 
discourse not only within the imagination of the listener, but in the 
relationship of the listener with his or her environment. 
1.3.5 Mimesis in acousmatic music 
There are some notable precursors to this view from within the field of 
acousmatic music. Although strongly influenced by the acousmatic tradition 
represented by Schaeffer, Smalley (1986) regards the mimetic attributes of 
sound as having a complex relationship with reduced listening. The 
recognition by listeners (and composers) of sounds' causation, whether real or 
apparent, is not to be ignored or relegated to supplementary status. Rather, it is 
seen as a primary force in the structure of acousmatic music, whether through 
metaphorical or more direct links with our environment. Sounds may have 
differing degrees of connection with their apparent sources, referring to them 
precisely or through a kind of family resemblance- a taxonomy of excitatory 
causes. Sounds are perceived not only to have detailed relationships with 
specific sound producing objects but also relationships with "surrogate" 
sources. The relationship between such extrinsic connections and the internal 
structure of pieces is a complex one in which timbre is neither regarded as 
fully independent of causation nor fully determined by it (Smalley; 1986; 
1992; 1994). In a similar vein, Ten Hoopen (1994) claims that the relationship 
between source and cause operates along a continuum so that sounds may be 
more or less ambiguously identified as having a particular cause. In more 
ambiguous cases, the listener is forced into a metaphorical relationship with 
the sounds of a piece, whereas in cases where definite cause can be attributed 
the listener is brought into a rather more veridical frame of reference. This 
formulation neatly encapsulates the importance of mimesis in acousmatic 
, 
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situations, and in a more radical form the tendency of listeners to ascribe 
causation, however vague, is central to this thesis. Both of these views seem to 
represent an interest in the force of source attribution, however vague, in 
providing the basis for intrinsic musical structure. Smalley's music and 
writings, however, do not explore the more obvious `narrative' role of sounds 
in any depth, avoiding the rather more radical approach to mimesis, that is 
represented by the title of a recent article concerned with the `story-telling' 
aspect of many tape compositions: "Telling Tales" (Norman, 1994). Norman 
offers the following starting point for an alternative discourse: 
"I'd like to abandon musical analogies and offer oral 
storytelling as a new-or rather, a very old-model for 
performance... " (Norman, 1994, p. 104) 
Within this context, the notion of combining musical and narrative devices is a 
side-show; the tape piece provides possibilities which need not be developed 
from a musical perspective at all. This kind of explanatory discourse begins to 
dissolve the boundaries between musical and narrative discourse in a way 
which calls into question the appropriateness of musical models for describing 
the montages of real world sounds exemplified by composers such as Luc 
Ferrari. However, story-telling is only one aspect of such work: what is 
important is not to exclude such narrative processes from analytical 
descriptions. The incursion of clearly recognisable actuality recordings within 
acousmatic pieces shows the tension that exists between traditional views of 
musical structure and current practice just as much as the utilisation of digital 
and analog techniques for manipulating sounds challenges simplistic views of 
timbre through the concealment of familiar sources. Despite the surface 
differences between these two practices, there is no guarantee that listeners 
will not focus their attention upon the narrative provided by the attribution of 
sources to ambiguous sounds, nor that they will not focus upon the more 
abstract aspects of a clearly narrative structure. What is clear is that such 
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explanatory discourses reveal the importance of mimesis in acousmatic music, 
not as a supplement to traditional musical structure but as part and parcel of 
the structure of individual works. Such a view is reflected by Emmerson 
(1986), whose concern is the relationship between mimesis and various forms 
of more abstract structuring principles. This view will be returned to in 
Chapter 4, where his approach will be compared with the perspective 
developed in the intervening chapters of this thesisls. 
The writings and music of Trevor Wishart (e. g. 1986) seem to 
illustrate the middle-ground here. A piece such as Red Bird provides obvious 
narrative structure utilising the common connotations of sounds as the units in 
a political polemic whilst combining this narrative with subtle transformations 
which in addition to their narrative role become, in themselves the basis of 
intrinsic structure. Such transformations facilitate story-telling in that they 
form abstract connections between sounds which can be interpreted as having 
narrative significance. These narrative links conversely provide additional 
strength to the transformations themselves. The "abstract" and "concrete" 
aspects of sounds discussed by Smalley (1986), via subtle editing, 
interpolation and cross-fading, become intertwined. The opening of Wishart's 
work Red Bird (music example 1.3) is illustrative here. Are the connections 
between the familiar sounds we hear achieved by skilful timbral connections 
or by narrative? And more importantly to this thesis, does the listener focus 
upon the unity16 of timbral relationships or upon the narrative suggested? It is 
clear that despite the problems of Wishart's writings as an analytical blueprint 
(see section 1.2.1) the subtle interpenetration of musical and narrative forms 
suggested in his writings are reflected in the music in an undeniable fashion. 
Hence, it may be argued that the mimetic aspect of music, obscured by the 
15 Emmerson's other major concern in this article is the relationship between materials and 
"language". This concern is returned to in Chapter 4. 
16 No claims are made here about the supposition that'unity is a necessary or defining feature 
of intrinsic musical structures. 
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praxis of Western music theory, is in a sense reclaimed by such relationships 
within acousmatic music. 
1.4 Summary 
Thus far, this thesis has concerned itself with the inadequacy of current 
approaches to forming descriptive analyses of acousmatic music and the 
grounds upon which such an inadequacy rests. Where the listener has been 
taken into account, perceptual research has been dominated by prescriptive 
goals that are embedded within the notion that music is primarily an abstract 
art-form. Where such an ideology has been abandoned or challenged, few 
efforts have been made to escape from this prescriptive bias. Rather than 
develop such efforts, this thesis will attempt to place acousmatic music within 
a broader debate that avoids complicity in any compositional or music- 
theoretical ideology. Although musical issues will be addressed, it is first 
necessary to jettison the idea that our traditional views of music are 
appropriate for forming analyses of acousmatic works. Rather than 
approaching such a project from the prescriptive perspective of Schaeffer 
(1966), whose methods imply the traditional boundaries of musical discourse, 
this thesis will take up a position outside these boundaries. An attempt will be 
made to understand the ways in which we listen to the world in general, and to 
observe acousmatic music from within this context. Only through questioning 
the boundaries of music, rather than positing them a priori, is it possible to 
appreciate fully that which distinguishes musical listening, or musical works, 
from other forms of listening or artefact. Hence, just as this thesis is an 
attempt to understand how one should describe acousmatic music, it is also an 
attempt to understand whether such a description entails a critique of the 
boundaries between aesthetic and general, experiences. It is not just that a 
music-theoretical approach may be inappropriate to the study of acousmatic 
music but also that it may conceal ways in which acousmatic music reflects 
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broader aesthetic issues. Hence, from the outset, acousmatic music will not be 
seen in the light of its differences from and similarities to traditional musical 
discourse, but as something that is listened to. The relationship between such 
listening and our knowledge of other forms of music will not be pre-supposed. 
Undoubtedly, such links exist, but these links will not be seen to constitute the 
bases of our perceptions and interpretations. This thesis is not an attempt to 
replace music theory with music perception, but an attempt to locate the 
experience of acousmatic music within perception as a whole. 
In place of music theory and current work in music perception that 
might seem relevant to acousmatic music, a theory of listening will be 
advanced, developed from the perceptual theories of Gibson (1966; 1979). 
This theory assumes no specialist knowledge of music, language or any other 
culturally convened system of signs, and takes as its starting point a direct and 
dynamic relationship between the listener and his or her environment. By 
observing the shortcomings of such a generalised theory of perception in 
explaining specific aspects of the perception of acousmatic music, a theory is 
developed that explicitly shows the relationship between general, or direct 
auditory perception, and the social and cultural mediation necessary for the 
aesthetic interpretation of sounds. Through this process the critical potential of 
acousmatic music is approached in its own terms, relative not only to 
traditional musical discourse but to listening as a whole. Hence, the discovery 
of the pertinent descriptive units of acousmatic music, their interpretation and 
relationships, is based upon the assumption that in order to understand the 
perception of `musical' structure, it is first necessary to understand the 
perception of the extramusical world within which such specific structures are 
located. 
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Chapter 2 
An ecological approach to acousmatic music 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter an approach to perception will be considered which forms the 
basis for a perceptual and descriptive approach to the analysis of acousmatic 
music, and which tackles the theoretical problems discussed in Chapter 1. This 
approach, largely based upon Gibson's "ecological" approach to perception 
(Gibson, 1966; 1979), presents its own difficulties, not least its concentration 
upon those aspects of perception that are not socially or culturally defined. 
Indeed, sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this chapter will comprise an attempt to apply 
Gibson's approach to the social and the aesthetic respectively. As these later 
sections show, Gibson's ideas can be used to relate perceptual descriptions 
and analyses of acousmatic music not only to the `natural' environment, but 
also to the `social' and `cultural' environment. 
Gibson's approach can be viewed as an alternative to the prevailing 
cognitive views of perception, and as an attempt to dismantle the dualism of 
mental representations of the world and reality, a view in which our 
perceptions are the result of mental processes that mediate between the 
sensory data available to our sense organs and what is perceived. This chapter 
will not attempt to enter into this argument more than is necessary: the 
ecological approach is advanced for its benefits in understanding auditory 
perception, and particularly aesthetic perception, rather than as a rival to 
cognitive psychology. An ecological approach, it will be argued, provides a 
level of description which places acousmatic music within a broader 
perceptual context than is provided by prevailing views of music perception or 
music theory. This ecological approach is not adopted as an alternative 
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explanation of perception, but as an alternative description of the structures 
which are relevant to a perceptually motivated analysis of acousmatic music. 
2.1 Ecological acoustics and acousmatic music 
2.1.0 The ecological approach to perception 
According to Gibson (1966; 1979), perception does not require the mediation 
of mental representations of the external world. Rather than assuming that the 
sensations passed from the sense organs to the central nervous system 
represent a chaotic source of information that mental processes organise and 
store in the form of meaningful percepts and memories, an ecological 
approach assumes that the `external' world, the environment, is structured and 
that organisms are directly sensitive to such structure. If this was the sum of 
Gibson's work accusations of naive realism would be justified. How could 
such a view `explain' the way in which human beings utilise language, mental 
imagery, knowledge and memories in their experience of the world? Merely 
stating that an organism is sensitive to environmental structure seems to beg 
too many questions. However, Gibson's work is much more subtle than this. 
He does not claim that memory, language and other symbolic systems play no 
role in our experience of the world. On the contrary, such systems to a large 
extent constitute that experience. However, Gibson is keen to distinguish 
between the experience of such structures and their role in perception (Gibson, 
1979) and, for example, between perception and symbolic systems which 
facilitate the mediation of perceptions (Gibson, 1966; 1979; Reed, 1991). 
Within an ecological approach knowledge is not denied, but it is not explained 
as the storage or manipulation of representations. 
67 
Chapter 2 
2.1.1 Event perception 
The core of Gibson's contribution lies in the way in which perception is seen 
as a continuous and mutual relationship between organism and environment. 
This relationship is expressed in both ontogenetic and phylogenetic terms: just 
as a species develops perceptual systems that are appropriate to its 
environment through natural selection, the individual organism's perceptual 
systems become progressively attuned to its particular environment through its 
developmental history. An organism evolves, both phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically, to pick-up information that will increase its chances of 
survival. It develops perceptual systems that enable it to perceive features of 
the environment that facilitate continued existence, and hence reproduction. 
Moreover, the dynamic relationship between a perceiving, acting organism 
and its environment is seen to provide the grounds for the direct perception of 
meaning. Gibson's term for this is "affordance". Objects and events are 
related to a perceiving organism by structured information, and they "afford" 
certain possibilities for action relative to an organism. For example, a cup 
affords drinking, the ground, walking. For different organisms, affordances 
will differ; for a human being an open body of water might afford swimming 
or immersion, but for a water bug the same stimulus information, picked up by 
different perceptual systems and relative to different organismic structure, 
would afford support (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). Moreover, affordances are fluid 
relative to individual perceptual development: for a surfer, certain patterns of 
waves afford surfing, whilst to a non-surfer they might afford drowning. 
Affordances, "point both ways" (Gibson, 1979, p. 129) in that they can neither 
be explained purely in terms of the needs of the organism, nor in terms of the 
objective features of the environment. The affordance is a relationship 
between a particular environmental structure and a particular organism's 
needs and capacities. 
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As each organism, or species, evolves it will develop certain 
effectivities, possible actions, and its perception of an environment will reflect 
those features of an environment that allow for or demand organismic actions. 
Conversely, as an environment develops it will offer certain affordances, 
features of survival value to an organism. An organism can be said to exhibit 
an effectivity structure, a complex of actions that reflect its relationship to the 
affordance structure of an environment. This perspective may seem circular, 
but it allows for a view of perception that avoids the problem of infinite 
regress. Internal representations of an external reality beg the question of who, 
or what, perceives such a representation, and who or what perceives the 
representation of the representation (see Shaw and Turvey, 1981). 
Event perception attempts to identify the invariant properties of events 
that specify permanent and changing features of the environment that are 
significant to an organism. The aims of this approach are neatly encapsulated 
by Shaw, McIntyre and Mace (1974, p. 280): 
"By analyzing the organism's context of physical stimulation 
into events with adaptive significance, we have a means of 
conceptually distilling from the ambient flux of stimulation 
those aspects most relevant to the maintenance of equilibration 
in the organism's ecosystem. " 
Any event will be perceived in terms of its affordance structure, its potential 
to evoke adaptive behaviour. The affordance structure of an event will vary 
according to the particular effectivities of an organism, its potential for 
performing adaptive behaviour. The properties of events that make up a 
particular affordance structure are termed invariants, and may be divided up 
into two classes, those that specify styles of change and those that specify 
persistence, or permanence (Warren and Shaw, 1985). An event can be 
defined as a process that leaves some physical properties unchanged and 
transforms others. The identification of the styles of change and persistent 
features of events that are ecologically significant is a primary motive in 
studying event perception. Following Gibson (1966; 1979), styles of change 
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and permanent features are examined in terms of their invariant structure. For 
example, the perception of facial growth seems to be the result of specific 
geometrical functions that transform certain elements of facial structure whilst 
leaving others permanent (Shaw, McIntyre and Mace, 1974; Mark, Todd and 
Shaw, 1981). Such geometrical functions can be termed transformational 
invariants, whilst those features left unchanged can be termed structural 
invariants. As Warren and Shaw (1985, p. 6) point out, permanence and 
change can only be differentiated reciprocally and with reference to the 
observer. Moreover, the difference between permanence and change depends 
upon the temporal perspective of the organism involved: 
"The bright orange-leaf that is transient for us is a permanent 
fixture for the 24-hour life span of the insect that lands upon it, 
and the mountainside that appears to us eternal will, in time, be 
levelled by erosion. " (Warren and Shaw, 1985, p. 6) 
Shaw, McIntyre and Mace (1974) have termed the ecological significance of 
an invariant its "attensity". The particular invariant properties of an event that 
make up an affordance structure will vary in attensity according to the 
particular adaptive relationship of a particular organism to its environment at a 
particular time. In summary, events can be described in terms of their adaptive 
significance to an organism, and are the result of the coevolution of the 
perceptual systems of organism and an environment. Within such a 
perspective, an event's `meaning' is determined directly, not by mental 
processes or representation: an event produces structured information that 
affords further perception or action. 
2.1.2 Auditory event perception: an ecological acoustics 
In order to explain more clearly how the environment makes available 
structured information, invariances, examples will be offered from research in 
auditory perception. Gibson's discussion of invariances is largely dominated 
by the visual domain (Gibson, 1979), despite some preliminary work on 
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audition (Gibson, 1966). As the concern here is with a primarily auditory 
phenomenon, it seems reasonable to move straight to work in audition, 
although other sources of information will prove relevant when we return to 
the `acousmatic' listening context itself. Moreover, the research cited will 
betray a concentration (maintained throughout this thesis) upon invariants that 
specify sound producing objects, leaving aside work upon sound localisation, 
the perception of distance (e. g. Shaw, McGowan and Turvey, 1991) and other 
areas relevant to the perception of the `layout' and segmentation of the 
acoustic environment (e. g. Bregman, 1990). The motivation for adopting an 
ecological approach in this context is to redress the balance between abstract 
approaches to musical structure and those that take into account the 
connections between sounds and the environment. Although the perception of 
the spatial layout and segregation of events could be included within such a 
project, this thesis will concentrate upon the way that the structured nature of 
auditory information specifies particular environmental events and classes of 
events. As will be shown, this is sufficient to challenge the assumptions made 
by existing theorists. 
Heine and Guski (1991) point out that although research in "ecological 
acoustics" is as yet an underdeveloped area within ecological psychology, the 
concern with studying real sounds in realistic situations has a considerable 
history. Just as Gibson's research in vision rests upon empirical research 
which allows the subject access to experimental materials and paradigms 
which resemble realistic situations, a number of studies have, without 
explicitly adopting an ecological stance, implicitly applied experimental 
paradigms which recognise the possibility that controlling experimental 
variables can lead to results which bear little resemblance to perception in a 
more realistic setting. Hence, before reviewing explicitly Gibsonian work, 
some of these studies will be addressed in order to illustrate the broader 
implications of studying the perception of "everyday sounds" (Heine and 
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Guski, 1991). All of these studies, to some degree, expose the way in which 
sounds provide information about events. 
Much of the literature which deals with perceiving sounds in realistic 
situations comes from research in sonar recognition. In order to isolate 
acoustic features that human sonar operators depend upon to determine the 
source of a sonar trace, one has to take into account both the variations in 
acoustic information available to an operator and the resulting percepts. A 
fundamental issue here is to identify those features which contribute to the 
identification of particular sources, such as those that determine the perception 
of a particular size or type of ship. One experimental approach to such a task 
would be to isolate particular acoustic variables available to sonar operators 
and to determine which variables, and under which conditions, give rise to the 
perception of differing qualities and types of shipping. This approach, 
however, based upon the reductive and controlled experimental procedures of 
conventional psychological investigation, has serious shortcomings. Firstly, 
one could waste considerable effort presenting subjects with irrelevant 
variables before discovering any useful findings. Secondly, and more 
fundamentally, one cannot be sure that the isolated variables that are presented 
will give rise to similar perceptual results as those that exist in a realistic 
context. Sonar information is highly complex and noisy, and it is possible that 
within such a context variables interact in some way that a reductive 
experiment could not predict. These problems led Solomon (1958; 1959a & b) 
to take account of the particular relationship of sonar operators, their "frame 
of reference" (1958, p. 422), in his research. Noting that sonar operators tend 
to categorise sounds using a specialised vocabulary, Solomon employed factor 
analysis of ratings along continua between adjectives to discover the 
perceptual similarity of real sonar sounds (1958) and was thus able to 
determine which sounds were perceived as having similar `meaning' within 
the context of sonar operation. Those sounds that were perceived similarly 
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were then analysed to discover their acoustic commonalities (1959a & b). This 
form of research has led to the possibility of modelling the perceptual tasks of 
the sonar operator (e. g. Howard and Ballas, 1983) with great success. It 
succeeds because it allows for the possibility that complex sounds are 
perceived according to the context provided by the organism that perceives 
them, and because the use of subjective scaling reduces the wastage entailed 
by more conventional methods. 
The problem with factor analysis of adjective ratings is that the results 
necessarily reflect the experimenters' choice of adjective pairs. Where a pre- 
existing vocabulary of adjectives, produced by a population in response to a 
pragmatic goal can be utilised, this problem is minimised- especially where 
a clear task is defined. For example, the classification of sonar sounds by 
sonar operators is required for a particular purpose: the identification of ships. 
The adjectives used by sonar operators to describe such sounds can be 
assumed to reflect the processes involved in a task with which they are 
familiar and skilled (see Solomon, 1958). However, if one uses such methods 
for more general perceptual tasks one runs the risk of accepting a descriptive 
terminology unfamiliar to subjects, an unfamiliar task, or both. The adjective 
pairs adopted by experimenters in such circumstances may reflect the 
perceptual variables that the researchers hope to find salient, and may bear 
little relation to the unconstrained categorisation subjects might adopt. Hence, 
the correlation of linguistic descriptors and acoustic parameters may fail truly 
to reflect the similarities perceived by subjects. Multidimensional scaling 
approaches sometimes attempt to avoid this problem by simply recording 
similarity judgements between stimuli and then attempting to find acoustic 
correlates (e. g. Howard and Silverman, 1976). This approach also has 
drawbacks, as one must assume that the acoustic correlates measured, rather 
than those ignored, account for the similarity judgements. This is again similar 
to the reductionist experimental paradigm, limited by those variables chosen 
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for analysis and isolated for presentation. Moreover, although 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) can avoid the oversimplification of complex 
stimuli it still begs questions regarding the choice of variables observed. For 
example, studies of instrumental timbre perception using MDS (e. g. Grey, 
1977; Grey and Gordon, 1978) have assumed from the outset that timbre is a 
discrete perceptual attribute, and that the judgements of similarity between 
events differing, for example, in amplitude envelope, spectral energy 
distribution, and the pattern of spectral distribution over time have some 
significance in explaining listeners' perception of sounds in situations outside 
the laboratory. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, Grey himself is quick to point 
out that the resulting three dimensional map of `timbres' is just as much a map 
of instrumental families. 
The studies addressed above are mainly concerned with non-temporal 
relationships between sounds. Howard and Ballas (1980; 1982) performed a 
series of experiments which aimed to address the perception of acoustic 
categories in sequences of pure tones and complex everyday sounds. In the 
first of these studies (Howard and Ballas, 1980) they presented short 
sequences of sounds which were either (i) generated in accordance with a 
finite state grammar; (ii) of equivalent length, but "ungrammatical"; or (iii) 
"noise" sequences which were randomly constructed. The elements in the 
sequences were either a set of pure tones, or a set of everyday complex 
sounds. Subjects had to distinguish, both with feedback and without, between 
grammatical and non-grammatical sequences. Although syntactical structure 
played an undeniable role in distinguishing between targets and non-targets, 
this effect was diminished where everyday sounds were employed, unless 
subjects were explicitly informed about the "semantic" relationship between 
these sounds. The results clearly show that the classification of auditory 
patterns relies upon both syntactical and semantic factors: everyday sounds 
cannot be regarded as being structurally equivalent to pure tones. Moreover in 
74 
Chapter 2 
a second study (Howard and Ballas, 1982), it was confirmed that syntactical 
structures were more easily differentiated from non-syntactical patterns when 
the patterns employed familiar everyday sounds as opposed to pure tones. 
Two conclusions can be drawn: everyday sounds suggest their own structural 
relationships which may conflict with an `abstract' syntactical structure 
imposed upon them. Secondly, sequences of everyday sounds may actually 
improve the acquisition of such abstract structures by providing "familiar 
scenarios" (Howard and Ballas, 1980, p. 439) within which to perceive 
sequential structure. This suggests that any attempt to observe the perception 
of complex familiar sounds cannot ignore their links with the environment and 
assume that such factors play no role in the perception of higher order 
temporal relationships. Although Howard and Ballas (1980; 1982) do not 
interpret these results within an ecological framework, such results are clearly 
consistent with notions of direct perception. 
Howard and Ballas' work suggests that the perception of sound 
sources may play a role not just in determining the classification of source 
events, but in the pick-up of higher-order relationships between sounds: 
"... the order of transient components within a pattern is not 
arbitrary, but rather reflects the temporal structure of the 
generating events. In an everyday example, one would expect 
to hear the garage door open before hearing the car being 
driven out. On the other hand, a car door opening could either 
precede or follow the sound of the engine being shut off. 
Although the temporal or syntactic structure which exists in 
patterns of this sort is clearly less rigid and well specified than 
that encountered in the grammars of language, some temporal 
structure does exist. " (Howard and Ballas, 1982, p. 158) 
This illustrates how important it is that an attempt is made to understand the 
invariant structures that specify source events since these not only identify 
what we are hearing at the level of individual sources, but may also determine 
the structural relationships between sounds perceived through such 
information. 
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The ecological approach provides a method for ascertaining the 
relationship between acoustic structures and perceived events which avoids 
many of the limitations of factor analysis and MDS through presenting 
realistic auditory stimulus information and attempting to find "existing 
connections between acoustic invariances and actions of humans" (Heine & 
Guski, 1991). Although research in this area is sparse, and often falls short of 
making the connection between perception and action in explicit terms, some 
degree of success has been achieved. Whereas psychoacousticians tend to 
focus upon noticeable differences in pitch, spectral structure, or duration, such 
research attempts to identify the transformations in acoustic structure which 
inform the listener of some change in the environment. For example, Warren 
and Verbrugge (1984) discovered that the distinction between "breaking" and 
"bouncing" glass is made by subjects on the basis of specific temporal 
invariants, rather than any frequency information. Although the noise burst 
that occurs at the start of the sound of a breaking bottle is absent in the case of 
bouncing, removing this spectral information has little effect on the 
discrimination of these two types of event. It seemed that the only information 
necessary for the discrimination of breaking and bouncing lies in their higher 
order temporal structures (see figure 2.1). In order to test this hypothesis, they 
constructed synthetic `breaking' and `bouncing' events which consisted of 
series of glass impact samples varying only in the temporal relationships 
between each sample, over four channels: this information alone was 
sufficient for subjects to distinguish between the two classes of event. As one 
can see from the figure, this temporal information consisted in the first 
instance (a) of a single pulse train with a damped period and in the second 
instance (b) of a synchronised onset followed by asynchronous damped pulse 
trains. These invariants are lawfully related to the events that produce them. In 
the first case a single object repeatedly impacts with a surface with a 
decreasing period due to the conversion of kinetic energy into, amongst other 
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things, sound. In the second case, a single object impacts with a surface and 
breaks. Subsequently, the parts of that object follow the temporal patterns of 
bouncing objects, each with different physical structures and hence different 
damping functions. Each of these parallel temporal structures is identified as 
coming from an originally unified source by the onset synchrony of the event 
as a whole. 
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Figure 2.1 A schematic representation of the synthesised bouncing (a) and breaking (b) 
patterns used in Warren & Verbrugge (1984). Each pattern consisted of the four numbered 
channels of glass-impact samples. The onset noise originally included in the breaking pattern 
is shown. Based on Warren & Verbrugge (1984), Figure 3, p. 708. Copyright permission 
obtained. 
It must be noted that the changes in inter-onset time and overall organisation 
of these patterns are specified by the physical nature of the event; it is hence 
possible to synthesise convincing virtual breaks and bounces by starting from 
a mechanical description of the masses, densities, elasticities and forces 
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involved in such an event. In this sense Warren and Verbrugge (1984) are 
involved in what might be described quite accurately as an "ecological" 
acoustics: certain invariant properties of the sound are directly and lawfully 
related to the physical properties of the causal event, and it is this lawfulness 
which specifies the event for the perceiver: 
"sound in isolation permits accurate identification of classes of 
sound producing events when the temporal structure of the 
sound is specific to the mechanical activity of the source" 
(Warren and Verbrugge, 1984, p. 705) 
Only certain invariants are necessary for such specificity, in this case, time 
relationships. It is only by performing experiments of this kind that such 
invariants can be identified and distinguished from acoustic structures that 
play no necessary perceptual role. 
A related study (Warren, Kim and Husney, 1987) provided even more 
startling evidence for the role of higher order structure in auditory perception 
and its lawful relationship with the physical properties of events. It would 
seem that the elasticity of balls can be as successfully perceived and acted 
upon when subjects hear a single bounce period (the period between two 
bounces of the ball), relative period being completely superfluous. The 
interesting feature of this experiment is that according to purely physical 
principles the duration of a single bounce is not as accurate a predictor of 
elasticity as a more complex variable such as the relative period of a number 
of bounces, as it varies according to starting height as well as elasticity. The 
research suggests that the most likely reason for this is that for "ecologically 
reasonable" values of elasticity the correlation with a single bounce duration is 
close enough to give accurate judgement. Moreover, this work on temporal 
invariances (see also Spelke 1976; 1979) has shown that such invariants, 
whether as information for the elasticity of bouncing balls or as information 
for correctly synchronising optical and acoustical patterns of events, can often 
be seen as intermodal, as operating across two or more modalities. In the first 
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study, for example, it was found that the temporal structure of the impacts of 
bouncing balls specified their relative elasticity regardless of whether the 
temporal information was made available in the auditory or visual domain. In 
both cases the visual and auditory information can be regarded as specifying 
elasticity due to the relationship between the temporal structure of a 
mechanical event and the temporal structure of the period between impacts of 
an object. It is clear from this research that a lawful relationship obtains 
between the physical structure of such events and the acoustic or visual 
information available to the organism. This relationship is not physical, nor is 
it imposed by the organism: rather it is picked up through our contact with the 
lawful behaviour of environmental events, and hence can be described as 
specifying such events directly. 
In a similar vein Repp (1987) and Freed (1990) have searched for 
other acoustic properties which specify events lawfully. Freed (1990) 
investigated the possible acoustical correlates of "perceived mallet hardness" 
using real mallet sounds. Here, subjects were able to perceive mallet hardness 
independently of the attributes of the object being struck to make an 
"environment-oriented judgement". The reliable judgements of mallet 
hardness could be predicted on the basis of the spectral energy distribution of 
the different mallet sounds. Here, spectral invariants seem to specify the 
interaction of materials according to the physical nature of the event. 
Similarly, Repp (1987) discovered that hand claps are consistently yet 
incorrectly categorised by gender. Although classifications into male and 
female clappers are consistent across subjects they do not reliably predict 
gender, rather they predict the physical configuration of the hands and the 
tempo and intensity of the clapping. Low frequencies in the spectra seemed to 
correlate with palm to palm clapping; high frequencies with palm to fingers. 
The perception of gender differences seemed to rely upon the classification of 
higher, softer, faster claps as being female, according to a cultural stereotype. 
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One must interpret this as providing evidence for lawful and invariant 
relationships between physical actions and judgements of causation, rather 
than the matching of stored representations of `male' and `female' clapping 
sounds with acoustic stimuli. 
The analysis of the free categorisation of environmental events gives 
considerable credence to the hypothesis that, in everyday situations, it is more 
often the physical nature of an event that is perceived than the abstract sensory 
qualities of the sound produced (Vanderveer, 1979; Jenkins, 1984; Gaver, 
1993). Sounds are produced by events in the world, and the acoustical 
structure picked up by the listener contains invariant information that specifies 
the kind of event producing a particular sound. Events are lawfully related to 
their causes, and it is these lawful relationships that are perceived through 
structured and invariant information. We need not reconstruct or represent the 
causes that lead to a particular event, as our perceptual systems have evolved 
in an environment that behaves lawfully: a vibrating object produces sound 
waves that are related to the size, composition and shape of that object and the 
amount of energy applied, and the interactions between objects produce sound 
waves related directly to their individual physical characteristics and the mode 
of interaction. Any sound is the result of energy being transferred from a 
radiating body to a transmitting medium, and as the auditory system has 
evolved as a survival-driven interface with the environment it is the causal 
qualities of events that listeners will perceive. As Kendall notes: 
"In everyday life, sound events arise from action, in fact, from 
the transfer of energy to a sounding object. The auditory 
system provides us with perceptual characterizations of the 
energy transfer and of the internal structure of the objects 
involved. Early in childhood one learns to recognize the 
occurrence of sound events and to relate them to physical 
events... " (Kendall, 1991, p. 71) 
Moreover, sounds, as Gibson would assert, do not identify their 
causes, or signify them, they specify events or objects that afford. For 
example, striking an object may produce a sound that informs the perceiver 
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that the object affords "filling" due to invariant properties that specify an 
affordance structure of "hollowness". In this case structured auditory 
information specifies not only that the object is hollow, but that it might afford 
the carrying of water or some other fluid, just as the perception of the 
elasticity of a bouncing ball might tell us that the ball affords `catching' as it 
allows the catcher to predict how high that ball will bounce given a certain 
input of energy (Warren, Kim and Husney, 1987). The links between 
structured perceptual information and the organisation of action are in these 
cases embedded within the larger context provided by the mutual relationships 
between organism and environment. Such links are direct, in the sense that 
they exist by virtue of relationships between action and perception that are not 
arbitrary in nature; they are not constructed by the organism, but discovered 
through that organism's exploration of the environment. This is not to say that 
a listener may not, through extended transactions with such structure, learn to 
perceive new affordances, or that such affordances may become more detailed 
and specific. However, it suggests that perceptual development does not 
depend upon providing such structure; such structure already exists in the 
relationship between a human organism and its environment. Sounds provide 
direct awareness of the ways in which particular objects may be acted upon, 
and the results of such actions. The transformational invariants which specify 
a bottle breaking (see Warren and Verbrugge, 1984) also specify its change in 
morphology. More importantly than specifying such a change is the 
relationship this specifies for the listener. The transformation of one fillable 
object into a number of un-fillable fragments precludes that object's potential 
as a fluid-carrying vessel. A change in structure is not behaviourally neutral: 
the affordance structure has changed, and this change may be directly 
specified by the event perceived. In this sense it is misleading to portray the 
perception of `breaking' as some ecologically neutral classification of this 
event. It is perceived in so far as it changes the relationship between listener 
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and environment: the bottle no longer affords filling. Within this perspective, 
the knowledge that the bottle is `broken' does not explain why we do not 
attempt subsequently to fill it with water and drink from it. We might describe 
the bottle as broken in order to communicate this change in structure and its 
behavioural consequences, but such a labelling cannot explain our actions. 
The representation of an object as broken, and hence useless for its task, relies 
precisely upon a change in its affordance structure which is available to the 
listener regardless of such explicit labelling. 
Additional support for the hypothesis that the structure of events is 
lawfully related to auditory perception is to be found in the modelling of 
natural sounds according to the physical properties of their causal events. 
Gayer (1992) has demonstrated the success of using physical models of 
vibration, and single and multiple collisions between objects, for synthesising 
the contrasting sounds of scraping surfaces and hitting wooden or metal 
objects. Other approaches, such as that of Claude Cadoz (e. g. Cadoz, Luciani 
& Florens, 1984; Cadoz, Lisowski & Florens, 1990) at the Association pour la 
Creation at la Recherche sur les Outils d'Expression (ACROE) in Grenoble 
exploit the explicitly ecological notion of directly linking synthesis algorithms 
based upon physical models of objects or instruments with gesture 
transducers. These links are direct in the sense that the player of such a virtual 
instrument has a degree of tactile and auditory feedback that relates in an 
ecologically reasonable way to the gestures he or she makes. The model not 
only produces sounds according to a model of a string, but also generates 
haptic and acoustic feedback according to the model in the form of the forces 
involved in a `virtual' interaction between `string', `bow' and the energy input 
from the `player'. Such models explicitly rely upon the directness of event 
perception and the way in which perception and action reciprocate one 
another. 
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Such research has led Gaver (1992; 1993; personal communication) to 
propose that both synthetic and real events may be perceived in terms of their 
probable causation, whether or not this causation is actual. A real source is not 
necessary for the perception of a physical cause. Since the invariant structures 
which specify a particular event may be modelled, presented and controlled in 
synthesised sounds, it is clear that the notion of causal correspondence is of 
limited importance: although events are specified by certain invariants this is 
not to say that these invariants have to be produced by any actual physical 
interaction of materials. It would be absurd to argue that controlling an 
algorithmic `string' via a gesture transducer relies upon the perception of a 
causal relationship between player, `bow' and `string' in any physical sense. 
Rather it is the transaction between player and a set of familiar invariant 
haptic and auditory structures which forms the link between action and 
perception. In the following section the consequences of this will be shown to 
be extremely important to the relationship between sounds and their perceived 
sources in acousmatic music. 
In summary, the view presented here is that the auditory system has 
evolved to pick up environmental features that allow the organism to perceive 
those structures that are lawfully governed by the physical properties of sound 
sources and types of sound-generating interaction: event perception. 
Moreover, such sensitivity to sounds as information for events, in the light of 
work on the sequential structure of complex sounds (Howard and Ballas, 
1980; 1982), cannot be regarded as independent from the perception of longer 
term structures. Before discussing the relevance of this perspective for 
describing and analysing the perception of acousmatic music, however, it 
must again be noted that the research cited does not represent a complete 
ecological theory of audition. As discussed above, no mention has been made 
of work in sound localisation or judgements of distance. Similarly, a 
discussion of the factors involved in auditory scene analysis (see Bregman, 
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1990), the segregation of acoustic information into discrete auditory `streams', 
has been avoided, even though the latter could be seen as playing a large role 
in developing descriptions and analyses of acousmatic music which have 
perceptual veracity (see e. g. McAdams, 1984; McAdams and Bregman, 1979). 
The development of research in auditory streaming is seen here as a parallel 
project to this one as it tells us little about the specificity of event perception. 
It is one thing to develop a method of segmenting acoustic information, quite 
another to describe what information these auditory streams provide about 
their sources' structure. Indeed it is common to distinguish within such work 
between schematic and primitive processes in segregation, those that depend 
upon knowledge-driven processes, and those that proceed without the 
intervention of memory and learning (Bregman, 1990). Within an ecological 
perspective such a distinction is meaningless: all perceptual processes are 
determined by the relationship between organism and environment, and 
learning is regarded as the refinement of sensitivity to invariants (Gibson, 
1966). Work in scene analysis tends implicitly or explicitly to maintain a 
distinction between perception and cognition and suggest that the latter, by 
relating sense-data to stored representations explains our ability to perceive 
the relationship between sounds and their corresponding events. This entails a 
perspective in which the lawfulness of event perception is ignored: the 
extremely artificial nature of the stimulus information generally used in scene 
analysis research tacitly denies the importance of higher order structure in 
complex acoustic information in the segregation or classification of everyday 
sounds. Throughout this thesis it will be assumed that scene analysis occurs in 
listening, just as it will be assumed that listeners may attend to different 
aspects of acoustic information. Whether or not a more ecologically based 
description of these processes can be developed is not a primary concern here. 
What will prove important is not the segmentation or localisation of sources 
within a complex acoustic "signal", but the way in which higher order 
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acoustic invariances specify physical interactions. This view of auditory 
perception is not a complete one, but serves the purpose of addressing the 
kinds of auditory information available to us from our immediate 
surroundings. Such information is not more `complex' than the steady state 
tones and noise-bursts studied by psychoacousticians as long as it is described 
at an appropriate level, that of the structural and transformational invariants 
which have some relevance to everyday human behaviour. What is required in 
this context is to clarify the appropriateness of such descriptions to acousmatic 
music. Already, however, it has been shown that an ecological approach to 
auditory perception explicitly acknowledges the relationship between listener 
and environment and hence between acoustic information and the perception 
of events. 
2.1.3 Event perception in acousmatic music 
According to the view of auditory perception presented above, sounds are not 
perceived as abstract entities related only one to another, as `tone colours' or 
timbres, nor are they perceived as standing for concepts or things, as signs. 
Instead they provide unmediated contact between listener and significant 
environmental occurrences. Such a perspective does not imply that sounds 
cannot be described as having `qualities' such as those provided by Schaeffer 
(1966) or that they cannot be used as signs, whether culturally convened or 
more directly motivated. It does imply, nevertheless, that such mediated 
concepts are unnecessary for sounds to inform us about our environment. In 
an ecological framework, sounds provide an organism with information that 
allows it to locate, identify and successfully interact with food sources, 
predators, or members of its own species with which it may mate, collaborate 
or challenge for territory. 
Such an approach may seem at first peculiarly unsuited to describing 
the perception of music. However, as will become clear, acousmatic music, 
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due to its acoustic structures, benefits from exploring this most direct level of 
perception. Gayer (1993) notes that the concentration upon `musical' sounds 
in acoustics, psychoacoustics, and latterly music perception, can be seen as a 
primary factor in our "ignorance" regarding "everyday listening": 
"... an account of hearing based on the sounds and perceptions 
of musical instruments often seems biased and difficult to 
generalise. Musical sounds are not representative of the range 
of sounds we normally hear. Most musical sounds are 
harmonic; most everyday sounds inharmonic or noisy. Musical 
sounds tend to have a smooth, relatively simple temporal 
evolution; everyday sounds tend to be much more complex. 
Musical sounds seem to reveal little about their sources; while 
everyday sounds often provide a great deal of information 
about theirs. Finally, musical instruments afford changes of the 
sounds they make along relatively uninformative dimensions 
such as pitch or loudness, while everyday events involve many 
more kinds of changes-changes that are often musically 
useless but pragmatically important. Our current knowledge 
about sound and hearing has been deeply influenced by the 
study of a rather idiosyncratic subset of sounds and sources. " 
(Gayer, 1993, p. 3) 
If Gaver means traditional musical sounds in the above quotation, as one must 
assume he does, then what about the use of noisy, unpitched, inharmonic, 
source identifying sounds utilised by acousmatic composers? The materials of 
the acousmatic composer are often precisely those sounds excluded from a 
traditional view of musical sounds and sources. More importantly, it is these 
non-musical sounds and sources which are perceived by listeners: the 
parameters of pitch and rhythm are often hard to find in acousmatic music, 
and instrumental and vocal sources no more likely than the sounds of the 
everyday environment. Clearly, Gaver is correct to admonish research in 
auditory perception which ignores everyday sounds. Equally, however, it is 
clear that such criticism must also be levelled at research in music perception 
which fails to act upon the changes in the nature of the acoustic structure of 
music represented by acousmatic composition. Applying research based upon 
"the sounds and perceptions of musical instruments" to acousmatic music is as 
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biased and inappropriate as applying it to everyday listening,. Gaver's 
description of the distinction between musical and everyday sounds, despite 
his assertion that noisy sounds and pragmatic listening have no musical role to 
play, could almost be translated into a description of the distinction between 
the sounds of traditional and acousmatic music. Similarly, when Jenkins 
(1984, pp. 129-132) notes that "Music seems to belong in a space or world of 
its own" and emphasises "the special status that music may have in the realm 
of acoustic events" he is quick to discriminate between "sound effects" which 
often rely upon contact with the more familiar `everyday' world and 
perception in such a specialised context as music. Within this context 
acousmatic music seems often to resemble the practice of sound effects in 
radio broadcast more than it does conventional music. 
Before attempting to show how an ecological approach may be used to 
form the basis for describing and analysing acousmatic music, Balzano's 
ecological description of pitch structure (Balzano, 1980; 1882; 1986) must be 
addressed as it shows the necessity of describing musical structures in 
appropriate terms. Balzano attempts to find a "level of description" for pitch 
structure based not upon the structure of individual tones or interval 
relationships, but in the structured pitch sets that form the basis of much 
instrumental and vocal music. The important implication of Balzano's work is 
not his decision to do this, but the reasoning that lies behind this decision. 
Choosing an appropriate level of structural description is of benefit here 
because for most music 
"Streams of pitches arrayed over time that do not generate a 
determinate pitch set, such as the intonation contours of normal 
1 Moreover, there is no reason to assume that an `everyday' account of listening has nothing 
to offer in explaining the perception of traditional instrumental music. Davidson (1993) has 
found remarkable evidence for the intermodal perception of expressive "intentions" in 
instrumental performance which suggest that the movements of the performer's body are 
directly specified by visual invariants and that these invariants are just as informative of 
musical structure as are changes in the auditory signal. Indeed, it has been further suggested (Todd, Clarke and Davidson, 1993) that such intermodality may be the result of the 
movements of the peformer being directly linked with the patterns of tempo fluctuation which 
seem to correspond to the `phrasing' of the music. 
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human speech, do not normally elicit a state of the listener 
commonly associated with perceiving music. " 
(Balzano, 1982, p. 321) 
Balzano assumes that structured pitch sets, more commonly known as scales, 
may have properties that are independent from descriptions of their 
constituent acoustic elements, or frequency ratios between elements. This 
assumption, although inappropriate to acousmatic music, rests upon the same 
reasoning which motivates this project: acoustic information is structured and 
informative but since such structure only becomes transparent at particular 
levels of description, a major concern must be isolating such a level. Just as 
studying the frequency ratios or harmonic spectra of sounds may be 
inappropriate for discovering invariances in the structure of scale-based music, 
indeed too fine-grained for such analysis, expecting to find in the rhythmic or 
frequency structure of acousmatic music an appropriate level of description 
seems absurd. Likewise, research in timbre seems more concerned with 
prescribing musical practice than describing it. Viewing the practice of 
acousmatic music as leading to an increase in musical complexity, driven by 
the finer and finer grain control over musical materials available to the 
composer, seems to encourage research which attempts to control this 
apparent complexity at the most detailed level. Faced by an infinite palette of 
potential timbres and infinite gradations of frequency and time, the question 
posed seems to be one of finding appropriate ways of structuring such 
continuous variables (e. g. Wessel, 1979). However, there is no reason to 
require perceptual and music-analytical research to follow such prescriptions. 
What seems more important is to recognise that many of these infinitely 
variable sounds, and their combinations, seem remarkably familiar in 
everyday terms. The sounds may have been recontextualised, processed or 
generated by a synthesis algorithm, but to ignore the human perceptual 
system's ability to perceive the higher order structures of the everyday 
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acoustic environment through such sounds would be to ignore the direct way 
in which our everyday perceptions normally connect us with the world. 
Although the appropriateness of choosing an everyday level of 
description may seem to have its most obvious benefits for understanding the 
use of recorded `concrete' sounds in acousmatic music, this thesis proposes 
more than this. A concrete sound may be edited or processed in such a way as 
to conceal its original source, just as a synthetic sound, with no corresponding 
environmental cause, may specify an unambiguous `surrogate' environmental 
origin. Moreover, such matters may or may not be under compositional 
control. Just as a composer might attempt for example to exclude any 
connections between his or her piece and familiar events whilst a listener 
might still hear such connections, whether or not these are veridical, so also a 
composer's intentional `narrative' of familiar sounds might be 
misapprehended where a listener fails to perceive the `correct' sound sources. 
Just as physical models of sound-producing events may create virtual 
instruments and events (see above, section 2.1.2) through modelling invariant 
acoustic information, such invariances may be perceived regardless of their 
actual causation. 
This discussion can be clarified by a distinction between real and 
virtual events. Both real and virtual events are specified in the same way, by 
acoustic invariances that are lawfully related to the physical interactions that 
produce sound. In the latter case of virtual events, however, perception is not 
veridical: the listener hears an event that has not occurred. In a sense all the 
events of an acousmatic piece are virtual, since they do not inform the listener 
about his or her real environment. An acousmatic piece destroys the direct and 
continuous relationship between acoustic invariants and the surroundings of 
the listener through its fixed artefactual nature. Although one can `explore' 
such a piece through repeated listening, and by interrupting the flow of the 
piece using a tape recording or other device, one cannot do much more than 
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this to `explore' the acoustic scene, due to the mediation of recording 
technology. Moreover, the acousmatic piece prevents the listener from 
exploring the environment in an intermodal fashion: the `acousmatic' 
(Schaeffer, 1966) prevents the listener from using his or her other perceptual 
systems (vision, touch, smell, taste), and intimately relating the events 
perceived with one's actions. Neither are the sounds of an acousmatic piece 
directly relevant to the listener: the sounds clearly originate from a number of 
loudspeakers, and despite all the efforts of research in modelling spatial 
perception (see e. g. Kistler and Wightman, 1992) one cannot forget that a 
listener to an acousmatic piece is already inhabiting an environment within 
which an impoverished `virtual' environment is presented2. In another sense 
however, such events are just as `real' as any to be found outside acousmatic 
music. The ability of listeners to identify a recording of an oboe, or for that 
matter a synthesised oboe, is not significantly different from their ability to 
identify a water sound, whether produced by granular synthesis techniques or 
through an actuality recording. The recorded and diffused acoustic structures 
may to a certain extent be impoverished, but this does not mean that listeners 
may not exploit their sensitivity to invariances in the perception of individual 
sounds or the structural relationships between them. The differences between 
listening to an acousmatic piece and listening to the environment are 
important and unavoidable. In sections 2.2 and 2.3 they will be discussed and 
shown to reveal important consequences for the perception of affordances, and 
for aesthetic interpretation. Here, such discussion will be deferred in order to 
address the role that event perception can play in providing a suitable level of 
description for acousmatic music. 
2 Noble (1981, p. 68; also see Gibson, 1966, pp. 233-234) notes the same limitations for film 
projection. Here, since the visual image is, amongst other things, insufficiently wide to fill our 
visual field, it is this, not our head and eyes which constrain looking and hence perceiving. In 
fact there are much more pressing contextual and social perceptions which constrain the 
sense of realism in both cinematic and acousmatic presentations which will be discussed in 
section 2.3. Although, as Noble points out, visual displays that fill the field of view can 
produce physiological reactions that suggest greater `realism', such reactions are not generally 
interpreted by the perceiver as being ` real. ' 
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Given that the human organism's perceptual systems have evolved to 
pick up invariant acoustic structures that specify everyday events it is 
reasonable to suggest that where these invariant structures occur in acousmatic 
music a listener will be able to perceive the events and objects which would 
normally and lawfully give rise to such structures. It is sometimes all too easy 
to confuse the sounds of an acousmatic piece with the `accidental' sounds that 
often intrude into listening environment. Given that most acousmatic pieces 
eschew more familiar `musical' events such as discrete pitch structures, 
relatively hierarchical or periodic rhythmic structures and familiar 
instrumental sources, more often than not, the only familiar structures 
available to the listener are those that specify everyday events. Moreover, 
given that such familiar events may be directly specified, it follows that any 
longer term sequence of sounds is liable to be perceived in terms of these 
events. As Howard and Ballas have shown, the `syntactic' structure of a 
sequence of sounds interacts with the `semantic' structure formed through the 
events that they may specify (see Howard and Ballas, 1980; 1982; discussed 
above on pp. 72-73). Any structural description of acousmatic music must take, 
into account the possibility that listeners are sensitive not only to temporal and 
frequency relationships as such, but as information for events. Moreover, it is 
suggested that event perception most often dominates more abstract structures. 
This argument is as important for synthesised sounds and heavily processed 
sounds as it is for samples or more extended actuality recordings. This can 
work both ways: certain synthesis techniques betray their real causation to 
those familiar with them, whilst those unfamiliar with the technical processes 
and resulting sounds of computer music hear one or more virtual event of 
more general specificity. Frequency modulation, additive and subtractive 
sound synthesis, the use of a phase vocoder are all quite easily, even 
unavoidably, heard by practitioners in the field and early electronic music is 
generally easily identifiable for this reason alone. For a naive listener, 
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however, many FM sounds tend to specify bells through their inharmonic 
frequency structure; the sounds of early electronic music might specify the 
sound track of an early science fiction movie3 and its attendant `futuristic' 
technology which makes bleeps and bloops, because of their steady state or 
artificially filtered spectra; and many other synthetic sounds are heard as 
having percussive, or vibrating sources. The two types of listener may 
describe what they hear in different ways, and may focus upon different 
aspects of the auditory structure, but the links between such structure and the 
source event are lawful and `out there' waiting to be discovered. 
It could be argued at this point that by prioritising the perceived events 
that give rise to sound, such a perspective denies the `musicality' of 
acousmatic music, reducing listening to the identification of sound sources 
and events. On the contrary, it is proposed that by assuming that abstract 
structuring principles might be identified which are independent of event 
perception one runs the risk of missing the most important facet of acousmatic 
music. The undoubted ability of listeners to perceive sources, even where such 
perceptions are non-veridical, suggests that it is precisely the gap between 
`everyday' listening and `musical' listening which is of importance. One must 
not forget that most of our listening is intimately concerned with events and 
objects, not their aesthetic contemplation. This `gap' will be returned to in 
detail in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Here it suffices to emphasise that however 
inappropriate this level of description may seem to be, it is nonetheless of 
fundamental importance. Acousmatic music is often criticised for its 
resemblance to everyday sounds, whether mechanical or natural. It is the 
intention here to show that such resemblance, however inevitable, does not 
run counter to this music's aesthetic status. Describing the events that 
3 Louis and Bebe Barron's music for the film Forbidden Planet manages to blur the 
distinction between sound effects and music through the use of identifiably `synthetic' 
sounds: here the synthetic nature of the sounds is dominant, and seems to occupy a strange 
position: the sounds are virtual in the sense that their sources are supposedly from the future, 
but quite real in the sense that they correspond to the operation of the machinery in the film 
and in that their real sources (oscillators and noise generators) are perceived. 
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acousmatic music specifies provides a level of description to which all 
listeners have access, regardless of their ability to mediate such perceptions 
through abstract terminology. Moreover, the perception of sound-producing 
events affords analysis that takes into account the longer term `causal' 
connections between such events. Juxtaposing and merging sounds in an 
acousmatic piece cannot be viewed in purely abstract terms. If events are 
directly perceivable, then their temporal positions and transformations in a 
piece are subject to the lawfulness of perception: the connection between the 
sound of a door and its handle are not spectrally related but related through 
our familiarity with their sources' physical relationship and our perceptual 
relationship with these sources' affordance structures (as in Wishart's piece 
Red Bird). Similarly, the close temporal proximity and sequential order of a 
noise burst and a harmonic sound which gradually decays in intensity makes 
sense as an object being struck or plucked in a way which these sounds on 
their own or in reverse order do not (see e. g. Smalley, 1986). It is not 
suggested that this should be interpreted as prescribing any relationship 
between sounds. What is proposed, however, is that to ignore such 
relationships is to ignore the kinds of structure with which human listeners are 
most familiar. Moreover, it is not suggested that an ecologically `illogical' 
sequence or combination of sounds is illogical per se. However, such a 
sequence or combination may be perceived within the context of the lawful 
nature of the everyday environment. By identifying ecologically lawful 
sequences of events it is possible to describe and analyse acousmatic music in 
a fashion that is grounded in the familiar perceptual context within which 
listening most often occurs, but which assumes nothing about the way in 
which acousmatic music should be heard. In the following section the limits of 
this approach will be tested, and it will be shown that event perception 
provides an essential, but preliminary, stage in forming descriptions and 
analyses of acousmatic music. 
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2.1.4 Event perception and analytical pertinence 
In Chapter 1, attention was drawn to the problems of defining the "pertinent 
units" of acousmatic music. The appropriateness of deriving a definition of 
pertinence from research in timbral perception, Schaeffer's conception of the 
objet sonore and a number of documentary and notational sources was 
questioned. It was argued that perceptual descriptions might form the basis for 
defining pertinence, especially where such descriptions avoided the implicit 
and explicit assumptions made about music's self-referential structure. Indeed, 
the mimetic aspect of acousmatic music was seen to demand attention to the 
ways in which sounds relate not only to each other, or to a culturally convened 
musical system, but to the `extra-musical' world. Event perception seems 
immediately to provide a theoretical framework for observing such 'extra- 
musical' concerns. In its insistence upon describing sounds as information for 
events, it explicitly points towards an analysis of acousmatic music which 
regards events, not sounds, as the primary units of auditory perception. Within 
such an analytical approach, pertinence might be defined according to the 
events that may be perceived through the acoustic structure of the music, 
rather than acoustic structure in itself or any higher level description of that 
acoustic structure such as rhythm, pitch or timbral structure. Hence, one might 
argue that segmenting acousmatic music according to the events perceived 
provides a valuable alternative to segmenting it according to specious acoustic 
or documentary evidence. Such segmentations could then be analysed 
according to the relationships between events that might be perceived by 
listeners. Pertinence in acousmatic music would therefore become defined 
according to the lawful nature of everyday listening, and one might argue that 
such a mode of listening represents some primitive or naive level of 
perception: sounds would be distinguished from one another and related to 
one another on the basis of distinctions and relationships between their 
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perceived environmental origins, however virtual these might be. Such a 
definition of pertinence would lead to analyses that explicitly prioritise the 
`extra-musical' aspects of acousmatic music. 
Although such a basis for defining pertinence might be preferable to 
Nattiez' unwarranted trust in the scores of acousmatic pieces (see Chapter 1, 
p. 33) as the evidence upon which a process of "discretization" might result, it 
would entail a considerable cost to the analyst. Just as one might criticise 
existing analytical approaches for their implicit or explicit immersion in the 
ideology of musical self-referentiality, such an event-based segmentation 
procedure would be guilty of ignoring the musical context within which 
listeners perceive acousmatic music. In order to illustrate the consequences of 
ignoring the distinction between `everyday' and `aesthetic' perception two 
analyses will be discussed below, one of which takes a radical view of the role 
of everyday perception, the other a more flexible view. Both analyses take as 
their starting point the everyday familiarity of the sounds in acousmatic music, 
and both assume that listeners exploit acoustic invariances in their 
interpretations of the music. However, the analyses differ in their 
interpretation of the ecological approach to psychology itself, and point 
towards the different ways in which such an approach might be used to 
discover `meaning'. The two analyses will also reveal an important distinction 
between two conflicting approaches to `structure'. Although the first analysis 
may seem the most radically `ecological', it is the second that shows the way 
in which Gibson's approach to perception might provide a fruitful alternative 
to the view that musical artefacts can be analysed as closed and self-referential 
objects which refer only to themselves and a canonic musical tradition, and 
the first that implicitly maintains such a view. 
The first approach (Windsor, 1994), considered the consequences of 
segmenting and analysing a fragment of Denis Smalley's Wind Chimes 
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(music example 2.1) according to a strict definition of pertinence derived 
from ecological acoustics: 
"... the acoustic surface of an electroacoustic piece may be 
segmented on the basis of ecological pertinence; whether a 
sound or sequence of sounds is perceived to be caused by a 
familiar everyday source. Just as linguistic pertinence may be 
derived from the relationship between acoustic changes and the 
discrete categories provided by a system of language..., 
electroacoustic pertinence is derived here from the relationship 
between acoustic changes and their specification of discrete 
environmental events. " (Windsor, 1994, p. 305) 
In a similar fashion to that of Gaver (1993) the sounds of the extract are 
classified according to the materials and interactions between materials that 
would cause these sounds in everyday situations. These classes of event are 
general enough to avoid any discussion of cultural specificity: describing a 
material as /solid/, and an interaction as an /impact/, it is argued, expresses 
cross-cultural information that listeners might use in the perception of events' 
affordances. These paradigmatic classifications allow a syntagmatic analysis 
which produces a linear, but parallel, segmentation of the extract, and more 
than this an analysis of the possible causal links between separate events. For 
example, a /solid impact/ followed by /vibrating solid/ would become 
syntagmatically linked as they could be interpreted as having a causal 
environmental relationship. 
The question of `interpretation' leads to the first problem of this 
approach. Despite the formal nature of the analysis, the decision to interpret a 
particular sound as corresponding to a particular event seems at once over- 
constrained and arbitrary: by appealing to some ideal `naive' listener, or more 
precisely an individual's ability to masquerade as such, the analysis rests upon 
a definition of pertinence which is contrary to the whole spirit of the 
ecological approach. As noted in the previous section, sounds are not 
classified by our perception of their invariances, rather it is their affordances 
that are specified. Within this context the notion of interpretation seems oddly 
out of place: if the analyst has to interpret the sounds he or she hears in order 
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to arrive at the ecological units of the analysis, and then bases an analysis on 
the labels provided for these units, then clearly the analysis, however 
ecological in its motivation, has departed from ecological principles to some 
considerable degree. The resulting analysis replaces a "neutral level" based 
upon documentary evidence or acoustic analysis with an analysis that purports 
to be ecologically neutral. The whole notion of neutrality, however, is 
questionable: sounds may provide information for events, but the affordances 
of these events are not determined by these events alone, but our relationship 
to them. By proposing that an analysis based upon source events is neutral, the 
mutuality of perception so important to the ecological approach is denied. To 
argue that the sound of `two solid objects' colliding specifies the same thing 
as hearing two specific objects colliding such as `leather on willow' denies the 
difference between hearing leather on willow and any other two objects just as 
it denies the differences between hearing leather on willow for someone 
listening to an acousmatic work and someone listening to a radio broadcast of 
a cricket match 
. 
Interestingly, the affordance of hearing `leather on willow' is 
as unclear as it is for any listening situation in which direct involvement seems 
inappropriate: it cannot contribute to an affordance of `catching' in a radio 
broadcast, but nevertheless accurately specifies an event with clear meaning. 
The generality of this first analytical approach seems to obscure as much as it 
reveals through its appeal to everyday listening in an extremely un-everyday 
context. 
The second problem with this first approach is that it makes an implicit 
assumption about the distinction between `culture' and `nature' in perception. 
Although Gibson makes a clear distinction between "direct" and "indirect" 
perception (Gibson, 1966; 1979; Reed, 1991) this distinction is not to be 
confused with a simple culture-nature divide. Direct perception refers to 
perception that operates by virtue of an organism's ability to pick up 
unmediated affordances; indirect perception refers to the perception of 
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anything mediated through the representation of perceptual information in 
another form, such as pictures, speech, writing and so on. Within this context 
a cultural artefact may be perceived directly and indirectly: a book may afford 
`grasping' and `opening' directly, just as its written contents might indirectly 
inform the perceiver. As both Costall and Still (1989) and Noble (1981) point 
out, the distinction between indirect and direct perception itself proves 
problematic. The human environment is largely made of human artefacts, 
making it difficult to distinguish between indirect and direct perception: the 
social and cultural constraints provided by the human environment have led 
such commentators to suggest that socially and culturally mediated 
information might not be perceived in a fundamentally different way to that 
provided by the unmediated environment. Just as a book affords `reading', so 
also the acoustic information in an acousmatic piece might afford active 
involvement of a specific kind quite different from that afforded by the same 
acoustic information in an everyday context. The sounds of an acousmatic 
piece are mediated by both social and technological means, and if one is to 
talk of the affordances of the events they might specify, it becomes necessary 
to analyse more carefully the effects on perception of these factors. As 
Smoliar (1993) points out, both Gaver (e. g. 1993) and Schaeffer (1966) tend 
to disrupt the continuous and mutual relationship between an organism's 
perceptual systems and environment (Gibson, 1966) in their concentration 
upon sound as a discrete source of information. The exploration of the 
environment does not just result in changes in the auditory domain, but within 
the context of information provided across the senses of an organism. The 
perception of an acousmatic piece does not occur in a purely auditory domain, 
and the affordances of such a piece cannot be viewed without reference to 
corollary information picked up by the listener. It is intuitively clear that a 
listener at an acousmatic concert does not perceive the affordances of a lion's 
roar in the same way as a hunter on the plains of Africa, however 
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`realistically' recorded and diffused, despite that listener's pick up of the same 
acoustic invariances. The analysis discussed above builds its description and 
analysis of an acousmatic piece upon a closed system of relationships telling 
us little about the relationship between that piece and the perceiver. Although 
the relationships analysed are based upon everyday listening, they fail to do 
more than replace `musical' relationships with `everyday' relationships in 
such a way as to deny the cultural and social significance of sounds. 
Moreover, in the `bracketing' of other sources of information such an analysis 
is as limited in scope as that of an analysis based upon Schaeffer's "objet 
sonore". 
In order to show how event perception does provide the basis for a 
more revealing analysis a second approach will be advanced. During the 
course of Wishart's Red Bird the sound of a slamming book is transformed 
into the slamming of a door (music example 2.2). Wishart seems to intend 
this transformation as an expression of the imprisonment of freedom by 
rational, logocentric thought (see Wishart, 1978). Leaving to one side, for 
simplicity, contextual information, such as the threatening utterance "listen to 
reason" and the buzzing of the "fly" that accompanies the transformation, one 
can clearly see that the isomorphism between `book' and `door' requires the 
perception that some structural feature common to both sounds is held 
invariant, that of the auditory information that specifies `slamming'. 
Moreover, it is necessary for some features to be transformed between the two 
events, those that specify the materials that are in collision: bound paper in the 
case of the book and the solid material of the door. Wishart exaggerates the 
differences between the materials by presenting the sounds of pages being 
turned in the case of the book, and a rattling handle in the case of the door. An 
isomorphic relationship is thus created between two distinct events by their 
common information for slamming, yet the two objects are distinguishable by 
virtue of information for the different materials that are slammed. This level of 
99 
Chapter 2 
perceptual similarity manages to link two very different objects allowing for 
the semiotic isomorphism that Wishart desires. The particular interpretation 
proposed by Wishart of <<imprisonment by reason>> might not be reached. 
Instead one might interpret the link between the two sounds as 
<<imprisonment of reason, for example. Although Wishart states that the 
book sound is that of a book being slammed on a table (Wishart, 1992), it is 
quite easy to perceive this sound as that of a book being slammed shut. The 
shutting of a book hides the text, and this could be equated with the shutting 
away of reason. Moreover, even if one perceives a book being slammed down 
on a table, one could interpret this as being a casting away of logos, and hence 
an isomorphism between such a rejection of reason and imprisonment. Table 
2.1 illustrates some of the possible levels of isomorphism in operation in 
schematic form, 
Semiotic 
isomorphism 
Imprisonment (of? /by? )reason 
Interpretation Reason Imprisonment 
Interaction specified (perceptual 
isomorphism) 
Slamming 
Material specified book door 
Table 2.1 
The peculiar power of this transformation lies in its operation at the 
level of both event perception and signification, and it is noticeable that both 
allow for flexibility of interpretation. It has been noted that perceptual 
information may be insufficiently specific to distinguish between two similar 
events, leading to the possibility of two radically different cultural 
interpretations. Such flexibility could also be mediated by cultural context. 
One might be more likely to hear ` book on table' if one shared Wishart's anti- 
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logocentric perspective, or indeed if one had read Wishart's document 
(Wishart, 1978) or sleeve notes (Wishart, 1992). 
This analysis shows the value of Gibson's ideas in providing the 
framework for discussing the `structure' of an acousmatic piece and the 
relationship of this structure to direct and indirect perception. It distinguishes 
between two levels of structure: a level based upon direct perception, and a 
level based upon culturally agreed, or mediated perception, and attempts to 
show the way in which these two levels interact to form both a `narrative' 
based upon the perception of sources and an `abstract' structure which 
emerges in conjunction with such perceptions. Sounds are seen as acting as 
direct information for events, and as denotative and connotative signs, and a 
distinction is drawn between event perception and `semiosis', the former 
being lawful and constrained by our perceptual coevolution with the 
environment, the latter by our familiarity with the culturally convened content 
of events that may be perceived directly. The example also suggests that 
although event perception may explain what we perceive, the interpretation of 
the structure of the piece relies upon a degree of isomorphism between events 
with ecologically similar origins. This isomorphism is difficult to explain in 
terms of shared affordances, but seems to originate in shared invariances. 
Indeed, the question of isomorphism recalls notions of abstract musical 
structure such as thematic or tonal recapitulation. Here, however, the 
isomorphism occurs not at the level of the sounds themselves, but at the level 
of the events that they specify, and the cultural significance of these events. In 
this way, the analysis reveals the way in which the specificity of event 
perception may lead to the possibility of structural coherence within an 
acousmatic piece. Whether or not any `narrative' is explicitly perceived, the 
events perceived provide the basis for a remarkably `musical' structure. 
Describing this extract in terms of acoustic transformations cannot explain 
why we hear book and door being slammed or closed, rather than any other 
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acoustically similar sounds, nor can it explain why this denotative labelling 
might lead one to interpret these specific events as having further 
connotations. Through retaining an awareness of sounds' informative nature, it 
becomes possible to pay attention not to the structural implications of sounds 
in themselves, but to the structural implications of the events that they specify. 
However, the question of how one might interpret this extract has not 
been satisfactorily addressed. Event perception alone provides a description of 
acoustic structure that may be of pragmatic value in music analysis, but no 
progress has been made toward explaining the seeming gap between 
perceiving the affordance of an event, and interpreting it as an element in a 
musical structure. Clearly, in this example much of this interpretation rests 
upon our perceptual systems' tendency to pick up the real or virtual origins of 
sounds. However, this does nothing to explain the relationship between direct 
and indirect perception, between cultural conventions and affordances, nor 
does it explain how the directly informative nature of sounds becomes at once 
divorced from, yet constrained by the lawfulness of the everyday environment 
and our actions. To take a more global example from Wishart's music, the 
extract referred to at the end of Chapter 1, from the beginning of the same 
piece (music example 2.3), seems to illustrate just this tension between direct 
perception and indirect interpretation. The events themselves are recorded and 
presented in such a way as to retain some vestige of their everyday 
affordances, yet are juxtaposed and recontextualised in such a way as to 
override everyday behaviour. The events specified are dangerous and hence 
might afford `flight', yet the listener does not run away. The listening context, 
and the recontextualisation and transformations between sounds (barking to 
machine-gun, human cries to seagull) militate against such everyday 
affordances. In order to clarify this as more than tension, the whole notion of 
affordances and interpretation must be readdressed. In section 2.2 the 
relationships between direct and indirect, `natural' and cultural', perceptual 
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and interpretative, will be addressed in order to clarify the relationship 
between `lawful' and culturally or socially convened perceptions. Following 
this, section 2.3 will attempt to reconcile the functional nature of affordances, 
the direct links between perception and action, with the supposedly `aesthetic' 
nature of acousmatic music. Thus far, the pertinence of events as analytical 
units has been demonstrated, but the nature of the structures that may be 
perceived through the combination of such units within the context of an 
acousmatic piece has yet to be explored with sufficient theoretical clarity. 
2.2 Ecological perception, society and culture 
2.2.0 Direct perception and the problem of mediation 
Gibson's concentration upon `direct' perception, and his rejection of 
conventional views of perception as dependent upon cognitive processes and 
representations (Gibson, 1966; 1979), suggests a considerable resistance to the 
study of cultural and social issues in perception. If one wishes to describe and 
analyse acousmatic music in ecological terms, taking into account the mutual 
relationship between listeners, their environment and the structured 
information available from acousmatic music, then it is vital to clarify the way 
in which social and cultural information may be integrated within an 
ecological approach. Only through this will it become possible to form 
descriptions and analyses of acousmatic music that are internally consistent: a 
piece-meal approach that overlays a semiotic, or traditionally cognitive, 
interpretation of social and cultural significance upon event perception will 
tell us little about how cultural knowledge is related to `direct' perception. 
Through adopting an ecological approach to social and cultural issues in 
perception it will prove possible to describe not just `what' is heard by a 
listener, but how this relates to this listener's position within the human 
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environment. This approach can show the way in which the human 
environment provides constraints upon cultural and social behaviour, whereas 
a piece-meal approach simply accepts the divisions between perception and 
cognition, between nature and culture, between music and the everyday, 
without attempting to reconcile these dualities. Accepting that events are 
directly perceived, but their meaning is constructed, not only betrays the 
central issues of functional meaning raised by Gibson's assertion that it is 
affordances that are perceived, but also introduces an unnecessary division 
between the products of human behaviour and the `natural' environment 
(Costall, 1989; Costall and Still, 1989) which precludes discussion of their 
relationships in a consistent fashion. It is clear that sounds may have social 
and cultural functions, play a role in communication, and take on aesthetic and 
commodity value (see e. g. Truax, 1984 for a discussion of acoustics in 
communicational terms): the challenge here is to show how such mediate 
functions may be described not as fundamentally special cases of perception, 
but as part of our mutual relationship with a social and cultural environment. 
This permits one to debate the way in which acousmatic music seems to 
mediate the perception of sounds through contextual and conventional means 
in terms of the information available to the listener, and hence allows one to 
describe how such mediation relies upon the listener's exploration of the 
structured environment, rather than his or her imposition of structure upon that 
environment. 
The importance of studying acousmatic music from this perspective is 
driven by the problematic nature of standard approaches to the genre (see 
Chapter 1). An analyst must choose to interpret music according to some 
broader framework, however implicit. Here an attempt will be made to choose 
a framework that explicitly positions acousmatic music within the context of 
our everyday actions and perceptions. Within such a context the differences 
between musical and everyday sounds become contingent upon the 
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information available to the listener. This contingency can be observed 
immediately in the material of acousmatic music, and it is highly 
unsatisfactory to explain away such contingency through nominalist or 
essentialist arguments. It is not enough to say `this is heard as music because it 
is labelled as such', `this is music because I or others have decided it is music' 
or `this is music because it has such and such features'. These statements may 
lead us to perceive a sound in a particular way, relative to a particular context, 
but they do not in themselves explain the basis upon which such statements 
might be offered or perceived. Similarly, perceiving that a bell sound signifies 
/fire/ cannot be explained by simply stating that this sound occupies a 
particular position within a culturally convened code. Why, and under what 
conditions, do bells also signify /prayer/, /a town meeting/ and so on? How do 
we tell which course of behaviour is appropriate to a sound? How do we 
choose which coded content to apply? 
The intention here is not merely to describe the relationship of signs 
within a code, but to describe the relationship of the human organism to that 
code and its usage. The concept of an affordance seems to help here, by 
suggesting that a bell sound affords particular courses of action ('attention', 
`looking', `running', `attendance'... ) depending upon the listener's particular 
environmental context. In the following sections an attempt will be made to 
show how the human organism perceives such socially and culturally 
mediated affordances, and how this illuminates our view of listening as a 
contingent pursuit. Through this discussion it will become clear that 
describing an acousmatic piece in a perceptually motivated fashion must take 
into account the active relationship between listener and environment, and the 
various sources of stimulus information available to the listener which guide 
and constrain this relationship. 
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2.2.1 Ecological approaches to social and cultural perception 
A number of approaches have been taken to the problem of reconciling 
Gibson's theory of direct perception with the supposedly `indirect' sources of 
knowledge which exist in the human environment (e. g. Noble, 1981; Reed, 
1991; Costall, 1989; Costall and Still, 1989; Kugler, Shaw, Vincente and 
Kinsella-Shaw, 1990). Language, pictures and symbols of all kinds; 
perceptions mediated through technology and social interaction; memory and 
imagination, all seem to fall into an area of `indirect' perception within a 
Gibsonian approach. Indeed, as Costall notes, `indirect' perception is so 
variously identified (Costall, 1989) that it is often unclear how any perception 
may be direct: 
"... I am not at all convinced by Gibson's recurrent image of 
culture as merely a kind of potentially distorting screen partly 
interposed between us and an independent, `real' world, a 
`wilderness', beyond. This is surely wrong. We are in culture; 
it is our world. Indeed, it is the only world we could ever 
directly perceive. " (Costall, 1989, p. 19) 
Due to the all-pervasively cultural and social environment in which we 
perceive and act, it seems extremely problematic to insist upon a dualism 
between direct and indirect perception, especially since Gibson himself 
defines this boundary in a number of distinct ways: is indirect perception the 
kind of perception that occurs where incomplete or ambiguous stimulus 
information requires "guessing" in addition to an extended search for 
collateral information (Gibson, 1966, p. 303-304), or the kind of "mediate" 
perception that occurs in relation to coded, socially mediate communications 
that predicate or represent the direct perceptions of others (Gibson, 1966, e. g. 
p. 91)? As Costall (1989) points out, the dualism inherent in making 
distinctions between direct and indirect perception creates a muddle which 
was never untangled by Gibson. 
This potential for confusion and the way in which dualism is reinserted 
into what seems a fundamentally non-dualist or mutualist approach to the 
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perception of meaning suggests two possible approaches to bringing 
ecological perception into contact with cultural and social issues to Costall 
and Still (1989). Either one accepts that there is a primitive and culturally 
independent form of knowledge which may be directly perceived through "the 
simplest and best kind of knowing" (Gibson, 1979, p. 263) and that knowing 
mediated by "instruments", "language" and "pictures" or through imagination 
or memory is of a quite different kind, or one attempts to show that one might 
deal with questions of cultural relativism and convention without implying 
any distinction between events, surfaces, objects and their multiple and 
socially contingent affordances, rejecting this dualism and embracing 
mutualism. The benefit of the second course to this project is that it allows one 
to observe the way in which stimulus information may provide affordances of 
different kinds within different contexts without losing sight of the way in 
which acoustic structures may themselves specify particular events. The 
question of why a listener interprets particular sounds in different ways 
depending upon their context becomes a question of what kinds of available 
information provide the grounds for perceiving and acting upon such 
differences. Hence, rather than develop Reed's implicitly dualist version of 
ecological perception (Reed, 1991), where the mediation of direct perceptions 
provides the key to an ecological approach to cognition and cultural 
significance, the following argument will focus upon the argument that 
affordances themselves are culturally relative, and open to social mediation 
(Noble, 1981; Costall and Still, 1989). It will become clear that the perception 
of acousmatic music is constrained both by the structure and order of our 
relationship to the `natural' environment, and by the structure provided by 
social interaction and cultural convention, and that our active exploration and 
modification of these structures gives rise to a wide variety of affordances, not 
just those implied by a narrow view of the environment as pre-cultural and a- 
social, but not excluding those which could be considered `everyday'. 
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2.2.2 Perception in a cultural and social environment 
In what ways, then, can one reinterpret the social and cultural realms in terms 
of affordances? It is traditional in semiotics to distinguish between `expression 
units' and `signifiers' which have physical reality and the `content units' or 
`signifieds' which exist as a system of cultural conventions (see e. g. Saussure, 
1983; Eco, 1979). Within such a perspective the relationship between an 
expression and its meaning or content is not governed by any direct 
connection between, for example, an acoustic signal and its interpretation: 
such links are regarded as arbitrary, as they differ between languages and 
cultures, or at most "motivated" by some form of similarity or isomorphism 
between signifier and signified. Indeed, Eco (1979) has claimed that it is 
unnecessary to relate meaning to any physical referent. `Meaning', within this 
view, is determined by a system of oppositional relationships between 
signifiers, and between signifieds, not by the recovery of an intended message, 
or by reference to the world. However, it is intended here to show that despite 
semiotics' proposal that social convention is central to the interpretation of 
signs, such coded relationships should not be regarded as foreign to an 
ecological approach to perception. 
The main reason that semiotics seems so incompatible with ecological 
perception lies in its insistence upon a duality between expression and content. 
One is physical, the other cultural or social, recalling the distinction between 
sensation and representation in cognitive science. Eco distinguishes between 
"signals" and "stimuli" in themselves and their interpretation as signs (Eco, 
1979) despite extending semiotics to all but the most automated or biological 
processes. Indeed he sees semiotics as playing a role in identifying the 
"missing link" between signals and signs (Eco, 1979, p. 21). Within an 
ecological approach such distinctions are meaningless: the organism neither 
reacts to stimuli, nor does it interpret them; rather, the organism discovers the 
affordances of events and objects through stimulus information which neither 
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determines meaning nor allows for completely arbitrary relationships between 
organism and environment. Within this context there is no gap between 
`signifier' and `signified' that is not the result of applying an inappropriate 
level of description to one or both of these abstractions. Interpreting a sign 
becomes not a matter of decoding, but a matter of perceiving an affordance. 
The `knowledge' which makes this possible is not physical or mental, but the 
result of attending to structured stimulus information. A system of cultural 
agreements is not internal or external but the result of acting and perceiving 
within a social environment within which other organisms produce structured 
information in the form of utterances, books, films, music, tools, facial 
expressions, gestures and so on. These forms of information are not 
communicated from one individual to another, but discovered through 
perception and action. The exploration of the human environment makes such 
information available, and such information provides affordances which 
constrain the actions of individuals, but do not determine them: just as a rock 
affords many possible actions, so a sentence may afford multiply. In an 
ecological approach, language must be approached functionally, and signs 
described in terms of the information they offer to a human organism. Rather 
than ask what the word `freedom' means one should ask what it affords to a 
particular individual. Asking what a word means leads one to produce a 
definition, to make a gesture, to point to the American flag (or bum it): within 
semiotics such an approach clarifies the flexibility and self-referentiality of 
codes and their interpretation, the way in which systems of signs rely upon 
what has been termed "infinite semiosis" (Eco, 1979), but such an approach 
cannot explain why a sign results in particular courses of action. 
Within an ecological approach a sign has multiple affordances, and the 
task is to correctly describe the stimulus information that provides the basis 
for these affordances in such a way as to explain the transaction between 
human and environment. Rather than asking why `freedom' is used and 
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interpreted so multiply, one should ask what stimulus information is available 
to a particular individual and how this affords behaviour. This entails not only 
analysing the acoustic or visual structure of a sign, but also the structured 
information available to the organism which complements such information, 
whether from a book or from the gesture which accompanies a word, or from 
a blow from a policeman's baton. This thesis cannot hope to explore the 
perception of the cultural environment in detail, but will attempt to provide the 
basis for descriptions of cultural and social information of the same order as 
those of `natural' information. 
First, then, it is necessary to explore some of the structured 
information which provides the grounds for socio-cultural perception. Other 
human organisms are rich sources of information in a very immediate sense: 
the human body is open to exploration of a very `direct' kind. One may 
perceive the movements of another human through looking, listening or 
touching. Such information specifies not only aspects of the activity of that 
human, but also detailed information regarding gender and even intentions 
(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983; Davidson, 1993). Although such research has 
concentrated upon visual perception, a degree of intermodality has been 
demonstrated for visual and acoustic information in musical performance 
(Davidson, 1993) and it can be assumed that such information may be picked 
up regardless of the particular perceptual system involved. Such pick up of 
structured information can be interpreted in terms of the perception of 
affordances: the perception of gender, for example affords many constraints 
upon behaviour dependant upon the gender of the perceiver, just as the 
perception of intentions may constrain and offer certain courses of action. 
However, such affordances are often culturally relative. Movements may 
specify what kind of human performs those movements, and what the 
intended result of those movements might be, hence providing social 
affordances, constraining the way in which the perceiver might interact with 
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the individual involved. However, these affordances look rather more complex 
when one considers the cultural relativity of gesture and movement or the 
kinds of aesthetic intentions which might be picked up. Perceiving that 
another human is of a different gender in itself does not necessarily explain 
the way in which human beings' courting and mating behaviour is constrained 
by `moral codes' which seem to differ between different social and cultural 
groups. Similarly, perceiving the different `expressive' intentions of a musical 
performer (Davidson, 1993) cannot be easily explained without such cultural 
context. Understanding whether a performance specifies an under-expressive 
or over-expressive intention is not just relative to the visual and acoustic 
information available at the time: familiarity with culturally specific 
information must be assumed. Moreover, `interpreting' such information can 
only occur within a particular culture. In western `serious' music culture, that 
in which a performer does not compose the music that is performed, it 
becomes possible to distinguish between a satisfactory and unsatisfactory 
performance of a canonic composition. Such a distinction can only be made 
relative to other performances of this piece, or contact with similar pieces, or, 
in the case of the musically literate, some coded representation of the score 
upon which the performer draws, or upon explicit information regarding 
performance practice and music theoretical conventions. This is quite different 
from the kinds of value judgement made regarding music which is only played 
by its composer: it becomes much more difficult here to differentiate between 
the canonic aspects of a performance and the `piece' itself. Although collateral 
information may be used in forming an aesthetic evaluation, one cannot refer 
to another performer's version for comparison, or to the score. 
As well as information that informs the perceiver about their intentions 
and activity, per se, humans produce structured information that informs the 
perceiver about events and objects that exist in a shared environment. The 
weight of an object may be specified by the movements of someone lifting it 
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(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983), just as we may be informed of the presence of 
an event by observing the actions of another. A look of surprise, pointing 
toward an object, an ostensive linguistic construction, may afford attention to 
an event which lies outside our visual field, for example. Just as social 
information provided by another through ostension may direct attention to an 
event which is behind us, so coded `signs' produced by another human 
provide information about events and objects which are not immediately 
perceptible. Within this perspective a road sign, a book, and a facial 
expression are more similar than they might at first appear. The road sign, 
book and look of surprise inform us about events we have yet to perceive. Just 
as a facial expression provided by an onlooker may afford `ducking' to avoid 
a missile approaching from the rear, a road sign may afford the necessary 
adjustments to driving necessary to avoid crashing on a sharp bend, and a 
book might afford one to avoid being duped by a totalitarian regime. Within 
Peirce's trichotomy of signs (Peirce, 1991, e. g. pp. 239-240) the `facial 
expression' seems closest to an index, in that there is a causal connection 
between `sign' and event (despite its possible social mediation), the road sign 
an icon, having a resemblance to an event (despite the coded conventions 
which may govern the precise way in which this icon is formed), and the book 
a collection of symbols, having only a conventional relationship between sign 
and event. However, all three of these ` signs' are social, in that they are made 
available by other human beings. Moreover, they can all be considered in 
terms of their affordance of avoidance. 
The key here is to recognise that the human environment is not only 
social in that we perceive other human beings, but also in that we perceive the 
artefacts and expressions which are produced by their activities (Mead, 1934; 
Noble, 1981). Just because some of these artefacts inform us about unforeseen 
situations and may be perceived relative to cultural agreements does not make 
them any less `direct' in a truly Gibsonian sense: to argue that the cultural 
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agreements which structure language or other symbolic codes are of a 
different order from the structures provided by inanimate or animal sources of 
stimulus information leads one to suggest that there is a definite dividing line 
between becoming sensitive to the natural and cultural environments. Just as 
learning a `complex' sporting skill requires specialised exploration of the 
environment, so does the `learning' of a code. Both may involve `coded' or 
immediate social transactions and undirected or `taught' exploration of the 
relevant `environment'. 
At this point a cognitivist counter-argument should be addressed. 
Surely, learning involves the `internalisation' of structure: surely the 
environment of a skilled sports person is different from a novice in that these 
internalised structures literally create a `different' and more structured world. 
Although Gibson's radical reversal of this philosophy may be demonstrated in 
that invariances may be experimentally manipulated and shown to portray a 
rather more structured version of the world than that normally assumed, it is 
also necessary to show that more complex patterns of action and perception 
can be described without the intervention of a `mentalist' view. Although the 
example described below deals with insect organisation, it helps to show the 
danger of assuming that social `knowledge' and complex inter-organism 
interaction and cooperation requires cognitive representation of the external 
world. The intention here is not to deny the role of memory, imagination, 
planning or symbol manipulation, but to raise the question of whether such 
processes illuminate perception. As this thesis will go on to argue, what is 
normally regarded as `cognitive' has an important role in constraining 
behaviour, but not in the accepted sense of determining what we perceive and 
how we act. 
Kugler, Shaw, Vincente and Kinsella-Shaw (1990) attempt to describe 
the extraordinary architectural prowess of termites in terms not of explicit 
knowledge but in terms of the informational and physical constraints that 
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these insects are sensitive to. The precise and complex structures that termites 
build through their collective actions seem at first to demand some form of 
program, map or template which informs their building: one might easily 
assume that like a group of construction workers, the termites are following a 
blueprint, albeit internal, rather than external. However, if one describes the 
relationship between the insects actions (movement, deposit of waste) and 
perceptions (pick up of attractive pheromones from deposited waste) it 
becomes clear that no such blueprint exists: the insects' `cooperation', 
`creativity' and `skill' emerge from the dynamic and continuous cycle of 
depositing waste at sites at which pheromones may be perceived, the limits of 
diffusion of these pheromones and so on. The `arches' and `pillars' of a 
termite nest result from the way in which individual termites are coupled not 
only to the constraints of the environment and their effectivities but also to 
those provided by their fellows' actions. Interestingly, the comparison with 
construction workers reveals the continuity between this `un-coded' behaviour 
and the interpretation of codes. Construction workers do not perceive the 
actions of their fellows through the pick up of pheromones, but through the 
exchange of language and gesture. Moreover, they are in a sense constrained 
by an explicit blueprint: but this blueprint is external, it is perceived, and 
adjusted according to the day-to-day problems which are encountered in 
construction. Although the situation is arguably more complex, the social 
exchange afforded by linguistic and diagrammatic codes still operates within 
the broader context provided by the connections between individuals and 
between these individuals and their environment. Each construction worker 
perceives and acts within a constraining context, yet with considerable 
flexibility. At the simplest level of description the survival of individual 
workers is at issue not only through the immediate dangers of working on a 
construction site, but in that failure to complete the work satisfactorily may 
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result in financial, and hence survival consequences for members of the social 
group involved. 
In summary, then, it has been proposed that the perception of other 
human beings, and their immediate and more permanent artefactual products 
can be explained within the context provided by an ecological account of 
perception. Codes are to be seen in terms of what they afford and how they are 
made and used by individuals within a social and cultural environment. Rather 
than using Gibson's assertion that "knowledge about the world rests on 
acquaintance with the world" (Gibson, 1966, p. 28) to support a dualism 
between direct and indirect perception, an approach has been taken which 
subsumes cultural and social knowledge within a wholly ecological 
description, based upon the concept of affordances, as suggested by Costall 
and Still (1989). Society and culture emerge from the social and cultural 
transactions between individuals, however mediate they seem. 
Indeed, some of these transactions occur through the production of 
artefacts that are discovered and manipulated by individuals, through the 
perception of tools. Tools make stimulus information and affordances, 
otherwise unavailable, directly perceptible, and often serve a similar function 
to more explicit `signs': 
"most of these (the affordances of objects in our surroundings) 
are actually designed and constructed in order not only to 
function appropriately but also to be conspicuously meaningful 
to a potential user. " (Costall, 1989, p. 19) 
Tools not only afford things which exceed the limitations of the human body 
and perceptual systems through making available stimulus information and 
effectivities, but also afford social and cultural transactions. A tool's 
affordances are manufactured by others, and they are in a sense, whether 
`coded' or not, a transmission of information. This transmission is not meant 
in any naive communicational sense: certain tools may be used in ways 
unforeseen by their originator, but the use of a tool made by another both 
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relies upon social interaction and may afford perception of the social and 
cultural information relevant to a particular environment. Using a screwdriver 
embeds an individual within a cultural context suffused with implications 
about that culture's character: through examining its highly immediate 
affordances, in relation to screws, various materials and so on, the individual 
is already embedded within a culture in which such technology is shared. 
Similarly, through extended familiarity with written and spoken language, and 
the environmental contexts within which certain stimulus information 
becomes available, the affordances of these `codes' may be explored and 
developed. Each user of a tool may discover novel affordances just as each 
user of language may do so: but such novelty is constrained by the social 
connections between individuals as much as by the structure of an individual 
artefact or utterance. 
In a similar sense, just as artefacts may inform us about the 
environment's socio-cultural aspects, so may `natural' events and objects be 
manipulated by human agency in such a way as to afford `coded' meanings. 
Just as a screwdriver might be used metonymically to refer to the 
technological or craftsmanlike, as a sign with very different affordances from 
that provided by its affordance of `screwing', so might the sound of a bell be 
used in a context affording `worship', `community'; or a piece of rock from 
the moon come to stand for the boundaries of human exploration. Such use of 
natural events and objects does not entail a change in their `physical' 
structure, but an exploration of that structure within a social and cultural 
environment. The bell itself is specified by its acoustic (or visual) structure: in 
one case it might afford simply `attending' or `ringing', in another it is 
perceived to be quite lawfully coincident with a town meeting or church 
service. The association of an event with another event is not just `imposed' 
by the perceiver or by someone wishing to communicate, but is to be found in 
the mutual relationship between perception or action and the cultural 
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environment which is perceived or acted upon. The observation that 
"associations" are not made in the head, but due to our relationship to an 
environment in which events are lawfully related, and hence predictable 
(Gibson, 1966, pp. 271-273), is just as pertinent for cultural agreements as it is 
for natural ones. Associations between natural events and `cultural' or `social' 
affordances may be made, but they are also, once prevalent, open to discovery 
by the perceiver in the course of exploration and perceptual development. 
Hence, there is no difference between `cultural' and `natural' 
environments. Rather, the environment within which the human organism 
exists includes symbolic, coded systems. Contrary to Reed (1991), I would 
contend that an event can `stand for' another event due to our direct 
perception of the cultural portions of the environment. Signification is 
possible because the human organism learns to perceive the cultural 
affordances of events, relative to the social agreements of a group of 
individuals. These social agreements exist and are available to a group directly 
through their perception within a broad context of usage in relation to the 
environment. Just as `natural' affordances vary according to the context 
provided by the particular needs of an organism and the particular state of an 
environment, so the affordances of signs are rich and flexible. The sound of a 
lion would not afford danger to a hunter equipped with a high-powered rifle, 
just as the word /danger/ could afford many different interpretations 
depending upon the particular context it is placed within. This context could 
be provided by a paralinguistic inflection or its position within an extended 
text. <<Political danger», <<danger of death», <<danger of 
embarrassment>> can all be afforded by this speech event, when embedded 
within a particular environment. 
Although it is at first unclear how a speech or music event may 
lawfully specify an affordance, one must remember that cultural environments 
are relatively stable. Diachronic change in the relationships between 
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expressive acts and their content are limited by the social necessity for 
communicational clarity. This diachronic stability is survival driven. The 
faster a language changes the more likely it is that geographically distant 
groups of native speakers would develop idiolects with little in common. 
Imagine trying to learn a foreign language that changed the expression units 
corresponding to commonly used concepts every week, or a culture where a 
book written six weeks ago was already in a `foreign' language. Cultural 
transactions require a certain degree of permanence if they are to serve as 
means for communicating bodies of knowledge over long periods of time. 
Obviously, the cultural environment changes. Languages, for example, change 
to provide the expressions demanded by changes in the natural or social 
environment, which are in turn produced by the actions and perceptions of 
individuals and groups of individuals. 
Given that the cultural environment is a dynamic system of agreed 
relationships between expressive acts, or signs, one can see that the `direct' 
perception of events is not so different from the perception of coded meaning, 
in the sense implied by Gibson's use of the term "affordance". Both our 
natural and cultural environments change over time, but these changes are 
bounded by certain ecological limitations. On the one hand, nature seems, at 
the level of human perception, to obey certain physical laws. On the other, 
culture remains to a certain degree bounded by the limitations of 
communicability. Certain changes in cultural or natural environments may 
demand adjustive behaviour for a group of organisms. This requires dynamic 
adaptation, or learning. As Gibson himself states (1968, p. 285), learning is 
vital to the perception of affordances. One must regard cultural agreement in 
semiosis as a cultural environment, with as much external reality as the 
`natural' environment. 
Hence, signs are regarded as no less lawful than other events: the 
sound of a breaking bottle is lawfully related to its cause by our coevolution 
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with the environment of everyday events just as the speech act `broken bottle' 
is lawfully related by our coevolution with a particular cultural code. It 
matters not that the `real' breaking bottle event may not exist (cf. Warren and 
Verbrugge, 1984). The invariances that specify it may be synthesised (a 
virtual event) just as a human may utter a speech act in the absence of any 
immediately observable referent. Both circumstances rely upon the creation of 
an artefact: one provides acoustic structures which specify a breaking bottle 
by virtue of physical lawfulness, the other by the lawfulness of the code. A 
cultural code is not an abstract entity, but something that is perceived and 
made by social individuals. It is structured and predictable, yet open to 
modification, just as is the natural environment. Just as making a fire affords 
protection from the cold for a group of individuals, so making the utterance 
`we should make a fire' might afford the movements which lead that group to 
make a fire, rather than any other form of protection against the weather such 
as a shelter. 
In more extended terms, just as a weapon might afford defence against 
an intruder, making the utterance `freedom is an inalienable right' may afford 
the actions that make us pick up the weapon and use it. Although the utterance 
`freedom' may not seem as connected to the environment as the presence of 
an intruder, its affordance structure is most clearly specified by a particular 
cultural code, specific to English speakers, specific to a sub-culture that 
protects its territory with the use of force, specific to a culture in which, 
perhaps, artefacts are acted upon differentially depending upon ownership. 
Even ownership here is not an abstract concept. It may again be defined in 
functional terms: in a particular culture the exchange of certain tokens for an 
artefact entails certain patterns of action and not others. These patterns of 
action are explored, challenged and tested by individuals, but are there to be 
perceived just as much as the prevalence of gravity. A speech act which labels 
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such social information relies upon the perceptual availability of these 
structures. 
However, the availability of these structures does not determine action. 
Just as the sound of a breaking bottle affords different things for a bare-footed 
person and someone wearing stout boots, the utterance `this is mine' may 
afford different courses of action depending upon the social context: to a 
burglar possession is nine tenths of the law, whereas for the gun-toting house- 
dweller the exchange of money for an artefact provides a less immediate, but 
no less `real' affordance. Language, or any other coded source of information, 
is mutually perceived and produced, in relation to the particular circumstances 
of an individual. Through that individual's perceptions and actions within a 
society that uses language, perception and action are constrained but not 
determined. We discover what an expression affords through our familiarity 
with the structure of the environment, an environment which is not only 
predictable on the basis of ecological physics, but also on the basis of the 
social and cultural relationships which we both perceive and create through 
our individual actions. If this were not the case, the social cooperation (and 
conflict) which characterises human behaviour would rely merely upon our 
direct contact with other human beings. 
Language and other symbolic systems rely upon our perception of the 
structured information that is produced by other human beings, and which 
may be stored and transmitted between individuals who need not meet. Such 
information specifies affordances that otherwise would have to be individually 
discovered (see e. g. Reed, 1991). To say that a human's facial expression 
affords `amiability' (Gibson, 1979, p. 233), and to deny that the expression `I 
like you', does the same is to impose an absurd dualism upon perception. 
Although one source of information is visual, and the other acoustic, both are 
perceived in relation to the social and cultural context available, both can be 
perceived as affording `kissing', and both might result in a slap in the face. 
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The fact that the acoustic information is coded in an `arbitrary' form, may be a 
lie, and seems to rely upon cultural perceptions, cannot be used to portray the 
visual information as somehow better or more direct. A facial expression may 
be misleading, and may be `coded' through reference to others' use of such 
expressions. 
To extend this example, note that just as `I like you' could be used by 
a character in a film or a book, so could a description or film of a facial 
expression. This storage and translation of `real' information in a different 
form does not prevent the perception of an affordance. `Kissing' may not be 
afforded by the facial and linguistic information for the characters, but how is 
this different from observing a couple in a real exchange? What is afforded for 
the observer? In one case the reader or film-goer cannot directly act upon the 
`characters', but otherwise there are similar affordances available. The line "I 
like you" (or more strongly "I love you") in combination with a particular 
facial expression affords continued looking or reading, averting one's gaze, 
stopping reading, discussion of what has been seen or read, arousal, disgust: 
these are all made possible by our familiarity with the information provided, 
our own context, and most of all by our perception of structured invariants 
that strongly specify the subsequent kiss (and possible slap). The coded 
information available from language and facial expressions specifies 
affordances that are multiple and socially constrained. 
The `depiction' of a scene may alter the affordance structure, as in a 
case where we cannot intervene, but this does not mean that affordances are 
not perceived. A broken bottle may afford fighting, but so may a word, a 
sentence, a philosophy. Similarly, the sound of a broken bottle may be used in 
an attempt to convey `fighting' or be perceived in these terms. In the second 
case the sound is used or perceived relative to a set of cultural agreements, 
which may or may not be shared or applied by one or both parties. In differing 
contexts the affordances of this sound will differ: in a crowded bar the event 
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might afford `evasive action'; in a radio play the `sound effect' specifies a 
change in the portrayed environment which would not afford any such direct 
action. However, this change in the virtual environment would afford a 
description of the scene as a fight in a bar, rather than anywhere else. Just as 
an event may orient us within a real environment, it may do so relative to a 
virtual environment. Rather than saying that an event in a radio play does not 
afford any bodily course of action, one might say that the context of a radio 
play affords `safety', `sitting still' and `the production of a critical linguistic 
response' to the sound, as opposed to taking evasive action. The events 
themselves afford little unless related to the context provided by listener and 
environment, whether heard on the radio or in a real bar. Similarly, the sound 
of a linguistic utterance may or may not provide an affordance in itself, but 
only in combination with the diverse sources of information that accompany 
it, whether linguistic or not. 
It is no different learning to discriminate the multiple affordances that 
are provided by a cultural artefact than it is to discriminate between the 
affordances provided by a natural event: both kinds of discrimination are 
made relative to the perceptual development of an organism, surrounded by 
`cultural', `social' or `natural' occurrences which are structured and 
informative, and to the immediate context of that organism. Just as for a 
water-bug a fluid of particular density affords support, yet for a human 
immersion or swimming (Gibson, 1979, p. 127), human utterances, books, 
instruments and actions afford things for humans that they do not for other 
organisms. Within this approach one should not ask what a cultural or social 
affordance might be, but what cultural and social information affords. After 
all, what is culture? It is the products of a particular set of social individuals 
who share a particular environment. It is perceived just as anything else is 
perceived, through the continuous exploration of our surroundings, and 
constrains and facilitates human action through providing affordances specific 
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to that environment. Human actions, and the changes in the environment 
wrought by them, are meaningful because they are embedded within an 
environment that is social. This does not mean that meaning is fixed, any more 
than the affordance of any event is fixed. Culture is acted upon as well as 
perceived, just as are our inanimate, vegetal, animal and human surroundings. 
2.2.3 Perception and interpretation 
Within the perspective on society and culture presented above it becomes 
possible to reassess the notion of `interpretation' in a fundamental sense. 
Gibson suggests that socially mediate knowledge, and knowledge mediated by 
memory, imagination and other `cognitive' processes are not to be seen as 
having a direct role in perception (Gibson, 1966). The previous section 
challenges Gibson's assertion that the kind of knowing available from 
language is radically different from that available from the environment. 
Rather than accepting the traditional view of coded information accepted by 
Gibson and contrasting it with direct perception (1966, p. 244) an attempt has 
been made to relocate social and cultural perception within the notion of the 
affordance. This has serious consequences for how one might describe 
interpretation. In figure 2.2 Gibson's original comparison between linguistic 
and direct perception is reproduced. 
- 
Perceptual fEnvironmental Stimulus II Perce t 
meaning source invariant 
p 
Physical Psychological 
law Resonance 
Verbal Referent Symbol Thought 
meaning Social or word psychological 
Convention association 
Figure 2.2 Gibson's comparison between the three-way relationships in language and direct 
ion. Adapted from Gibson (1966, p. 244) 
123 
Chapter 2 
Note that the mutual relationship between the organism and environment is 
not to be found here as an explicit feature. It is however, implicit in the terms 
used by Gibson to identify the `boxes' and connections between boxes used in 
the upper diagram, representing direct perception, but not in the lower, which 
is intended to represent linguistic, mediated perception. The distinction 
Gibson makes relies upon his inconsistent description of the two types of 
knowledge, and representation of perception as a chain of transformations. 
Gibson notes that the relationship between "environmental source", "stimulus 
invariant" and "percept" is "three-way", but represents it in such a way as to 
conceal the mutual relationship between these. Nor does Gibson introduce the 
notion of affordances to clarify this mutuality (Gibson, 1966, p. 244). Indeed 
as we will see below, by reorganising Gibson's diagrams, and naming them 
consistently, the differences between linguistic knowledge and direct 
awareness seem to disappear. 
The key here is to be found through providing a consistent level of 
description for the two types of knowledge. It is helpful to this end to replace 
the chain of transformations implied by Gibson's diagram with a triangular 
relationship. Peirce (1991, pp. 239-240,180-187) notes that signs are not to be 
understood in terms of mere cause and effect. Through his concepts of 
"firstness", "secondness" and "thirdness" it become clear how `meaning' or 
signification can be distinguished from mere causation. Two firsts, for 
example a footprint and a foot, may be causally related through a relationship 
of secondness: one directly leads to another. However, for us to interpret the 
footprint as a sign of the foot it is necessary to introduce a third term. In order 
for the footprint to be regarded as `standing for' the foot, an interpretant must 
be added. The nature of this interpretant need not be a mental image (Eco, 
1979, p. 68-71): it could be another `sign' (a word, a gesture, an action). In the 
case of the present example one might represent the relationship between 
"sign", "object" and "interpretant" as in figure 2.3. If we take the "sign" to be 
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the footprint, the "object" the foot and the "interpretant" to be the word /foot/ 
it becomes clear that without "thirdness" nothing could be regarded as having 
been signified. The foot and footprint would retain a physical relationship, but 
no act of interpretation would have been made. Of course, this tells us nothing 
about the grounds upon which an interpretant may be chosen. However, it 
does point toward a more consistent conception of perception, as noted by 
Shaw and Turvey (1981). 
In a naively behaviourist interpretation perception is a relationship of 
secondness: a stimulus conditions a response. In an ecological approach, 
however, stimulus information is perceived relative to both the structure of the 
environment and the organism. 
interpretant 
sign object 
Figure 2.3 Peirce's triadic sign function between two firsts, forming a second, by virtue of 
a third. 
Hence, our first relationship of "thirdness" might look like figure 2.4. Here, 
the relationship between information, organism and environment is clearly 
shown to be triadic. However, this does not quite capture the subtlety of the 
ecological approach: it is not the stimulus information itself that is perceived, 
but an affordance structure. The organism and environment are brought into a 
meaningful relationship by perceiving and acting upon affordances. However, 
affordances are a description of the relationship between organism and 
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environment, not the means by which organism and environment become 
coupled. 
Hence, it would be incorrect, for example, to replace "stimulus 
information" with "affordance" in figure 2.4. Rather one should describe this 
triadic relationship itself as representing an affordance. A similar triadic 
relationship neatly captures the relationship between action, perception and 
structure: structured information is perceived according to the effectivities of 
the organism, and similarly the actions of the organism are constrained by the 
information that is picked up. Consider the relationship between a sound and 
the actions of an organism: we hear, for example the sound of a breaking 
bottle and go to collect a broom. It is easy to mistake this for a causal 
relationship between two "firsts": a "second". The nature of this relationship 
is concealed, however, in this version of the situation. Only by relating both 
the sound and the action through the structure of the event, a "third", does the 
affordance become clear. The sound itself does not cause the action, it is 
`interpreted' by virtue of the structure of the event: without this "third" the 
collection of the broom is entirely mysterious, as it has no meaningful 
relationship with the sound itself but to the event specified. Similarly, one 
might consider the lawful relationship between sound and event as a "second", 
and hence suggest that this accounts for the affordance perceived. This too, 
however, collapses the true nature of the affordance: the action of the 
organism `interprets' this causal relationship to create the possibility of 
meaning through a "third". Stimulus information, events and actions are the 
necessary components for describing affordances, and no pair of these terms 
provides a sufficient explanation of perception. 
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stimulus information 
environment organism 
Figure 2.4 Gibson's ecological version of perception represented in triadic terms. Note that 
any of the three terms can take on the status of an interpretant relating the other two terms: 
organism and environment are related through stimulus information, just as organism and 
stimulus information are related through the environment. The `meaning' is captured through 
the relationship of a third. 
Comparing the lower panel of figure 2.2 and figure 2.4 seems 
impossible. But the comparison between figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggests a strong 
isomorphism. It is clear that just as a sign requires an "interpretant", so does 
an affordance: the action of an organism is not in reaction to stimulation, but 
in the triadic relationship between organism, environment and stimulus 
information. Collapsing this "third" leaves one with a deterministic 
relationship between stimulus and response. The affordance that is perceived 
is the result of the permanence or change in stimulus information relative to 
both organism and environment. In the same sense, if one regards the structure 
of a code as part of the environment, then a similar triad emerges: there is no 
need to suggest that the associations between invariants and events are any 
more "psychological" for language than for natural events: just as Gibson 
proposed that in an ecological approach "learning by association becomes the 
learning of associations" (Gibson, 1966, p. 273) through acknowledging the 
lawfulness of the natural environment, one should extend this suggestion to 
cultural and social knowledge. We become sensitive to the associations 
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between symbols and their directly perceivable consequence, we do not 
impose them upon culture. 
Returning to the notion of interpretation, Peirce's trichotomy helps 
untangle a relationship between action, perception and stimulus information 
which reveals an ecological description of what it is to `interpret' a sign, and 
through this the relationship between culture, society and perception. The 
interpretant of a sign function is an active, not a passive phenomenon. The 
social and cultural nature of the human environment affords the production of 
interpretative actions: interpretations are made by human beings in order to 
supplement the information available from the environment. In a certain sense 
Gibson's view of the function of socially mediated knowledge is correct: 
"The human learner, from childhood on, often needs to be 
given an acquaintance with objects, places, events, animals, 
persons, and facts that he has not yet encountered. " 
(Gibson, 1966, p. 234) 
Moreover, it may be correct to suggest that "pictures, models, diagrams and 
maps will do this in a way words cannot" (Gibson, 1966, p. 234). However, 
"the arts of language" (Gibson, 1966, pp. 234-5) and other codes are not as 
arbitrary as Gibson assumes, as has been argued above. If the consequences of 
"inadequate information" are that the perceptual system "hunts" for meaning 
(Gibson, 1966, pp. 303-304), then the role of social and cultural information 
becomes clear. Such information allows the human organism to perceive that 
which is not yet encountered, but more than this it allows the production of 
symbolic artefacts which themselves provide affordances. To say that an 
iconic road sign is of more "direct" significance than one which has to be read 
(STOP! ) seems to miss the cultural nature of our surroundings. Moreover, the 
affordances of the latter, despite their reliance upon social and cultural 
information, are affordances nonetheless. Similarly, by speaking, imagining, 
planning and so on, the human produces things which add information to the 
environment. In this way, interpretation can be regarded as a socially mediate 
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act, in that such behaviour provides affordances for both that individual and 
those that perceive these actions. Such interpretations are of interest here to 
the extent that they provide information that becomes part of the environment 
and hence perceivable to others. They are important in that they comprise 
events that are perceived, and hence make up a large and significant portion of 
the human environment. Moreover, in that they reveal the `inadequacy' of 
other sources of information in a particular context, they perform a useful 
analytical function: the production of symbolic interpretations informs us that 
a situation literally "affords" interpretation, rather than any more `direct' or 
immediate form of action. As will be discussed below, the `environment' of 
acousmatic music may be regarded as impoverished in relation to the 
everyday environment, but this impoverishment itself, in combination with a 
wide variety of structured information, affords particular kinds of activity 
which are not afforded by everyday objects and events in an everyday 
environment. 
2.2.4 Acousmatic listening-perceiving acousmatic music 
The approach to perception thus far suggested is in stark contrast to 
Schaeffer's conception of the acousmatic (Schaeffer, 1966). Rather than 
providing a method for concealing sounds sources, the recording, synthesis, 
processing and rediffusion of sounds over loudspeakers becomes a source of 
acoustic stimulus information for the perceiver. Such stimulus information 
may be structured in such a way as to specify events, regardless of a 
composer's intentions, and is perceived contextually. This context is provided 
in two ways. First, context is provided by the fact that any listener has 
coevolved with a structured environment. Second, context is provided by the 
combination of stimulus information across the perceiver's perceptual. 
systems. The result of this first kind of context is that the listener is especially 
sensitive to invariants which specify familiar environmental events. The result 
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of the second is that the listener is not just a listener, but perceives acoustic 
structure originating from the loudspeakers along with a multitude of other 
informative sources. The result of this, discussed in more detail below, is that 
the perception of an acousmatic piece may be radically different from the 
perception of real events, but is not just acousmatic listening. The listener 
inhabits an environment rich in stimulation, rich in structure, and will perceive 
affordances not only through the pick up of structured auditory information 
from the piece but from the environment as a whole, whether acoustic or not. 
In order to describe the consequences of this view consider the 
analysis of Wishart's Red Bird, made at the end of section 2.1.4. Here, an 
isomorphism was described between two sounds, which might lead to a 
semiotic interpretation. The listener must here be assumed to perceive 
structured acoustic information specifying the sources of these two sounds, 
two familiar everyday events. However, the objects specified cannot be seen 
or explored in the same way as a real door and book. In this sense listening is 
indeed acousmatic. The diffusion of the sounds over a loudspeaker system 
precludes such direct exploration. The objects are simply not available to be 
explored through touch or vision. The perception of these objects is 
impoverished, but only in relation to the everyday environment. The actual 
environment of our hypothetical listener is not, however, impoverished. 
Loudspeakers may be perceived, both visually and acoustically (Smalley, 
1994), other listeners may be perceived, the programme note may be read, and 
the listener may perceive all these and other available sources of information. 
The affordances of this environment will depend upon the interaction of all 
these sources of information, whether perceived acoustically or not: perhaps 
the information may afford the production of a coded, symbolic, set of 
linguistic utterances, perhaps a more subtle change in the listener's actions. 
However, the difference between the listener's present environment and that 
specified by the book and door sound is of importance here. The stimulus 
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information specifying these two objects has remained constant: what has 
changed is the environment of the listener. Within the acoustic structure of the 
piece, and within the surroundings of the listener a pair of untouchable, 
invisible objects are specified, which are acted upon in a familiar fashion. 
Whatever this affords, the listener is exposed to an artefact which cannot be 
`correctly' perceived. The available information neither confirms nor denies 
the `reality' of the sounding objects. However, one must be careful not to 
overplay the `illusory' nature of the objects that are perceived. The book and 
door are only illusory in that they are perceived within a context which affords 
a deferral of exploratory action. Editing out the book sound and playing it on a 
high quality sound system behind the head of an unsuspecting subject in a 
quiet library completely alters the actions that one might expect to result. 
The example from Red Bird, where clear specification of everyday 
events is constantly afforded, tells us little about acoustic information which 
seems not to specify any familiar causal event. Such situations are, however, 
more common than a naive application of ecological theory would propose. 
As Gibson himself states in response to the question of what happens in cases 
of "inadequate information": "the perceptual system hunts. " (Gibson, 1966, p. 
303). As noted in the previous section, where the immediate information from 
a particular source is insufficient the human, being not only hunts for 
additional information from the `natural' environment, but also from the social 
and cultural environment. By observing the actions of others, exploring 
cultural artefacts, by involvement in discussion with others, information may 
be explored which supplements that provided by the event or object in 
question. In the case of a sound or sequence of sounds which fails to clearly 
specify an event, the human listener attempts nonetheless to make sense of 
these sounds in relation to the environment. Such sounds do afford exploration 
of that environment. They afford behaviour that is social, where the 
involvement of others is used to provide supplementary information, cultural, 
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where culturally relative affordances are perceived, and aesthetic, in that their 
affordances may be so far removed from `everyday' behaviour that they 
appear functionless. 
2.3 The affordances of acousmatic music 
2.3.0 Toward an ecological aesthetics? 
In this final portion of chapter 2 the affordances of acousmatic music will be 
considered in general terms. This will raise the larger question of what an 
ecological aesthetics might be like. Acousmatic music, although it may 
`afford' raises aesthetic issues. It is tempting to see aesthetics as something 
divorced from everyday experience, something relying upon the disconnection 
of experience from reality. Whether in terms of "disinterest", the "sublime", or 
"immanent critique" much philosophical aesthetics suggests that the art work 
remains in some sense autonomous or divorced from the concerns of the 
everyday world. Within an ecological approach such dislocation is always 
viewed as partial and contingent; relative to the perceptions and actions of an 
organism within a structured environment. Since the following chapter will 
elucidate the practical application of the theoretical notions expressed here, 
and Chapter 4 the broader aesthetic issues raised by these notions, the 
following discussion will serve only to synthesise the overall conclusions of 
the preceding discussion in relation to the possible nature of aesthetic 
affordances and related constraints upon description and analysis. 
2.3.1 Aesthetic affordances 
It is one thing to suggest ways in which the affordances of the objects and 
events of our environment are multiple, and that these affordances are largely 
social and cultural. It seems at first quite another to discuss the affordances of 
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an artwork. One might assert that a book provides stimulus information which 
makes sense of our surroundings, however distant, but it is more difficult to 
consider the distinction made between a technical manual and a copy of 
Joyce's Ulysses. In the same way, an actuality news broadcast seems quite 
distinct from Wishart's Red Bird, let alone Francois Bayle's piece Grande 
Polyphonie, where many (but by no means all) of the sounds eschew everyday 
specificity or obvious denotative and narrative significance. This gap, 
however, does not serve to diminish the relevance of the ecological approach. 
On the contrary, only by taking such an approach does it become clear why 
music in general and acousmatic music in particular might be considered 
aesthetic at all. In the everyday environment, as has been proposed, sounds are 
not usually perceived independently from their sources and the activities they 
afford. Moreover, where events are specified by acoustic invariants, these 
invariants allow the organism to perceive affordances that are intimately 
connected to survival. In acousmatic music, such direct links between sounds 
and our survival seem tenuous, if not illusory. Despite the obvious specificity 
of many of the sounds in acousmatic music, and their more extended 
ecological relationships, this specificity does not afford everyday behaviour. 
As described earlier, the contextual information available to a listener affords 
actions which are socially and culturally appropriate, but this does not help to 
explain why such cultural norms develop. There is no clearer information for 
the cultural nature of an acousmatic piece than opening a CD case, reading the 
liner notes and then playing the CD, but this does not explain why the 
subsequent listening is `aesthetic'. 
Why are acousmatic pieces `meaningful' in a way that an actuality 
recording is not? The answer, it is proposed, lies in the simultaneous 
perception of two kinds of structured information. No dualism is intended 
here: rather a continuum between two poles. On the one hand the acousmatic 
piece presents structure of an everyday kind, on the other such structure is 
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contradicted. The first kind of structure may be perceived relative to the 
lawfulness of the environment, the second may contradict this lawfulness, or 
supplant it with novel structures whose lawfulness emerges only in relation to 
that piece or a specialised context. The acousmatic piece affords 
`interpretation' because its affordances must be manufactured, to a large 
extent, by the interpretative activity of the listener. Such affordances are not 
however, arbitrary, any more than are the affordances of a football, typewriter 
or technical manual. `Interpretation' is merely a term used to describe the 
production of signs and relationships between signs which provide the 
structure necessary for developing some form of relationship with an 
environment. In the case of an acousmatic piece, such symbolic structures 
may not result in a consistent and lawful state of affairs. The piece may afford 
an infinite number of interpretations, none of which exhaust or define its 
potential affordances. Nonetheless, the piece seems to demand an attempt to 
find an affordance structure. The listener perceives that some of the sounds 
specify events, or the manipulation or juxtaposition of sounds that should 
specify events but fail to do so. The aesthetic nature of the acousmatic piece 
lies in its position between the demands of everyday perception and its 
contradiction of the specificity which provides for a structured and relatively 
unambiguous relationship with the world. 
2.3.2 Descriptions, analyses and structured information 
Given that the acousmatic piece may afford the production of multiple 
interpretations it is important to clarify the way in which the description and 
analysis of acousmatic music should relate to available perceptual structures. --. 
As noted above, the affordances of a piece may be multiple, and infinitely 
flexible. Although at a broad level the piece affords interpretation, this does 
not mean that the description and analysis of that piece should attempt either 
to exhaust the multiple interpretations that are possible, or in reaction to this 
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multiplicity arbitrarily choose to concentrate upon a single interpretation. 
Since the most permanent feature of an acousmatic piece is its acoustic 
structure, and the least contentious aspect of that structure its specification of 
events, whether clearly delineated as in "the sound of a bell" or as vague as "a 
damped collision", the description of a piece should to a large extent take 
these as its primary evidence and pertinent units. Similarly, the analysis, at its 
outset, should attempt to show how the combination of these units might be 
interpreted as corresponding to everyday `associations' between them. 
However, both the description and analysis should take pains to show how 
such `default' listening is inadequate, and how such inadequacy might afford 
freer interpretation. Such interpretation must nonetheless be constrained by 
attention to those aspects of the piece that are specified by its relationship to 
environmental context. Hence, the description of pitch, or pitch structure, for 
example, should always be made in relation to the interplay between such 
interpretations and the ecological backdrop against which they might be 
deemed appropriate. In other words, the analytical approach should reflect not 
the ideology of traditional music theory (see Chapter 1) but the relationship of 
such `musical' descriptions to the structured information available to the 
listener, whether lawful in a physical or cultural sense. Moreover, where 
acoustic information is supplemented through its relation to particular cultural 
and social constraints, the descriptive. and analytical process should take such 
factors into account. Acousmatic pieces are artefacts that are perceived in 
relation to the environment as a whole, not just to the narrow cultural aspects 
of that environment which are described by music theory: as such they should 
be analysed with this contingency kept at an explicit level of the discourse. 
Hence, frequency, loudness and time should be regarded as abstractions, and 
the `musical' structures to which such parameters contribute should be 
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regarded as deriving from the perceptual systems' inability to gather 
environmentally unambiguous information4. 
In relation to visual art, Gibson notes that: 
"The structure of an artificial optic array may but need not 
specify (such) a source. A wholly invented structure need not 
specify anything. This last is a case of structure as such. It 
contains information, but not information about, and it affords 
perception but not perception of. " (Gibson, 1966, p. 225) 
In the case of acousmatic music similarly non-specifying structures may 
occur, leading to a situation where "structure as such" becomes foregrounded 
in a way unusual to everyday perception. Timbral descriptions of an acoustic 
structure, for example, fall into this category. However, it is the relationship 
between structure "as such" and structure providing information "about" and 
"of" events and objects which is important if one is to analyse an art work 
within the context of perception. Without describing this relationship the links 
between acousmatic music and everyday action and perception must remain 
nebulous. In order to foreground the aesthetic nature of acousmatic music it is 
necessary not only to identify information as such and the abstract structural 
descriptions appropriate to it, but also to describe the relationship between 
perceiver and environment which leads to the perception of information as 
such. 
For conventional vocal and instrumental music, with its highly 
constrained set of sources, it is relatively easy to set aside such considerations: 
such music does not sound like the everyday environment. The sources of 
such `musical' sounds are easily identifiable as originating within a 
specialised cultural domain. For acousmatic music, however, such 
4A sound may be described as higher or lower, rougher or smoother, brighter or darker, 
longer or shorter. These descriptions, being translations of visual or spatial relationships, must 
be regarded as metaphors. Obviously, the terms of music theory express considerable 
complexity through relating sounds, and expressing such relationships in quantifiable values. 
Intensity, or more specifically loudness (in the case of sound), cannot be regarded as a 
metaphorical description. Nonetheless, in ecological terms the loudness of a sound is an 
abstract measure of information, a measure of information which is perceived to specify 
distance from an event, or the forces involved in such an event's physical structure. 
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considerations are paramount: such music contains sounds that conspicuously 
specify `non-musical' sources. It should be the role of the analyst to uncover 
the ways in which such everyday sounds come to have an aesthetic aspect 
within the acousmatic context, not to conceal such processes through 
assuming that once embedded in a piece such sounds become significant only 
through their abstract `musical' relationships. Of course, these `musical' 
relationships are as much a part of the human environment as those of 
everyday events: they may form `coded' and familiar structures of a lawful 
kind such as the pitch structures identified by Balzano (1980; 1982; 1986). As 
such, they may indeed provide the listener with structure upon which 
interpretation is based, whether linguistic or bodily: they may afford actions. 
Acoustic structure `as such' may therefore itself afford without 
specifying an event or an object. However, in acousmatic music we are 
presented with invariances through which events may be perceived, and the 
significance of these events, however `virtual', is more than just incidental. 
Acousmatic pieces are articulated not only at the level of differences between 
sounds, but also at the level of differences between the events that these 
sounds may specify. In assuming that only the differences between sounds 
themselves are significant, the analyst mistakes the acousmatic music which 
Schaeffer theoretically envisaged (Schaeffer, 1966) for that which may be 
perceived by the listener. As the analyses of the next chapter will attempt to 
show, acousmatic music is doubly articulated in a most fundamental sense, 
contrary to the mistaken assumptions of Levi-Strauss (1969, pp. 22-23), 
whose view of musique concrete is so dominated by Schaeffer's notion of 
reduced listening. This double articulation exists not only between 
information as such and information for events, but also between the extrinsic 
and intrinsic relationships between events: events specified in a piece may 
inform the listener about his or her environment, or about the piece itself. 
Through attending to acousmatic music's similarity to the acoustic structures 
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produced by the everyday environment, rather than its similarity to existing 
`musical' structures, the analyst is immediately faced with the central problem 
of `musical meaning as opposed to everyday meaning' in a way that is 
otherwise relegated to supplementary importance. 
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Chapter 3 
Analysing acousmatic music within its ecological 
context 
3.0 Introduction 
Having developed a theoretical framework for understanding how acousmatic 
music might be described, it is now possible to apply this framework to 
complete musical works. The problematic nature of assuming that the intrinsic 
structure of acousmatic music has priority over the ways in which sounds refer 
extrinsically to the environment, and of attempting to define the units that 
constitute the acousmatic work in intrinsic terms alone has been addressed in 
Chapter 1. Through applying an ecological approach to auditory perception in 
particular, and to social and cultural perception in broader terms, it is possible 
to show how the internal and external aspects of the acousmatic `work' relate 
one to another. In this chapter an attempt will be made to situate the 
acousmatic work within the broadest possible ecological context, taking into 
account not only traditionally musical issues, but also the ways in which the 
piece provides information about the environment, and the environment 
surrounding the piece itself serves to contextualise the events that occur within 
it. Within the framework presented in the last chapter, it is essential to analyse 
a piece in terms of the information it provides, and what this information 
specifies in terms of events. Moreover, it is necessary to come to an 
understanding of how the information `in' the piece is contingent upon the 
environmental context in which it occurs and the relationship between the 
listener and that environment. Finally, in an attempt to understand the 
`meaning' of an acousmatic listening situation, the specificity and 
contingency of the affordances that may arise must be addressed. In this way 
the relationship between listener and work can be analysed in terms of its 
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function within the human environment, not just in terms of an abstract and 
autonomous `play' of intrinsically significant sounds. 
The wider implications of taking such a functional and non- 
autonomous view of music meaning will be returned to in Chapter 4, in 
relation to the central concepts of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (1974) to show 
how the approach advanced here both refreshes and challenges the notion of a 
critical aesthetics. By addressing issues of musical structure and meaning in 
an environmentally contingent fashion the relationship between the mimetic 
and rational aspects of Adorno's dialectic will be shown to have a relevance to 
contemporary musical culture far outstripping that assumed by many 
commentators (e. g. Paddison, 1991). Before this can be illustrated, however, it 
is necessary to observe the consequences of such a view in relation to a 
particular piece of acousmatic music. 
Although reference will be made to a number of works in this chapter, 
the primary focus will be a three minute long piece by Yves Daoust entitled 
Mi Bemol. (CD example 1). This piece, as will become clear, reflects many of 
the issues which have been discussed up to this point and should be regarded 
as an appropriate choice for a case-study on this basis. Moreover, its brevity 
allows for a level of detailed discussion which might be impossible for a 
longer work. The analytical work presented here should not be regarded as 
exhaustive. Indeed any `closure' of meaning is in stark contrast to the 
openness and flexibility of meaning implied by the ecological approach to 
perception described in the previous chapter. However, the analysis will show 
how the multiple sources of information available from a listening situation 
may specify events, and how the perception of these events produces both 
constraints upon interpretation and the possibility of infinite re-interpretation. 
Despite the seemingly behaviourist slant of much research in ecological 
psychology, the actions of the listener allow for continual realignment vis-a- 
vis the work, in relation to a constantly changing relationship with the broader 
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environment: the listener is not merely a passive receiver, stimulated by the 
work, but an explorative organism, sensitive to information from both the 
work and the wider environment. As noted in the previous chapter, ambiguity, 
or under-specificity of information leads to a search for meaning: the 
acousmatic work in question both specifies events and places them within a 
context in which their behavioural implications are unclear. The tension that 
exists between intrinsic' and extrinsic significance, intrinsic and extrinsic 
contexts, and the many different sources of information which come to 
constitute experience of the work, do not suggest a positivist closure of 
interpretation. On the contrary, these tensions and ambiguities reveal the way 
in which the `natural', `cultural' and `social' environments come together in 
the perception of a work not to produce certainty, but to produce individual 
and contingent interpretations, which are nonetheless constrained and 
informed by available sources of information. 
3.1 Analysing Mi Bemol 
3.1.1 Real and virtual environments 
Listen to CD example 1: it is clear that the sounds we hear, regardless of 
whether they inform us about `natural' events or more culturally specific 
events such as linguistic utterances or motivic structure, inform us about two 
kinds of environment. In the first instance the sounds of the piece serve as 
information for the real environment: although we hear sounds that have no 
visible sources it is clear that many more or less ambiguously defined events 
are specified by the acoustic structure of the piece. These events may not be 
perceived to occur in the listening environment itself, whether in a private 
space or a concert hall, but they can be clearly perceived to have their origins 
in a real environment as they preserve familiar and lawful relationships 
141 
C 
Chapter 3 
between events and acoustic structure. In the second instance, the sounds that 
we hear specify events within a virtual environment. In this case the sounds 
serve as information not for external events, but as the constituent elements of 
an intrinsic structure. 
There are three main sources of information relevant to this distinction. 
First, it is clear that the listener's relationship to these sounds is made within 
the context of `musical' listening. The listener contextualises the sounds 
through the actions of putting on a CD, entering the concert hall and so ont. 
This recontextualisation by the listener implies more than just a simplistic 
`aesthetic stance' towards what is heard. The listener places the sounds within 
a context in which recorded sounds are going to be heard, sounds that by 
definition have already occurred, and which specify past events if they specify 
events at all. Our familiarity with the transforming technology of the CD 
player is just as potent and defining a source of information as the sounds 
which are thus transformed. Second, and more importantly, many of the 
events do not normally occur within the kinds of environment which 
constitute a listening space, and hence cannot be considered to be lawful in 
relation to this space. Consider, for example the sounds of the outdoors which 
are to be heard in the piece, and the effects of a mismatch between the 
acoustics of the listening space and that of the recorded environment. The 
sounds of children playing (CD example 2) do not just inform us about 
`children playing' but about the acoustic space in which they play: the open 
air as opposed to the living room or concert hall. Third, the events specified 
by sounds in the piece do not follow an environmentally lawful pattern: the 
human listener remains stationary within a listening space, whilst events occur 
together which would imply many different environments: the outdoors; a 
firework display; the countryside. Sounds "fade in" in a way quite impossible 
in the `real' world, and are recognisable yet clearly transformed or recombined 
1 As noted in the previous chapter, the diffusion over loudspeakers of a sound itself provides 
information that informs the listener of the `unreality' of presentation. 
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in unlikely juxtapositions and superimpositions. Hence, the events specified 
through the acoustic structure of the piece can only be regarded as information 
for a past or historical environment, one which is in this case multiple and in 
itself unlawful in relation to the listening space and any single historical 
environment. In this sense the sounds of the piece present events which are 
part of a virtual environment which contains events which may have occurred 
in the real environment or could do so in future. 
However, these events inform us not only about the nature of a 
`historical' environment, by virtue of their disconnection from the 
environment in which they are heard, they also inform us about the real 
environment in a more immediate fashion. Consider CD example 3: here 
amongst other things are the sounds of a firework display followed 
immediately by a thunderclap. These sounds do not just specify events which 
have occurred in the past: they specify events which have continuing 
relevance to the human listener. A recorded thunderclap and a succession of 
firework explosions have familiar cultural connotations, they are used to 
specify culturally convened events. Fireworks are associated with celebration, 
with festivity, the thunderclap with the unpredictable forces of nature. One can 
choose to ignore previous experiences of these associated events but one 
cannot deny their familiarity. The thunderclap or storm is constantly drawn 
upon as a symbol of fate or nature in literature and film and listeners are no 
doubt familiar with this conjunction from their previous perceptual 
development, just as fireworks cannot be realistically separated from their 
celebratory function in the human environment. 
These events are not merely dissociated from their causes by their 
acousmatic re-presentation: by virtue of this dissociation attention is drawn to 
their role in the cultural environment. One cannot, and need not, hide or 
shelter from the thunder and rain, nor can one enter into any celebration as 
these events are not directly available. Instead, the listener is only able to 
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make sense of these events as information for storms and festivities in general, 
and may therefore attempt to interpret the cultural significance of their 
presentation without the necessity of overt action. This interpretation, if it 
occurs, is not merely a historical matter as it may lead to changes in the future 
activities of the listener in relation to these events. For example, the 
juxtaposition of these two explosive events might lead the listener to consider 
their relationship and to observe thunderstorms in relation to firework 
displays: the `firework' might become seen as an artefactual copy of the 
`thunderclap'. Despite the recorded nature of these sounds, the events they 
specify are more than just empty representations of situations that have 
occurred. Their affordance structure is transformed by both the technological 
process of recording and diffusion, and by their juxtaposition within the piece. 
These fireworks and this thunderclap are not perceived as having relevance to 
the relationship between listener and local listening environment but as having 
a broader interpretative relevance to the listener. By virtue of their 
inexplicable relationship to the listening environment they do not immediately 
afford social or individual action: to enter into a celebration or to take shelter. 
In one sense one could claim that the listener is drawn into an abstract 
relationship with them, in that their actions have little immediate importance 
as regards survival or appropriate social behaviour. However, this relationship 
is not abstract in any strong sense: the events specified do occur in the 
everyday environment and their interpretation `within' the piece cannot be 
separated either from their everyday significance or from the possible changes 
that may be wrought in this significance for the listener through their 
presentation in a dissociated and recontextualised form. The real environment 
outside of the specific environment of the listening space does not disappear 
for the listener. It is this persisting environmental context which the piece 
informs us about, not just what the listener can perceive of his or her 
immediate surroundings. 
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Just as the re-presentation of such real events serves as information 
about the real environment, these events may also constitute aspects of the 
virtual environment. The juxtaposition of the thunderclap and firework 
explosions not only points beyond the piece but also leads to the possibility of 
interpreting these events as being analogous to musical structures. One might 
speak of the thunderclap providing a structural link between the preceding 
section (fireworks) and the following section which specifies events common 
to the countryside (CD example 4). The thunderclap shares certain properties 
with both: on the one hand it is an `explosion' on the other a natural rather 
than artefactual occurrence. The virtual environment may thus draw upon 
everyday events to suggest intrinsic relationships between sections of the 
piece. 
The real and virtual environments discussed above form the two 
aspects of structure which will be addressed below. In order to clarify how 
these environments are structured it is necessary to proceed to a more detailed 
level of analysis. In the following three sections the coexistence of these two 
environments will be examined using the following oppositions. First, a more 
detailed analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic structures will be given (section 
3.1.2). Second, the relationship between different real environments and the 
contexts they afford will be examined (section 3.1.3). Finally, the ways in 
which real and virtual environments interact to form more complex chains of 
relationships will be addressed (section 3.1.4). 
3.1.2 Extrinsic and intrinsic relationships 
Whilst listening to an acousmatic piece, events are more or less ambiguously 
specified, and relationships between these events are perceived. Those 
relationships which pertain to the real environment are to be termed extrinsic, 
and those that pertain to the virtual environment, intrinsic. In the case of Mi 
Bemol some of the events are extremely familiar, if not banal, and some are 
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extremely unfamiliar, to the extent that they can hardly be deemed to be 
"specified" at all. Clearly, it would be mistaken to force these extremes to fit 
into any naive definition of "ecological pertinence" (cf. Windsor, 1994, 
discussed above in section 2.1.4): such an attempt would deny the mutuality 
and flexibility of perception. Instead, an attempt will be made to describe how 
a number of intrinsic and extrinsic relationships may be found, whether by 
virtue of relationships between events, or by virtue of relationships between 
`information as such' (see section 2.3.2). An attempt will be made to focus on 
the former, following the theoretical reasoning offered in Chapter 2, but where 
an acoustic structure seems to offer little information regarding the 
environment, the analysis will begin to focus upon more abstract relationships. 
As will become clear in the following section, many of these abstract 
relationships are in fact better described in relation to our familiarity with 
traditional musical structures, or rather the `musical' environment, and are no 
less grounded in event perception than those with clear everyday sources. 
Here, however, the focus will be upon the banal rather than the traditionally 
musical, and upon the way an interpretation of the piece might arise through 
the specification of everyday events, and the continuum between information 
for specific events and information as such. Similarly, relationships will be 
explored as much as possible with reference to the lawfulness of the real 
environment. Only where such lawfulness is clearly contravened within the 
acoustic structure of the piece will alternative structuring principles be 
suggested. Here too, through focusing upon the familiar, it will become clear 
that prior to any explicitly `musical' interpretation of events, a complex and 
wholly aesthetic structure begins to emerge. It is not argued that these 
relationships are the defining features of any "ideal listener's" representation 
of the piece's structure (cf. Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983): rather, these 
relationships are intended to be suggestive of the kind of pertinent units and 
146 
Chapter 3 
structures analysts might begin to focus upon within an ecologically motivated 
framework. 
First then, intrinsic relationships will be considered: those that seem to 
connect one section of the acoustic structure of the piece to another. Focusing 
at the shortest time scale, one should consider how it is that the smallest units 
of the piece come to be perceived as distinct and unitary. The opening sounds 
of the piece seem immediately to specify an instrument which, although 
unusual, is certainly coherent. Since this instrument, and the sounds it seems 
to produce recur throughout the piece it is worth spending some time 
exploring its structure in detail. CD example 5 comprises the first sounds of 
the piece, and as will be suggested, the first event. In one sense, the repetition 
of these opening sounds provides the criterion for considering each of the 
repeated sounds (CD example 6) as a unit. However, the criterion chosen here 
is that the acoustic structure of CD example 6 specifies a single event, a series 
of metallic, bell-like impacts, as if an object were being struck: one could 
subdivide this event into smaller events, but the temporal structure of the 
series of impacts links them into a coherent, source-specific higher-order 
event. This temporal structure clearly specifies a decaying, bouncing form of 
event, similar to the synthesised bouncing event manipulated by Warren and 
Verbrugge (1984). This temporal coherence is important, since it serves to 
connect the impacts in an ecologically lawful manner. CD example 7 follows 
the development of this event and the introduction of a another clearly unified 
event in the left portion of the acoustic space of the virtual environment. The 
development of the first event specifies a single `instrument' playing a short 
sequence of different pitches: in other words the acoustic information specifies 
that the original struck object is not only a single object, but a collection of 
objects of similar composition but different sizes. In this sense some form of 
instrument is suggested: the repeated striking of the same sequence of 
constituent objects does not suggest an inanimate set of objects being struck 
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randomly (for example, a set of chimes being blown by the wind) but 
something that is intentionally `played' by some agency: perhaps mechanical, 
perhaps a human player. The precision does not suggest the latter, but the 
melodic structure (returned to in section 3.1.3) certainly hints that a human 
source is likely. The events which occur in the left portion of the virtual 
environment literally mirror those on the right, albeit with a time delay. The 
temporal relationships between these two sequence of events directly specifies 
two instruments, one on the listener's right, and one on the left. The important 
point to note here is that although a musical interpretation, explicitly involving 
pitch and rhythmic structure could be found for these sounds, their coherence, 
distinctiveness one from another, and identity can all be explained in terms of 
the virtual events about which they inform the listener 
. 
Rather than stay at this detailed level, and continue to suggest ways in 
which individual events come to be specified and distinguished, a number of 
more global relationships will be explored. Although it is important to analyse 
the local level at which sounds come to be related and distinguished by virtue 
of the events that they specify, this more global analysis will reveal intrinsic 
relationships which define the virtual environment in a more extended fashion. 
The opening event's structure, and events which seem to originate from the 
same `instrument', recur throughout the piece. Sometimes these occurrences 
are transformed by studio techniques in such a way that a peculiar relationship 
with the real environment is suggested: if this `instrument' is an 
environmentally lawful one, and despite the combination of `striking' (which 
seem intentional or controlled by some agency) and `bouncing' (which seems 
less similar to the behaviour of a `played' musical instrument) this seems 
reasonable, then its transformations suggest that the virtual environment of the 
piece in which this instrument appears is not lawful in the same sense as the 
real environment. Consider CD example 8, which directly follows on from 
the segment presented in the previous tape example. This sound seems to 
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originate from the same source as the preceding examples. With a familiarity 
with the techniques of sound manipulation it is easy to perceive that our 
`instrument', or an excerpt from its playing has been reversed, especially 
through being able to un-reverse the excerpt using digital techniques. Despite 
this the original instrument is still specified through the timbral, bell-like 
quality of the sound. This cannot occur in the everyday environment2, and 
immediately informs the listener that the virtual environment is not going to 
behave in an entirely expected fashion. Regardless of whether a listener 
`recognises' the studio manipulation, it is clear that we are not perceiving a 
recording of some unmediated reality. The intervention of the virtual nature of 
the piece is here specified. The modified event, and its original are 
immediately juxtaposed, and seem to share some aspects of causation (a 
similar material is excited). These two events, despite their differences, can be 
perceived to be connected in some way, through sharing an aspect of their 
causation, a common source. They seem to specify the same virtual 
environment, defined in terms of which sound sources exist within this 
environment. 
More globally still, each time the original `instrument' is heard, the 
coherence of the virtual environment is reinforced. It is not so much that the 
sounds of this `instrument' are associated, more that they seem to share a 
particular virtual environment in which this instrument is played. However, as 
the piece continues it becomes clear that a number of such environments are 
specified: these too seem to share certain aspects, but do not necessarily form 
clear everyday relationships with the original environment specified. In this 
way the virtual environment of the piece may be perceived to specify a 
number of sub-environments, each containing events which originate from 
similar possible real environments. Each of these sub-environments may be 
considered to be both distinguished through these differences, and yet made to 
2 It can, however, obviously occur in the environment of the sound studio 
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appear related through their origin in the overall virtual environment of the 
piece. 
Which sub-environments may be identified, and how does this 
interplay between coherence and fragmentation manifest itself? We have 
already considered the `instrument' which opens the piece. This forms one 
sub-environment, which recurs in combination with other environments 
throughout the piece, encouraging coherence. Moreover, the events of this 
environment have a number of intrinsic connections with other events 
specified through the piece. For example, a number of its recurrences seem to 
initiate the onset of new sub-environments. This process is more than just a 
juxtaposition of the motive with the beginning of a different sub-environment. 
Consider, for example, CD example 9. Here, a version of the initial 
`instrumental' event, assisted by some supplementary `impacts', seamlessly 
provides what in musical terms could be considered an anacrucis to the 
following sounds, which specify the chanting of a crowd. The temporal 
structure of the initial event seems to imply a continuation, perhaps through 
the excitation of a new event. It is not suggested that any listener would 
perceive the chanting of a crowd to be `caused' by a continuation of this 
temporal structure. Nor is it suggested that this relationship may be explained 
entirely in terms of an environmentally lawful sequence of events (see section 
3.1.3). However, the acoustic structure of the `instrument' event does provide 
structured information which leads one to expect some terminal event. In this 
case the event is not another `instrumental' impact, but the initiation of a new 
sub-environment. 
In a rather different way, the mere fact that this `instrument' recurs 
during sections dominated by contrasting events forms a simultaneously 
fragmenting and unifying role. Its presence suggests that the virtual 
environment as a whole shares a degree of environmental specificity, 
regardless of its multiple nature. On the other hand the juxtaposition and 
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superimposition of this environment with the others specified in the piece 
informs the listener that what is heard cannot be mistaken for a mere actuality 
recording, just as the transformations of any specific event within this 
environment suggest another form of mismatch between real and virtual 
environments as a whole (see above, in reference to CD example 8): listen for 
example to CD example 10 during which the instrumental environment is 
heard throughout, superimposed over sounds that specify rain, bird-song, 
cattle, and the playing of a plucked instrument. The original `instrument' 
serves both to distinguish this from a recording of a real environment, and to 
provide a link with the virtual environment as a whole. Moreover, it seems to 
produce some form of link to the plucked instrument. This latter relationship 
will be analysed in more detail when the relationship between `musical' and 
`everyday' environments is considered in the next section. It suffices here to 
note that the instrumental nature of the two event sequences, the relationship 
between what seems to be two intentionally produced events, cannot be 
ignored. 
Leaving aside the initial events of the piece, and their relationship to 
other sub-environments, it is clear that a huge number of specific events may 
be heard, each leading to similar relationships of fragmentation and coherence 
on this intrinsic level. Consider, for example, the specified events of CD 
example 11: in terms of a timbral description of this extract one might be 
tempted to state that a number of unrelated sounds had been superimposed. 
However, the cyclic metallic squeaking could easily be produced by the 
squeaking of a playground swing. It is not suggested that this is the only way 
to hear this sound. However, in this case such an interpretation provides a link 
with the sounds of children playing, despite the artificially foregrounded 
nature of the swing. The question of whether such a relationship is imposed 
upon these two sounds or specified by their interaction will be discussed in 
section 3.1.4. All that is required here is to suggest that as soon as one 
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considers these sounds not as abstract timbres but as information for events, a 
shared origin in the real environment is made possible which implies a 
connection within the virtual environment. One should also note that the 
rather curious acoustic perspective, the `swing' sound being louder and 
seeming artificially close to the listener compared to the actual `playground' 
sounds, seems to simultaneously call this relationship into question. It should 
be added at this point that no claim is made that this is the only interpretation 
of these events. All that is intended here is to show how considering 
environmental specificity can draw a listener, in this case myself, into making 
some form of lawful interpretation of an artefactual and virtual environment. 
Perhaps more interesting than this banal relationship is the relationship 
between this `swing' event and its later appearance (CD example 12): here the 
temporal structure of the swing event is combined with a number of acoustic 
structures which mimic its cyclic, repetitive nature, not its precise source: a 
short melodic fragment, the sounds of fireworks (or are they big guns) all 
seem to follow the same cyclic temporal structure. Clearly the cause of these 
sounds could be related in terms of the kind of `gesture' which seems to 
govern their amplitude envelope and precise reiteration. However, whereas a 
swing, the movements of which are necessarily pendular and repetitive, 
lawfully produces such an acoustic structure, the sounds with which it is 
combined cannot be regarded in the same way, despite this similarity. 
Nonetheless, such a relationship is specified by this superimposition, showing 
the distinction between the real environment and the virtual environment of 
the piece. Again, this relationship will be returned to in a different light below. 
A relationship of a similar kind seems to obtain between each firework 
explosion and perhaps the least easy sound to regard as having a clear 
relationship to an event of some kind. The ` falling' gesture of CD example 13 
could be said to originate from some form of instrument or object, but it 
would be much more reasonable to suggest that is resembles the sound such 
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an object or instrument might make. If anything, this sound seems to originate 
from a hybrid source, part percussive (miniature pitched chimes), part 
specifying some form of falling object by virtue of its descending pitch, 
although this latter explanation verges towards the more speculative. 
Undoubtedly, some falling objects do produce such a gradual fall in pitch: for 
example, shells and fireworks. Listen now to CD example 14: here we do 
hear the sounds of fireworks, aided by the spoken dialogue, or perhaps the 
sound of big guns firing: the exclamations "fire", "... there's a double one" and 
"0 wow, look at... " seem to contrastingly specify one or other environment. 
Towards the end of the example a precise restatement of the `falling' gesture 
recurs, clearly resembling the gestural qualities of the fireworks. Whether or 
not this leads one to perceive the falling gesture in a more environmentally 
directed fashion, its presence here serves to form a link between its earlier 
statement and the present section. Whether one can speak of a shared 
environment here is open to question, but the coherence of the virtual 
environment certainly seems to be added to. Here, an ambiguous sound (in 
event-specifying terms), in Gibsonian terms "information as such", comes to 
be presented within a virtual environment which serves as contextual 
information. The role of such contexts will be returned to in the following 
sections. Here it is important to note only that the virtual environment 
specified by the piece is dynamic and evolves over time, encouraging constant 
reassessment of what the acoustic structure is information for. 
There are many other intrinsic relationships this analysis could 
describe and discuss. Rather than continue in this vein, however, attention will 
now be paid to the relationship between the acoustic structures of the piece 
and the real environment of the listener. As above, an attempt will be made to 
focus upon the banal in terms of the events isolated, and to suggest some 
relationships between these events and an environment. As noted in section 
3.1.1, this real environment need not be confined to the present environment 
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of the listener. Instead it comprises the listener's persisting surroundings and 
the `natural', `social' and `cultural' structures which it contains. 
Firstly, a return to the `instrument' events which open the piece is 
valuable in that it clarifies the `double articulation' of acoustic information 
(see section 2.3.2). Just as the unitary nature of this `instrument' forms the 
basis for defining a particular virtual environment, it simultaneously serves as 
information for the real environment of the listener. As already noted above, a 
degree of intentionality is specified by the acoustic information, offset by the 
mechanical precision of the `playing', and also by the unusual and unfamiliar 
combination of bouncing impacts upon the `instrument' and its similarity to 
some form of tuned percussion instrument. The real environment of the 
listener is directly specified by these sounds: the physical structure of objects 
and their interactions, and the familiar and more specific environment of 
musical instruments are both present within the relationship between listener, 
acoustic structure and the everyday environment. In more general terms 
consider the following sources of information and their relationship to the 
everyday environment: a firework display, as discussed above, speech events 
(both children's voices and news reports and interviews), outdoor events 
(animal sounds, weather sounds). All these sources of information may serve 
as information for the virtual environment of the piece, but simultaneously 
serve as information for a real environment, which although not immediately 
available, is lawful and persistent for the listener. 
Consider in more detail exactly how some of the speech events of the 
piece inform the listener about the real environment. It is obvious that speech 
information richly specifies according to a shared cultural environment. Here, 
in a rather more complex fashion, some of the speech sounds do much more 
than provide some form of simple narrative. CD example 15 contains 
information for three real speakers, distinguished by gender, and perhaps more 
importantly by their social role. Only two of these speakers can be understood, 
154 
Chapter 3 
one clearly specified as a radio or television journalist or news reader, one as 
an interviewee. The third speaker, although unintelligible, has a similar 
provenance. In historical, or documentary terms, it is clear that at least one 
`news item' is both reported and commented on by the two intelligible 
speakers. Specific external events are clearly specified here, both through the 
specific coded content of the utterances, and by the more global features of the 
discourse. One speaker follows the conventions of a journalist, describing an 
event in disinterested terms, the other refers to it as a participant. Geographical 
information is provided: it is clear through the accents of the speakers that the 
events described occurred in North America, just as it is clear through the 
unfamiliar language employed to refer to events. No attempt will be made to 
interpret the `meaning' of these speech events any further here. What is clear 
is that acoustic structures inform us about real external events in a 
documentary fashion. 
Supplementary to this documentary role, however, is the more 
immediate role of such explicitly extrinsic structure. The listener is informed 
about past events (unless the listener regards this past as artefactual, as a 
`fake') but is also informed about his or her real environment. The very 
unfamiliarity of the reported incidents leads the listener into an attempt to 
search for environmental structures which correspond in some way to those 
specified. This search is not necessarily manifested in overt exploration, but 
could equally be manifest in a search for contextual information contained 
within the piece, repeated and directed listening during which cultural 
implications are attended to. Alternatively, the listener may be drawn into 
overtly interpretative actions which serve to remove ambiguity from this 
information, through exploration of their own external environment. This 
latter course will be returned to below. What is important to note is that 
whether or not the listener reaches a final understanding of what the speech 
sounds `really' specify, they lead the listener into a relationship with the 
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cultural environment, and not just as information for past events. Speech 
sounds not only specify by virtue of our shared familiarity with a cultural and 
social environment, they also specify a particular cultural environment as a 
perceptual context. Not only are a number of events specified by the speech 
sounds here, but also the possibility of attempting to interpret these events 
through further exploration of our own cultural environment. Clearly, one 
cannot revisit the documented events themselves, but one can, through further 
exploration, attempt to form an understanding of them through exploring the 
cultural traces these events leave behind them, of which the re-presented 
broadcasts here are only a preliminary and ambiguous example. 
Clearly, when listening to the piece, the real environment is re- 
presented to the listener, and events, whether actual or `virtual' in their 
environmental origin, inform us both about the environment which is thus 
documented, but also the real environment in which we continue to perceive 
and act. Rather than continue to address extrinsic reference as if the real 
environment was common to each and every listener, an attempt will now be 
made to focus upon the differences between listeners' environments, and 
distinctions that may be drawn within a single listener's surroundings. 
3.1.3 Subjectivity and environmental contexts 
The preliminary analysis presented above relies upon a number of 
assumptions about the real environment: that it is lawful, that such lawfulness 
allows for direct perception and that to a large extent much of this 
environment is shared by listeners. However, listeners do not inhabit the same 
environment, and an individual listener may be familiar with a number of 
relatively distinct environments. Both of these factors lead to the possibility of 
multiple interpretations of acoustic information. 
Consider, for example, comparing my own interpretation of the speech 
sounds heard in CD example 15, with other possible interpretations in terms 
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of my own environment and that of another, imaginary listener, inhabiting a 
similar but subtly different environment, and taking rather different 
interpretative actions in relation to that environment. If one assumes that both 
of these listeners are familiar with radio and television news broadcasts, then 
at this level at least the analysis offered above seems reasonably 
intersubjective. If however, I was to state that both intelligible speakers are 
referring to a single event, a relatively recent event which occurred in Canada, 
and that this event involved the issue of ancient land rights for North 
American Indians, and more specifically a violent clash between police and 
protesters over such issues, then this is clearly a rather less obviously 
intersubjective interpretation. The issue here is not whether this new 
interpretation is more or less accurate, or whether such accuracy has aesthetic 
value, but upon what grounds such an interpretation can arise. Moreover, this 
discussion is intended to dispel any assumptions there might be about the 
relative merits of subjective and objective interpretations of the events 
specified in a piece. 
Where does this interpretation come from? The acoustic information 
within the piece does give considerable information regarding where the 
reported events may have occurred, and it is clear that some violent 
disturbance happened "over a golf course". In order to get from this 
information to the narrative described one might suggest that the interpretation 
is made through piecing together incomplete information and producing a 
logical (in everyday terms) narrative which fills in the gaps. However, this is 
not necessarily the case. Why American Indians, and more importantly, why 
Canada? To claim anything but an arbitrary choice here would be misleading. 
The logic of the interpretation does not require such a choice, and I might 
equally have chosen the United States, where Amerindian land rights have 
received considerably more international press coverage. Similarly, although 
land rights have been offered as a logical cause of a conflict between police 
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and protesters, why not some other issue: and why Amerindians rather than 
some other minority group who also burn "tobacco" at sacred ceremonies. 
Any listener might have arrived at my interpretation in search of a lawful 
sequence of events, but why this particular interpretation? The answer of 
course, is that different listeners exist within environments which are defined 
mutually, by the relationship between the environment and the listener's 
actions within that environment. The information that I utilised in forming my 
interpretation was `available' to many listeners (in the UK at least): a 
television programme which described the specific events outlined above. 
Similarly one might expect many Canadian listeners to come to this 
interpretation. However, this was only one source of information which may 
have been relevant: the CD on which the piece appears originates in Canada, 
the composer is Canadian, and these items of information are available from 
the sleeve notes accompanying the disc. 
Most importantly, however, this interpretation is neither subjective, 
nor objective, in the sense that arises from the previous chapter's theoretical 
explanation of how interpretations arise out of a mutual relationship between 
environment and organism. I do not intend to give an exact protocol of the 
stages in which the interpretation came about because such a protocol would 
be of limited value in terms of its generality. It is the fact that a specific 
environment, and a specific exploration of that environment came into play as 
a context within which to interpret the acoustic information provided by the 
piece which should be noted. Another listener, might not share this 
environment exactly, nor explore it in the same way, but might do so. 
It could be argued that this example of the contingent nature of the 
relationship between listener, virtual and real environments, dealing as it does 
with linguistic information is not representative of the more general, non- 
linguistic information which is available from acousmatic works. Clearly, 
however, non-linguistic information is just as contingent upon the 
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environmental context which the listener has explored, or may explore in the 
future. To take an extreme example, a listener who has never perceived a 
child's swing would fail to perceive any connection between the sounds of 
children playing and the pendular, cyclic squeaking which specifies a swing. 
Moreover, even if such an `association' has been perceived in the real 
environment, there is no logical need for such a relationship to be perceived 
within the virtual environment of the piece. Nonetheless, it is argued, such 
relationships are available to listeners that share such aspects of the real 
environment. 
Consider now the difference between a `musical' and `everyday' 
interpretation of the events in the piece. It is not suggested that all perceptions 
of a piece occur somewhere on a continuum between everyday and musical 
interpretations of events. Rather, the distinction between different 
environmental contexts is at issue: `everyday' and `musical' environments can 
be considered two of many possible subsets of a listener's overall 
environment. Here, such sub-environments are defined in a similar way to the 
virtual and real environments considered above. The `everyday' and `musical' 
environments are distinguished by differing kinds of lawfulness. The musical 
environment is defined by, for example, invariant pitch structures (see e. g. 
Balzano, 1980; 1882; 1986) which have little relevance to everyday 
perception. As noted in Chapter 2, `everyday perception' may be defined in 
opposition to the kinds of structured information which seem important to 
music perception (see Gaver, 1993, discussed above in section 2.1.3). Here, no 
assertion is made regarding any epistemological distinction between musical 
and everyday listening: just as a car mechanic will be sensitive to structured 
auditory information which another perceiver may simply regard as `engine 
noises' in order to diagnose faults in a mechanical system (Gayer, 1993) 
listeners may develop differing sensitivity to musical invariants. More 
importantly, acoustic structures may provide invariants which specify both 
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everyday events and musical events at the same time. This is analogous to a 
situation in which a car mechanic might respond to the acoustic structures 
produced by an engine in order to repair that engine, or to distinguish between 
different cars in some aesthetic sense. The acoustic structure of musical 
`events' is always perceived in a dual fashion: the perception of what it is that 
is played (an instrument), of the body that is playing, and the space in which a 
musical event occurs is not specifically `musical'. Simultaneously, however, 
listeners may attend to structural features of the music, such as harmonic and 
rhythmic closure, motivic variation and recapitulation, metrical structure: 
these kinds of acoustic structure, although produced by the efforts of a body 
upon an instrument are less easy to define relative to `real' events. Can one 
consider a musical motive an `event', for example? 
`Musical' events, in the context of acousmatic music, are not 
necessarily defined according to their similarity to conventional musical 
structures. However, within the experience of listening to an acousmatic piece, 
musical and everyday environments play an interactive role in defining the 
virtual environment of the piece. In the previous section the connections 
between various distinct sub-environments were considered on the basis of 
their coherence as everyday events or sequences of events. However, the 
opening events of the piece may also be analysed relative to the structure of 
the musical environment. Considered in this way, the opening events of the 
piece are a motive with a tonal centre of Eb, which serves as a structural unit 
which provides musical coherence. Note also that many of the sounds of the 
piece (such as the falling sound related to the firework section above) seem to 
form clear and directional pitch relationships with this motive itself, and with 
the implied tonal centre of Eb. The opening motive also seems to behave 
almost as if it was a sonata-form subject, returning clearly at the end. One 
might even suggest that the second subject of the work is, the everyday 
environment, contrasted with a `musical' first, subject, and that 
. 
the 
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recapitulation brings these two environments together through plucked 
instrument melody which enters towards the end of the piece. The original 
motive is also subject to pitch and rhythmic variations, suggesting a 
development section in the central portion of the piece. In order to perceive 
these relationships, the acoustic structure of the piece must be heard within the 
context of a musical environment, one which contains structured events, but 
where these events have no clear everyday significance. Of course, musical 
structures may inform us about the everyday environment, for example 
through their relationship with social and cultural structures (see e. g. Agawu, 
1991), and everyday events may be perceived to have little relevance to 
immediate actions in the real environment, as in the dislocated perceptual 
context of the acousmatic piece. Hence, no clear line can be drawn which 
divides musical and everyday events. However, the interaction between 
everyday and musical events is certainly important to an ecological approach 
to this piece: the `traditional' notion of musical coherence is combined with 
relationships which rely upon our familiarity with the everyday and 'non- 
musical' environment: in this way traditional musical units become just 
another source of information, lawfully structured, specifying aspects of both 
real and virtual environments. The affordances of both musical and everyday 
events are transformed within the piece: just as a direct relationship with the 
everyday environment is transformed by the structure of the piece and its 
listening context, so too the conventional musical environment is transformed. 
Musical events are no longer just information for the structure of a piece, or 
for locating this piece within a social and cultural context, but become 
information for the real environment of sound producing objects: through 
juxtaposing musical and everyday structures, the status of both is called into 
question. Just as we may be led to perceive an everyday sound as having 
musical qualities leading to a musical structure (the virtual environment) we 
may be led to perceive a musical sound as having everyday qualities. To 
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return to the opening events of the piece, the sounds that are presented are at 
once a musical motive, and information for a sound producing event. Both of 
these descriptions may lead to the formation of relationships within and 
external to the piece, and both rely upon our familiarity with aspects of the 
real environment. By juxtaposing and superimposing musical and everyday 
sounds the boundaries between the distinct environments which these derive 
from become blurred: the virtual environment of this piece makes no intrinsic 
distinction between these two types of event, leaving the listener within a 
context that is neither everyday, nor musical. 
Having noted the multiple contexts within which the piece may be 
perceived, some deeper theoretical consequences should be addressed. It is 
one thing to suggest that rhythmic and pitch relationships may be found that 
may be perceived in relation to the traditional musical environment. However, 
what does this imply about the two of the most often identified musical 
domains within acousmatic music: gesture and timbre. It was argued in 
Chapter 2 that gestural and timbral descriptions of acoustic structure were 
metaphorical, and that event-related descriptions should be regarded as having 
analytical priority, although not in an exclusive fashion. Moreover, it was 
suggested that gestural and timbral descriptions reflect attention to 
information as such, as opposed to information for events, and are hence 
appropriate only where impoverished information existed upon which to 
perceive in an event-related fashion. 
This being the case, some reconsideration of the distinction between 
information as such and information for events is called for. If attention may 
be focused upon the everyday attributes of musical events, and the musical 
attributes of everyday events, then it would be incorrect to maintain that a 
gesture, a motive, a timbre or a temporal structure must be interpreted as being 
information as such. Within the context of the musical environment, within 
which humans interact with musical instruments, sing, and listen to and 
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respond to musical events, such structures are clearly far from abstract. 
Although it is hard to point to a musical event in the same way one might 
identify a more obvious environmental occurrence such as the movement of a 
child's swing, musical structures do provide information about the 
environment. This suggests that the distinction between information as such 
and information for events must be regarded as contingent upon whether a 
listener perceives an acoustic structure in relation to an environment in which 
events are specified reasonably clearly. If attention is focused upon the 
everyday kinds of events which might form some type of narrative structure, 
then a gesture or timbre which fails to integrate within such an environment 
may indeed be information as such. Conversely, however, where a musical 
environment is being more clearly specified such sounds cannot merely be 
regarded as information as such. A listener may attend to the so-called 
`sensuous' qualities of sounds, but in most cases such attention is hard to 
disentangle from the perception of some form of environmental context. The 
relationship between information as such and information for events is a 
dynamic one, and can only be made in relation to the context within which 
perception occurs. 
To illustrate this, consider once again the dynamic status of the 
`falling' gesture discussed above in section 3.1.2: this acoustic structure may 
be considered as information for a musical environment, as information for an 
everyday environment or as information as such, depending upon its position 
within the intrinsic context of the piece and the extrinsic contexts with which 
it becomes linked. It is a motive, or a synthetic firework, and if neither of 
these, and only then, an abstract sound which might be interpreted in `sensual' 
terms. If the latter, then it 
-is clear that only by bringing it into some 
relationship with the real environment can one describe `what' one hears, 
however metaphorically. 
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Information as such is no less valuable in any aesthetic sense, but it is 
important to remember that such aspects of information are perceived in 
contrast to event perception. Sensuous perception is a tenuous and personal 
experience, and once one attempts to bring such experience into the social 
realm, through description, metaphor results. One is forced to describe sounds 
as higher or lower, rougher or smoother, brighter or darker. Herein lies an 
important feature of the ecological approach to description: despite the 
attraction for music theorists to attempt to divorce musical experience from 
everyday experience there is a dynamic interplay between sounds and the 
environment, through which even the most supposedly abstract sounds are 
perceived in relation to the environment which produces them. The contrast 
between information as such and information for events is always, a defining 
feature of the interpretation of acousmatic music, and should not be explained 
away by denying the value of either end of this continuum. A description of 
information as such should always be made in. relation to event perception: 
although information for events has been concentrated upon within the present 
thesis as a corrective measure (see Chapters 1 and 2), there is no reason why 
research into acoustic structure itself may not prove fruitful in explaining 
certain aspects of acousmatic music (e. g. Wessel, 1979). However, on its own, 
such work fails to do justice to the dynamic nature of the perception of 
acousmatic music. Although one might wish to classify the relationship 
between the `swing' sound and its development (CD example 16) as an 
abstract relationship based upon information as such one can equally retain the 
swing sound's event specificity in one's interpretation, interpret the 
`development' in relation to familiar musical structures, or attend to the 
`quality of the sounds' themselves. One might interpret the development of 
the `sound itself' as creating a continuum between the event specified and 
certain aspects of the information for that event being developed 
independently of the specified real environment. Alternatively, one might 
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perceive a transformation between everyday events and musical events (swing 
to rhythmic/pitch structure), with information as such (the temporal and 
frequency structure of the sounds) providing a common factor. Here of course 
the contingency of any particular interpretation should again be noted along 
with the additional proposal that such contingency applies to the listener's 
attention to information as such. Any attempt to define what is or should be 
heard within the acousmatic piece founders upon this contingency. Despite the 
specificity of events within the virtual environment of a piece, it is 
inconceivable that an analysis could predict the various interpretations 
possible in relation to this virtual environment and the persisting real 
environment. Hence, the following section will focus not upon how any 
listener might come to settle upon a particular interpretation in response to 
such diverse sources of information and courses of exploration, but upon some 
suggestive examples of the kinds of interaction between these sources which 
produce distinct interpretations at both local and global levels. 
3.1.4 Interactions between intrinsic and extrinsic structures 
In the previous section the relationship between information as such, 
information for events and the different contexts in which perception occurs 
was examined. Here, a rather different effect of context will be examined. 
Since sounds serve as information for both real and virtual environments, this 
dual role has important consequences for the perception of the piece as a 
cultural unit. Up to this point, the acousmatic piece has been described in 
terms of `what' is perceived, whether events, relationships between events or 
as information as such. However, little has been said about the cultural 
significance of perceiving these occurrences: despite the attention paid to the 
cultural environment nothing has been said regarding the piece itself except 
that it is a virtual environment which draws upon, but also challenges the 
lawful nature of the real environment. Before dealing with the difficult notion 
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of affordances in relation to the piece as an aesthetic rather than everyday 
object, it is necessary to show how real and virtual environments conspire to 
produce `meaning' in its broadest sense. Moreover it is necessary to illustrate 
not only that the acousmatic piece is contingent upon intrinsic and extrinsic 
structures, but also to show how these intrinsic and extrinsic structures 
conspire and conflict to produce this `meaning'. 
First of all, consider the superimposition of the pendular, metallic 
squeaking and the sounds of children's' voices mentioned a number of times 
above. CD example 17 comprises this section once again. Although it is 
stated above that the sounds of a swing and children playing are to be heard 
here, specific events, why is it that such an interpretation seems so reasonable? 
Although the structure of the sounds can be taken as specifying these events 
rather clearly, and their superimposition seems to strengthen their 
`association' through a virtual space which although odd in terms of 
perspective, seems lawful enough, it is helpful to disentangle a number of 
factors here. Eco (1979, e. g. p. 190-192) suggests a concept that is useful in 
doing this: that of "motivation". One can regard the structure of real and 
virtual environments not only as specifying events, but as shown above, as 
information that provides a context within which events are perceived. The 
real and virtual environments provide structures which "motivate" certain 
interpretations of events. Hence, as well as distinguishing between intrinsic 
and extrinsic relationships, one may also distinguish between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations which provide a context within which such relationships 
are perceived. In this case, the intrinsic relationship between the two acoustic 
structures is motivated by both intrinsic and extrinsic information, just as their 
extrinsic relationships respond to both forms of motivation. First, the sounds' 
intrinsic relationship depends upon a pre-existing extrinsic relationship 
between swings and children's play. Second, it relies upon the lawfulness of 
the real environment in which sounds that occur at the same time are more 
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likely to be related than not, especially where visual information is 
unavailable, another extrinsic motivation. However, one can reverse this 
interpretation: the superimposition of the sounds within the virtual 
environment could be considered an intrinsic motivation which encourages a 
search for extrinsic relationships between the sounds and causal events, and 
between these events. It is unclear whether the virtual environment provides 
impoverished information for events which demands interpretation in terms of 
the real environment, or whether the real environment provides information 
which leads to the perception of a relationship within a virtual environment. 
This circularity is not a problem, however: it is not important which 
sources of information are primarily responsible for the perception of a 
relationship. Rather, it is the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic 
structures per se, and between the intrinsic and extrinsic structures which form 
a context within which such structures come to be perceived, that should be 
noted. One cannot distinguish easily between the intrinsic and extrinsic 
aspects of the piece except within a particular context. A listener may not at 
first perceive the precise sources of an acousmatic sound, but may then on 
repeated hearings find some extrinsic information that provides an 
interpretation according to a familiar environment. Conversely, a listener may 
at first clearly perceive sounds as having clear and unambiguous sources, and 
then on repeated listenings become aware that these sources provide 
information which connects elements within the piece. In many examples 
either due to extremely under-specific acoustic structures, or the 
predominance of event-specific sounds which may be interpreted as a mere 
`actuality' recording this interplay may not occur. In these cases, the virtual 
environment of the piece, or the real environment which it may specify, 
becomes dominant. This continuum, similar to that proposed by Ten Hoopen 
(1994; see this thesis Chapter 1, p. 59), is at work dynamically within a piece, 
and between a listener's different- experiences of that' piece. Extrinsic 
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information may be gathered that re-interprets the piece, just as familiarity 
with the intrinsic structures of the piece may lead to new information being 
gathered. More than this, however, this dynamic process changes not only the 
piece itself, but the relationship between the real environment and the virtual 
environment of the piece. 
In order to illustrate this process further, a more global process will be 
described, which shows the dynamic nature of a single event, and the effects 
of its changing interpretation over the course of the piece. CD example 18 
recalls an acoustic structure discussed above: the `falling' sound was shown to 
have a dynamic relationship with the context within which it occurred, 
becoming not just a falling sound, but a simulation of a firework sound. 
Focusing in more detail upon its first occurrence, it is clear that this sound has 
significance in terms of its gesture: a falling `object' culminating in the onset 
of a new event and section (CD example 19): the event which succeeds it is 
`prepared' by this `gesture' and begins a rather different virtual environment. 
In order to form this interpretation extrinsic factors must be taken into 
account, whether of this explicitly event-based kind, or of more conventional 
`gestural' terms. In fact it matters little which of these explanations is offered. 
If one interprets the sound as a gesture implying some form of closure, this 
implication must come from somewhere3, and whether one chooses the 
conventions of musical gestures, or the `conventions' of non-musical objects 
an extrinsic factor must be admitted. Hence, an intrinsic connection could be 
said to obtain between this sound and any sound that followed it. In this sense, 
3 Even if one suggests that some form of gestalt principle is in evidence here, the pitch 
contour forming a distinct auditory stream made up of a number of acoustic `grains', it would 
still be unclear why closure would be implied so strongly except in reference to the everyday 
or musical environments. According to pure gestalt principles (good continuation) one would 
expect the sound to continue `falling' continuously, whereas a musical or event-based 
explanation explains why such falls are not expected to be infinite. Moreover, as Bregman (1991) suggests, regardless of the mechanism involved in auditory scene analysis and its 
relevance here, some form of evolutionary match between environment and auditory system, 
not that different from an ecological notion of coevolution, seems in evidence in the study of 
auditory streaming and related phenomena. 
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one could begin to speak of a structural function: according to this 
interpretation the sound serves to connect two sections of the piece. 
This gesture's later occurrence (CD example 20) follows a similar 
intrinsic function, linking two different virtual environments, one similar to a 
firework display, the other, initiated by a thunder-crack and rain, providing 
information pertaining to what can only be termed an outdoor `country' scene. 
However, as noted above, the gesture appears within quite a different context. 
This context provides additional information, reinterpreting its extrinsic 
relationships in terms of its similarity to the sound of a firework. However, its 
culmination in a thunder-crack suggests a rather more interesting and complex 
change in significance. The virtual environment provides an intrinsic 
motivation for the connection between this `gesture' and the following sound, 
since we have already heard the gesture fulfilling a particular bridging 
function. Moreover, the extrinsic motivations implying closure are still 
relevant. Overlaid upon these motivations is additional information suggesting 
that the gesture might be interpreted as analogous to the preceding fireworks. 
Hence, not only is an impact or closure implied, but also the explosion that 
follows the fall of a firework. Hence, a transition between firework, gesture 
and thunder crack is suggested which is not only supported by the immediate 
context in which the events occur, and the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
thus available, but also the motivations provided by the initial appearance of 
the gesture in a quite different context. Additionally, one might suggest that 
the original linking function provided by the gesture is itself retrospectively 
strengthened by its later occurrence in its new and more specific context 
- 
although one might need to listen to the piece a number of times to reach this 
retrospective interpretation. It is possible to interpret this gesture itself as 
motivating a larger structural interpretation of the virtual environment of the 
whole piece: a sound that seems artefactual first provides links between the 
sounds of humans (chanting and reporting news), is a common factor between 
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these environments and that of a firework display and a `country scene', and 
serves to link the latter two environments by providing the listener with 
information regarding the similarity of fireworks and thunder. 
3.1.5 Impoverished information, interpretation and affordances 
Before entering into a discussion of how listening to an acousmatic piece can 
be described in terms of affordances, it is necessary to focus in more detail 
upon the relationship between impoverished information and interpretation. In 
the previous chapter it was suggested that interpretation can be thought of as a 
response to insufficiently specific stimulus information, and that interpretation 
was an active search for natural, social or cultural information that makes 
sense of such impoverished information. In a certain sense, the acousmatic 
piece is an excellent example of such impoverished information, although not 
in the strong sense implied through Schaeffer's theory of the acousmatic 
(Schaeffer, 1966). The information available from an acousmatic piece, as has 
become clear in the previous discussion of Mi Bemol, is perceived within the 
context of the real and persisting environment, and is quite rich in its 
specification of extrinsic structures. More importantly, however, the 
acousmatic piece, however impoverished and unlawful it may be in relation to 
the real environment, is not necessarily impoverished in relation to its intrinsic 
structure, its virtual environment. Indeed, it is hard to talk of information 
being impoverished in a piece as rich in acoustic information as this. Hence, it 
would be misleading to suggest that an acousmatic piece lacks clear 
affordance structures. Clearly, the structures it presents are impoverished in 
relation to specifying real environmental events in such a way as to afford 
immediate actions: the acoustic information, as will have become clear, does 
not afford in this way. 
There are two ways in which one can think of an acousmatic piece 
providing affordances. The first is that through its impoverishment and 
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unlawfulness relative to the real environment it affords interpretation itself, a 
search for events and relationships between events which do provide for more 
immediate action on the part of the listener. However, this is supplemented by 
the second way in which the piece affords. The piece provides information 
which is perceived in relation to the real environment and the interpretative 
action of the listener: in this way the `meaning' of the piece is not just to be 
found in its contrast to the real environment, but also in its similarities. The 
real and virtual environments involved in the perception of Mi Bemol interact 
in such a way not only to provide information for interpreting the piece, but 
also information which interprets the environment. In this way, the piece may 
itself be regarded as a cultural event which has an affordance structure. It 
affords multiply, but in a way constrained by its position within the 
environment. For example, the piece has afforded a discussion of its structure 
in this thesis, just as it might afford some other form of analytical response. It 
could afford use as a cultural unit, as an exemplar of a particular style of 
music; it could afford communication of Amerindian land rights; it might 
afford contemplation on the part of the listener. Although these affordances 
are quite specific, it is not their perception itself which is of interest. Rather it 
is the way in which through listening to the piece the listener interprets not 
only the piece itself, but also, by virtue of this, the environment itself. In 
Chapter 2, the notion of affordances, and more specifically the structures 
which bring them into existence, was re-interpreted through Peirce's tripartite 
conception of the sign-function. Here it is helpful to view the way in which 
this piece might afford in combination with the listener and the environment. 
Figure 3.1 shows the tripartite relationship between piece, listener and 
environment: within this model the piece may be considered as structured 
information available from the environment. 
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piece 
environment listener 
Figure 3.1 A Peircian triad expressing the relationship between listener, piece and 
environment. 
From the perspective of the piece, the environment provides the lawful 
background against which the listener's perceptions and actions take place. 
From the perspective of the environment, the piece provides structures against 
which the environment is perceived and acted upon. It is not so much that the 
listener interprets the piece, rather that the piece, the listener and the 
environment may all be regarded as interpretants of the two other components 
of the triad. Hence one interprets the piece in terms of the listener, in terms of 
the environment, or in terms of the piece itself, but always taking into 
consideration the relationship between all three components. The affordances 
of this situation, the coming together of piece, environment and listener, will 
depend upon the structure of the piece, the structure of the environment and 
the structure of the organism. In the analyses presented above, the listener was 
treated in a rather cavalier fashion, through presenting the kinds of 
explorations of real and virtual environment a single listener might make. 
Clearly though, the affordance resulting will be changed if any of these 
components is altered: differences in the environment (including social and 
cultural contingencies), in the piece, or in the listener's interpretative actions 
will all create the possibility of a different affordance being perceived. 
Moreover, as noted above, it is 'difficult to clarify which of these mutually 
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interacting sources of structure is responsible for a particular interpretative 
decision. The important point to note once again is that one can view the 
perception of an acousmatic work as affording in two different ways: first, the 
mismatch between environment and piece relative to the listener may afford a 
search for information regardless of any observable change in the listener's 
behaviour; second, the information gathered during this search may itself lead 
to the perception of new affordances. Covert interpretative action is no less 
real than the overt actions of booing and hissing or applause which greet new 
works in the concert hall. Indeed, such covert actions may lead to lasting 
changes in a listener's behaviour which are difficult to trace in causal terms 
back to the experience of a piece. Indeed, in forming new interpretations (new 
cultural codes which might be shared and developed by a social body) the 
mutual relationship between the real and virtual environments involved in 
acousmatic music is no less pertinent to human ecology than any other change 
in our surroundings. This critical component of acousmatic music will be 
revisited towards the end of this chapter, and will form the basis for the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
3.2 Further analyses 
3.2.0 Generalising to other pieces 
The analysis of Mi Bemol illustrates the ecologically contingent nature of a 
particular acousmatic piece. To show that such contingency is at work across 
the spectrum of acousmatic music would require that a large corpus of pieces 
be analysed within a similar framework. However, what has been 
demonstrated is that the ecological approach taken does seem to dissolve the 
supposed barrier between musical and everyday perception, or at least suggest 
that for acousmatic music, the intrinsic structure of a work both reflects upon 
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and is motivated by its surroundings. In general terms, this suggests that 
taking into account the way that acoustic structures specify events, rather than 
assuming that acousmatic music is interpretable as being purely intrinsically 
structured, may be an approach which helps to clarify the object of analysis so 
problematic for acousmatic music within the context of an essentially score- 
based musical culture. Hence, rather than attempting to prove that the 
analytical approach taken is valid for all acousmatic pieces, this chapter will 
continue by applying itself to a small number of further case studies. As noted 
above, the intention in analysing a single piece in some depth was not to 
exhaust its potential interpretations but to illustrate how such interpretations 
may come into being through the relationship between real and virtual 
environments. Similarly, the shorter analyses presented below do not attempt 
to show that the analytical method is valid in any generalised sense: rather, 
they serve to show how particular virtual environments can interact with the 
real environment to produce other kinds of `meaning'. 
3.2.1 Pierre Henry: Variations pour une porte et un soupir- Comptine 
Comptine, the eighth `movement' of Henry's Variations (music example 3.1) 
illustrates the tension between intrinsic and extrinsic structures in acousmatic 
music in an extreme, yet subtle fashion. Disregarding the titles of the piece 
and this specific movement for the moment, and focusing upon what may be 
heard, it is notable that the acoustic structures of this piece have multiple 
environmental specificities. These specificities serve to articulate the virtual 
environment in a number of ways. First, despite the differences between the 
individual sounds it is apparent that a single type of source is responsible for 
the acoustic structures, some form of `squeaking'. However, in contrast, this 
`squeaking' is differentiated according to a number of possible events. Some 
of these seem to specify a familiar instrumental source, a single reed 
instrument, perhaps a saxophone, some a more `accidental' event such as 
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friction between two surfaces. The sounds, whatever their precise sources all 
suggest the gestural intervention of a `player' in the broadest sense. One could 
suggest that a continuum between a familiar musical source, and a familiar 
everyday source is present here, but notwithstanding this continuum some 
form of manipulation of the events concerned seems likely. Two motivating 
factors can be suggested here. First, the `instrumental' nature of some of the 
sounds serves to motivate an interpretation based upon a musical environment. 
Second, within this interpretation, the improvisatory quality of this 
`performance', whilst challenging any traditional models of musical structure, 
is clearly not an actuality recording of a `natural' event. On the other hand, if 
we are hearing an instrumental performance, it is clear that whatever familiar 
instrument might be perceived, many of the sounds provide information which 
challenges this perception. 
Contextual information helps provide a less ambiguous interpretation 
here. The title of the piece, and any sleeve notes available might tell us that 
these sounds are in fact all derived from a single recording of a door. 
Regarded in a traditionally acousmatic sense (e. g. within Schaeffer's theories, 
1966) the transformations that have occurred between the resultant sounds and 
the original recording distance the piece from the original events. Although it 
is not suggested that such a result was intended, it is clear that the virtual 
environment is not independent from the real environment which was 
recorded, nor from the real environment with which the listener is familiar. 
Whether or not the listener `hears' an instrumental source, a door-squeak or 
fails to hear any source for the sounds at all, perception occurs within such 
contexts. Indeed, it is suggested that it is the interplay between the virtual 
environment and the real environment which provides this piece with its 
focus. The acousmatic does not serve to conceal sources here, but serves 
simultaneously to challenge and conform to the lawfulness of the real 
environment. The sounds are not a squeaking door, nor are they a saxophone, 
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but they preserve certain invariant features of these sounds in such a way as to 
present a perceptual conflict. Herein, it is argued, lies the aesthetic component 
within this piece, a tension between the real and the virtual. 
Before moving on, it is important to note that there is a further and 
more subtle level of specificity here. The `quality' of the sounds employed, 
their texture, should not be regarded as a purely abstract, auditory 
phenomenon. This textural aspect is closely related to the possible causes of 
such sounds, and hence plays a role not only in specifying particular events 
but providing a link between the piece and the environment of real events. The 
structure of the sounds specifies causation in a direct yet general fashion: we 
hear some form of contact between two surfaces, or the supposed vibration of 
a reed between the lips of a player. Moreover, the possibility of hearing a 
player provides the basis for perceiving a human body as direct instigator of 
the events. The quality of the sounds is far from abstract, however abstracted 
from specific events our perceptions may become. Even familiarity with the 
`real' sources of the sounds in this piece, or conversely an attempt to banish 
such considerations, cannot wholly disturb this virtual environment. Indeed 
attempting to follow such listening strategies tends to increase the tension 
between the ` real' and virtual environment: on the one hand it does not sound 
as if all the sounds are best interpreted as merely a door squeak, on the other 
they do not seem to be an abstract set of structures. A virtual environment is 
suggested which is at once a performance, a recording and an exploration of 
acoustic quality. The latter aspect, however, should not be divorced from the 
events which produce sounds. A play of timbres may be a good description of 
this piece in one sense, but only when this description is related to source 
specificity does it take on its full interpretative significance. In order to hear 
this piece in an abstracted form, one must disregard all the information which 
richly specifies causal events, an interpretative course which implies a 
negation of this specificity. Such a course is in no way invalid as an 
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interpretation, but must be seen within the context within which it takes place. 
Whether or not the environmental contexts suggested here are perceived, it is 
clear that these sounds may inform the listener about more than just 
themselves, and it would be misleading to suggest otherwise. 
3.2.2 Fred Frith: Guitar Solos- Alienated Industrial Seagulls 
Although this particular piece (music example 3.2) cannot be regarded as 
truly acousmatic, in that it is a recording of an instrumental performance, its 
recorded form presents a number of issues relevant to the discussion of the 
contingent nature of the acousmatic work. The electric guitar, despite its 
versatility, has a familiarity in the latter part of the twentieth century which is 
undeniable. Although electronic transformation is very much a part of its 
identity, and playing styles differ considerably, it is generally an easily 
identifiable instrument. Here however, the `history' of the electric guitar is 
challenged through the acoustic structures available from the virtual 
environment. What we hear is hardly recognisable as a guitar at all: we hear 
rattles, scrapes, bangs, and very few sounds which clearly specify either the 
playing styles with which we are familiar (blues, jazz, rock) or the instrument 
itself. The most important source of information identifying this as guitar 
playing at all is the information provided through familiarity with Fred Frith 
as a particular player, and connected to this, the information available through 
the cover of the CD, which conveniently provides a photograph of Frith with a 
subtly modified guitar in conjunction with the overall title `guitar solos'. 
In the case of this piece the relationship between real and virtual events 
is a subtle one. The virtual environment is one which provides information for 
a number of events which seem to have little to do with guitar playing. Indeed, 
it is clear that if one wishes to interpret this piece as a `guitar solo', rather 
unusual playing techniques must be involved. Without the extrinsic context of 
`guitar solo' the piece could be an actuality recording of any number of 
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sources, and any interpretation arrived at would likely leave out the real 
component of the guitar as a factor. Is the guitar and its player then a virtual or 
a real source for the acoustic structures which result? In one sense the guitar is 
a real source, despite its interaction with unusual materials and some degree of 
electronic manipulation, in another it is a virtual source, specified only 
through familiarity with the cultural environment, especially the linguistic 
specificity provided by the sleeve of the CD and any contact a listener may 
have had with Frith's playing. Not taking this duality into account leads to a 
situation in which this piece remains either a guitar solo, or (perhaps) an 
improvisation using everyday objects. It is not suggested that either of these 
interpretations is of less value than the other, but it is proposed that the 
conflict between them leads to an added layer of significance. Only by 
considering the differing sources of information available to the listener does 
it become clear that both interpretations may be motivated simultaneously 
through dual extrinsic contexts (guitars or the everyday sounds of colliding, 
scraping and rattling `objects') thus providing an interpretative tension 
between our familiarity with guitars and the information for events provided 
by the sound of the piece. Moreover, it is proposed that interpretative action is 
itself afforded by the conflicting structures available to the listener. Conflict 
between sources of information, just like insufficient information, affords 
interpretation, whether through a perceptual search for additional information 
(which may never be definitive), or through the production of interpretative 
statements which purport to explain the piece. To give one such `interpretative 
statement', this piece seems to provide information which both challenges 
perceptions of what a guitar itself might afford and what might be afforded by 
a virtuoso instrumental technique. The important point to note here is that 
such a statement only makes sense in relation not only to what is heard, but 
what is available from the context in which it is heard. 
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One should also note that any clear distinction between culture and 
nature here is facile: Frith's playing is `naturally' lawful in that it is the result 
of actions which conform to the possibilities provided by the relationship 
between his body, an instrument and the information provided by his 
perceptual systems, but equally the results of these actions are cultural in that 
they challenge the more contingent laws which a listener relies upon in 
making sense of these actions. That these cultural constraints are just as 
dependant upon the perception of other players' relationships with their 
resources and are hence far from arbitrary emphasises not the differences 
between cultural and natural environmental structures but their common 
source: the activity of human beings in relation to their environment. Viewed 
from another perspective, one might equally state that Frith's own playing 
results from his own actions within the context provided by his `cultural' 
knowledge of guitar playing: likewise, this cultural knowledge is derived from 
familiarity with the environment, and is far from arbitrary. Neither natural nor 
cultural lawfulness can be examined independently from the organism which 
perceives and acts. 
3.2.4 György Ligeti: Artikulation 
In Chapter 1, an aural score of Artikulation (Ligeti/Wehinger, 1970) was 
criticised for its conflation of functional and perceptual analyses (see 
Delalande, 1986). Indeed it was proposed that this score reifies certain 
functional aspects of the composition and presents these as a perceptual 
analysis in a potentially misleading fashion. Within the framework developed 
in this and the previous chapter it is possible to suggest some alternative 
analytical interpretations of this piece. Rather than fixing the meaning of the 
acoustic structure within the context of its manufacture, its actual sources 
(oscillators, filter banks, etc. ), the analysis proposed here attempts to show 
how the uncertainty in attribution of source events is itself a component in 
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possible interpretations. Within such a view, the actual causes of the sounds 
are at issue, but only insofar as they are available to listeners through 
structured information, and in relation to the listener's environmental context. 
It is suggested that in perceptual terms, this piece creates a tension 
between virtual and real sources, between its status as a piece of 
"electronische Musik" and as information for possible events. It does provide 
information for `electronic' events with which many listeners will be familiar. 
In combination with a familiarity with the history of electronic music, it would 
also be possible to suggest an interpretation based upon this work's position 
within such a history. One might for example `hear' this piece in relation to 
Stockhausen's early electronic studies or Kontakte. The environmental context 
in this case is a highly specific one, and its specificity is relative to two 
sources of structured information. The first is that of the piece and its 
particular acoustic structures and listening context, the second, familiarity 
with the acoustic structures of a number of other pieces in combination with 
their listening contexts, contexts which include information regarding their 
manufacture. 
This piece, however, cannot be seen merely as the result of the 
technical and historical processes perceived. Just as one might hear 
`electronic' source events, and indeed, in combination with the information 
provided by the `score', the `imitation' of speech sounds, one also hears 
`metallic' sounds, sounds that specify flowing and bubbling fluids, wind, and 
changes in spatial structure which suggest events occurring within a number 
of virtual spaces. These latter interpretations are no less valid than those made 
in relation to the real sources identified through perceiving the 
-piece in 
relation to studying the score or listening to other instances of electronic 
music. Indeed, one might argue that a distinction between real and virtual 
sources is only possible with reference to the particular real environment of 
the electronic studio. For the listener, no such context should be assumed to be 
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relevant to interpretation, nor should it be proposed as providing some form of 
necessary ground against which other interpretations are to be contrasted. The 
tension between interpreting this piece as `electronic music' and as a montage 
of sounds that more closely resembles occurrences outside the electronic 
studio is not to be dismissed lightly. Whatever prescriptive motivations might 
be given for attempting to ignore the alternative environments which may 
have produced the sounds of this piece, it is clear that a perceptual approach 
must embrace all such possible contexts and resulting interpretations: just 
because the sources of the sounds are well documented does not mean that we 
are constrained to interpret the piece according to such documentation. Indeed, 
for most listeners, despite their familiarity with the environment of electronic 
sound sources, an environment impossible to ignore in contemporary western 
life, the precise provenance of the sounds will remain contingent unless 
emphasised through a programme note or the score. For listeners, and for 
analysts whose interests lie beyond the actual manufacture of the piece, an 
everyday interpretation of the events involved in the piece is no more or less 
`true' or `objective' than one which accounts for sounds in relation to their 
actual production and status within the historical context of electronic music. 
Take, for example, the opening of the piece (music example 3.3): is it 
not possible to interpret the events one hears as drips of water and the impacts 
of various solid objects? Moreover, as the extract develops one might perceive 
a growing conflict between such an interpretation and the more clearly 
artefactual sounds which occur. This contrast between two possible 
environments creates the possibility not just of interpreting the piece as 
referring intrinsically within an abstract timbral or gestural framework, and 
extrinsically in relation to the `environment' of electronic music, but also as 
an interplay between the electronic, or synthetic and the `natural'. Moreover, 
within the `natural' domain one could suggest an interplay between solid and 
liquid events, a kind of proto-narrative interpretation wholly independent of 
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the axis between real and virtual source environments. Such interpretative 
axes are as important for electronic music as they are for acousmatic pieces 
which more unambiguously combine recorded and synthesised sounds. 
Indeed, as argued in the previous chapter, the perception of any acousmatic 
piece always occurs within the broader context of the familiar environment in 
which sounds are perceived as information for familiar events, as a contrast to 
everyday perception, yet intimately related to it. Through the mismatch 
between everyday perception and acousmatic perception, informed by the 
inability of the listener to explore the perceived events in an unconstrained 
and cross-modal fashion, the listener is placed in a position where either 
perception is both impoverished or misleading in relation to the immediate 
listening environment, yet meaningful in a less immediate, but no less 
informative fashion. 
As noted above, although the virtual nature of an acousmatic 
environment may constrain the listener from intervening directly in the events 
that might be perceived, this does not mean that such events cease to be 
meaningful in an ecological sense. Although the affordances of such events 
are undoubtedly transformed by their unusual context or by processes of 
electronic production or transformation, or indeed by a tension between their 
status as information as such and information for events, such processes lead 
to new affordances. The electronic sounds can be heard as impoverished 
information for everyday events, and the tension between everyday and 
electronic contexts literally affords a search for some kind of social or cultural 
explanation. That this search may be open-ended in terms of its direct 
consequences for the future actions of the listener does not reduce the 
importance of viewing an aesthetic response within the broader context of 
human actions. By actively attempting to produce discourse which `makes 
sense' of what we hear as a cultural object, as 'communication', 
_as 
`art', the 
listener acts in such a way as to replace an everyday interpretation (which is 
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clearly contradicted not only by the structure of the piece but by the structure 
of the environment in which it is perceived) with one which is consistent with 
a view of the environment as a human environment. Moreover, viewing this 
piece in such a way, as a structure which affords interpretation in relation to 
the human environment, avoids reducing musical experience to the discovery 
of any sole structuring principle by portraying interpretation as an active 
process which momentarily fixes the piece within the context of human 
behaviour and the human environment. Such a momentary and contingent 
view is in direct contrast to that of attempting to define a neutral level of 
analysis for acousmatic music (Nattiez, 1990) whether through the 
observation of documentary evidence which supports particular views of 
analytical pertinence or through empirical research which takes as its starting 
point the abstract and self-referential nature of musical structure (see Chapter 
1). On the contrary, meaning is seen as arising from the mutual relationship 
between listener and piece. 
This need not lead to an extreme relativism in which all interpretations 
have equal status: in the case of Ligeti's Artikulation it is clear that by 
describing available information, an interpretation of the piece may be shown 
to be grounded within particular informational contexts. The analyst's role 
within such an approach is to identify such contexts and how they constrain 
and inform interpretation at any given time, not to discover any more general 
and coherent view of the `work'. Such a perspective may not result in the 
kinds of structural insights desired by traditional models of analysis4, but 
serves instead to emphasise the shortcomings of viewing acousmatic music as 
a coherent analytical object. Whereas Wehinger's `listening score' 
(Ligeti/Wehinger, 1970) attempts to explain how the piece is constructed, and 
4 One might suggest the Ursatz of Schenkerian approaches or the Grundgestalt of 
Schoenbergian approaches as examples of the kinds of interpretative fixity the present 
approach attempts to avoid. Although these concepts of harmonic/contrapuntal or motivic 
unity come from tonal theory, they can be seen as analogous to the attempts made by 
contemporary theorists to emphasise the intrinsic unity of acousmatic works at the expense of 
their extrinsic contingency (see Chapter 1). 
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to direct our aural attention to acoustic features which relate to such an 
explanation (or confirm it), the approach developed here offers no such 
certainty. However, it is hoped that what is achieved is a view of the 
relationship between pieces, the human environment and human perception. In 
this vein, Artikulation is not seen as an analytical object, but as structured 
information which, combined with other sources of information, may result in 
interpretation. The `work' is seen not as an object but as a relationship 
between listener and the environment, a relationship which is dynamic, yet 
open to analysis. Similarly, any division of the work into smaller units must 
always take into account these units' contingency. Artikulation is not its score, 
nor is it just an acoustic trace, nor indeed is it merely something which 
resembles everyday events yet fails to specify them unambiguously. It is a 
combination of sources of information and can be analysed in such terms. 
These sources of information may include Wehinger's aural score 
(Ligeti/Wehinger, 1970) but may also include sources of information available 
only to a particular listener. Some sources of information, such as the real 
environment, must be regarded as having more stability and generality than 
others, but none should be discounted as having relevance to an analysis. 
Moreover, interpretation itself should be seen within its social and cultural 
context, as a means of actively constructing affordances where these are ill- 
defined through perception of the immediate structure of the environment. In 
the case of Artikulation it is clear that there is a distinction to be drawn 
between awareness that acoustic information is available, and an attempt to 
understand this acoustic information in relation to the human environment as a 
whole. 
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3.3 Summary and conclusions 
3.3.1 Description, interpretation and affordances 
Through analysing the relationships between the virtual environment of the 
piece, the listening environment, the lawfulness of the more extended 
environment, and the listener, it has been suggested that acousmatic music can 
and should be analysed in a contextual and perceptual fashion. An ecological 
approach to analysis has been taken which succeeds in revealing structures 
concealed from those who attempt to impose traditional concepts of self- 
referential structure upon acousmatic music. Within such an approach the 
context provided by the musical environment is but one of many possible 
contexts within which interpretation may occur. 
No attempt has been made to propose any falsifiable theory of 
listening in this chapter. It is not the aim of this thesis to propose a theory of 
musical listening, but to show how our view of musical listening is itself 
inadequate if it continues to assume that the perception of music can be 
studied independently from perception as a whole. It is suggested here that the 
contingent nature of our interpretations of acousmatic music may itself serve 
to generate fresh insights into research in music perception, if only as a 
reminder that musical behaviour occurs within a much broader context of 
human behaviour, and that musical works cannot be wholly separated from 
the much broader context of the human environment. However, the prime 
function of this thesis is to provide a theoretical standpoint which is 
appropriate for the descriptive study of acousmatic music, and to demonstrate 
how such a theory can be applied analytically. Through such a process it 
becomes clear that rhythm, pitch and timbre need not be the central focus of 
musical structure and meaning for all music, and that through shifting the 
emphasis away from such a view of music as pure structure the `problems' of 
acousmatic music become largely dependant upon whether one is prepared to 
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accept such a change in focus. Lack of notation, lack of a theoretical basis for 
pertinence, lack of theoretical terminology all become far less important when 
it becomes clear that acousmatic music reflects a dual nature, at once 
significant through its internal transformations, superimpositions and 
juxtapositions and through its connections to the external world. 
The analyses presented above also reveal the way in which a 
description of an acousmatic piece might take the form not of an analysis of 
the piece itself, but of the relationships that can be formed between the 
different sources of information which can be brought to bear upon the 
interpretation of a particular listening context. Interpretation has been 
characterised as an attempt on the part of the listener to make sense of the 
conflicts between different sources of information and the environments they 
specify through actively seeking out contextual information and constructing 
some form of affordance structure, however ill-defined and unstable this 
might be. Listeners perceive what to do with a `piece' just as clearly and 
directly as they perceive what to do with any environmental event. That 
listening to a piece can be a private contemplative act does not contradict this 
view: for the piece to be interpreted it must result in a change in the 
relationship between listener and environment. Merely acting to sit down and 
ignore other events and attend to the piece itself should be regarded as 
sufficient justification for such a view: the piece, as a contextual whole, 
affords such actions. Similarly, the attempts we make to bring such `private' 
decisions into the social and cultural domain, through analyses of our own 
aesthetic behaviour must also be regarded as being afforded by the context of 
the piece. It is not only theorists and analysts which attempt to make sense of 
what they hear through social and cultural interaction with other humans. 
Hence, to reiterate the ways in which acousmatic music `affords', it is 
clear that the mutual process of listening within the environment affords 
certain characteristic interpretative actions. The listener, rather than seeking to 
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act in an immediate fashion relative to currently available information, acts in 
such a way as to search for and even produce new information. Through such 
interpretative action events become defined which are perceived to originate 
in familiar contexts, whether everyday or musical, natural or cultural. These 
events are not the sounds of the piece, but should instead be regarded as 
events for which the sounds provide structured information. These events 
become linked through their perceived origin within coherent and lawful 
environments, and the relationships between such environments. Whereas the 
structured information available to the listener may afford interpretative 
action, such interpretative action itself produces new affordance structures. 
The process of interpreting acousmatic music leads to clarification, however 
contingent and momentary, of the events that might be perceived: these 
events, whether individually or in combination, afford things for the listener. 
The listener might, for example, choose to attend to the piece again, perhaps 
focusing their attention upon rather different aspects of the acoustic structure, 
as a result of interpretative action. Here, the piece affords a repertoire of 
actions. At the most banal level the piece affords those actions which lead to 
replaying the piece. Just as a sentence might afford `looking' in a particular 
direction, the piece affords listening. More than this, however, the piece in this 
case affords a particular attentional focus. Just as the visual structure of an 
object affords perceptual activity focused upon certain aspects of that object, 
such as toward the handle of a tool in the case of grasping, the acoustic 
structure of a piece may also be regarded as information which affords 
directed attention. This of course is rather different from perceiving the 
graspability of a handle of a tool itself. However, the events and environments 
perceived in relation to an acousmatic piece do afford in this way as well. A 
piece may afford `discussion', and it may afford being used as a cultural unit, 
a tool within the human environment, which comes to have some coded 
structure. 
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To place this in its proper context, it is clear that acousmatic music is 
distributed, discussed, exchanged, played, diffused and so on. Acousmatic 
pieces are hence themselves part of human behaviour and not just abstract 
units which are interpreted in the private domain. The information they make 
available, in combination with the interpretative actions of the listener, affords 
socially, as part of the social human environment. Such information provides a 
focus for interpretative action, but action nonetheless, manifested through our 
continued involvement in the kinds of behaviour which are afforded by 
acousmatic music. However, it is clear that for acousmatic pieces to become 
meaningful in this way listeners must in a sense create such meaning through 
interpretative action. Listening itself plays only a small part in the affordance 
structure of an acousmatic piece, as will have become clear through the 
environmental contingencies analysed in this chapter: it is the connections 
between listening, the environment and our actions which make potential 
interpretations available. The `piece' may be a focus for the perception of 
affordances, but the affordance structure perceived is a complex of 
informational sources in relation to such a focus. 
The analysis of Mi Bemol is especially pertinent to this view. Not only 
does this piece afford interpretation, an attempt momentarily to fix its 
relationship to a number of possible environmental contexts, but it may also 
lead the listener into new relationships with the human environment through 
informing us about cultural matters, even political matters, through its 
narrative elements. Moreover, to any listener familiar with the musical 
environment of the west, its juxtapositions of musical and `extra-musical' 
structures provide information relating to the structure of the musical 
environment itself, and the relationship between the musical environment and 
the everyday usage and perception of sounds. It is difficult to tell whether the 
kinds of cultural relationships about which we are informed motivate the 
intrinsic structure of the piece, or whether the particular structures of the piece 
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lead us to perceive such cultural relationships. In this sense the piece not only 
informs us about the cultural environment, but also affords certain actions in 
relation to this environment. For practitioners of music, the perception of a 
piece such as this may afford changes in their compositional or performance 
practices, for theorists and analysts the creation of new analytical and 
theoretical discourses to deal with its particular character, and for all listeners, 
regardless of their particular perceptual development, something will be 
afforded. That something may be turning off the CD player, deciding to buy 
and repeatedly listen to the piece, or attempting to explain to others why it is 
of value. Regardless of the lack of immediate survival value in the perception 
of, and action in relation to, acousmatic music, this is no reason to suggest that 
no affordances are available. Clearly we do act in relation to cultural events, 
and in the case of acousmatic music there is no better example of a cultural 
event which has the potential to inform us about so many diverse 
environments, and the relationships between these environments. Acousmatic 
music does not merely represent events, it may specify them, whether through 
invariants which survive electronic transformation or are produced by 
electronic transformation. Through such direct means, the affordances of 
events themselves become open to interpretation on the part of the listener, 
and manipulation on the part of the composer. Although we do not take cover 
when we hear the sound of gun-fire in an acousmatic piece, the event that we 
perceive retains the potential to afford, but in a more flexible and less 
immediate fashion. 
3.3.2 From description to critique 
At this point it becomes clear that the analytical approach taken thus far is 
j 
deficient in an important respect. No attempt has been made thus far to 
evaluate the possible relationship between acousmatic works and the society 
and culture in which we find ourselves except in the most descriptive terms. 
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To suggest that acousmatic music informs us about the environment both 
directly and through our attempts to interpret it is insufficient if we are to 
come to any understanding of the value we might ascribe to such information. 
Acousmatic music is different from the real environment, but perceived in 
relation to it, and this implies the need not only to describe these differences 
and relations in disinterested terms, but also in terms which reflect the 
possibility that we might attain some insight into the everyday environment 
through the transforming focus of the acousmatic work. Put in the most stark 
terms, the perception of the so-called `real' environment may be contrasted 
with the acousmatic piece in that it seems that perceiving and acting in 
relation to the real world has direct consequences for our survival, whereas 
perceiving and acting in relation to an acousmatic piece seems peripheral to 
matters of survival. Failing to perceive food sources results in starvation, and 
our actions in relation to food sources can be seen to have consequences not 
only for the individual but for social groups. The sharing of food sources, in 
relation to our social organisation, and the cultural codes which relate to such 
sharing, can all be seen to have direct and valuable consequences for the 
survival of individual humans. The same can hardly be said for acousmatic 
music. Here, not only are the events we are informed about unavailable for our 
immediate consumption or use, they are often only indirectly related to our 
survival in their specification of environments which are structured unlike the 
real environment. Although acousmatic music has been considered 
informative in relation to the real environment, a description of the structured 
information which makes such relationships possible cannot explain why 
perceiving an acousmatic work might be of value to individuals or society. 
One could respond to such a stark distinction between aspects of the 
environment which are immediately concerned with survival and those that 
are peripheral to such needs by regarding the perception of acousmatic music 
as a purely aesthetic act. Indeed, such a view would be in agreement with a 
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view of art as being defined by our disinterested attitude towards it (e. g. Kant, 
1952). However, having shown that acousmatic music itself has the potential 
to blur the boundaries between the musical and the everyday, between 
intrinsic and extrinsic and between cultural and natural, it seems rather 
unlikely that distance from the concerns of the everyday is a sufficient 
description of acousmatic music's relevance to human experience. On the 
contrary, the distancing effects of the acousmatic medium have been shown to 
be matched by the ways in which sounds retain structural pointers beyond the 
piece itself, and that the tension between the context of the piece and the 
context of the wider environment has been shown to have an illuminating role 
to play in analyses of particular pieces. It is precisely because acousmatic 
music so unashamedly juxtaposes the real and the virtual that it seems so 
unusual in aesthetic terms, and to suggest that acousmatic music allows us to 
dispassionately assess such a juxtaposition runs against the grain of the 
ecological approach to perception adopted here. If one attempts to talk of the 
affordances of acousmatic listening, the potential it has for constraining and 
suggesting action, however indirect, however interpretative, then it is clearly 
incorrect to propose that acousmatic music elicits a disinterested response. 
One way of moving away from viewing acousmatic music as a source 
of information, and developing insight into the value this information might 
have for us, is to consider the wider implications of analysing acousmatic 
music in an ecological fashion. It was suggested in the opening chapter of this 
thesis that acousmatic music is notable for the attention it pays to mimesis, to 
the representation of reality. However, the mimetic aspect of acousmatic 
music has been shown to operate at the same time, and in concert with, the 
virtual nature of the acousmatic listening experience. We hear events which 
may simultaneously specify intrinsically and extrinsically. In the last chapter 
of this thesis, an attempt will be made to show how an evaluative approach to 
aesthetics might be formed which takes into account the kinds of descriptions 
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advanced here. Moreover, an attempt will be made to show how both listener 
and composer perceive and act upon the environment within the context of 
acousmatic composition. Although an attempt has been made thus far to 
concentrate upon description based upon the kinds of perceptual and 
interpretative behaviour relevant to the listener, the production of pieces 
themselves will be shown to occupy a middle-ground between representations 
and transformations of reality and its affordances similar to that perceived by 
the listener. 
A 
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Chapter 4 
Acousmatic music, aesthetics and society 
4.0 Introduction 
The two previous chapters can be seen as providing an alternative discourse 
for describing acousmatic music, a discourse which places emphasis not upon 
traditional music theory, but upon the structures which acousmatic music 
makes available to the listener, the environmental events and contexts these 
specify, and the interpretative actions these afford. This chapter aims to 
reinterpret this ecologically contingent view of acousmatic works in terms of 
aesthetic, rather than music-analytical theory. If the previous chapters propose 
an alternative view of how acousmatic music can be considered an analytical 
`object', then this chapter should be regarded as an attempt to draw some 
conclusions as to what kind of aesthetic `object' this alternative view suggests. 
Furthermore, having proposed an aesthetic interpretation appropriate to the 
analytical concerns identified thus far, this interpretation will be assessed in 
relation to a number of wider issues relevant to the study of contemporary 
musical culture. Lastly, some more general conclusions will be presented, 
which will present an assessment of the implications of this research for the 
theory and practice of acousmatic music and the relationship between 
perceptual and musical issues. Hence, this chapter as a whole represents both a 
conclusion, and a reinterpretation within an explicitly critical approach to the 
aesthetic and social issues raised by acousmatic music. 
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4.1 Acousmatic music as critique 
4.1.0 Introduction 
The ecological approach to perception provides a framework within which the 
analytical focus is shifted away from sound itself towards sound as 
information for events, thus providing a context within which an appropriate 
description of an acousmatic work may be seen to derive from our familiarity 
with the environment. Within such an approach, musical structures may play a 
role, but this role is not a dominant one. Indeed, quite the converse often 
seems to be the case: familiarity with everyday events often provides 
sufficient context within which to form an interpretation. This being the case, 
any aesthetic evaluation of acousmatic music must account for this apparent 
shift in emphasis away from the explicitly `musical' towards the `everyday'. 
Hence, this section will consider an approach to aesthetics that already 
contains within it a recognition that art both draws upon pre-existing 
structures and yet distances itself from them. It has become clear that 
acousmatic music may be interpreted through such a dual process: the 
impoverished and transformed information offered by an acousmatic work 
both specifies aspects of the real environment, yet also contradicts aspects of 
it, thus specifying a virtual environment. The `acousmatic' does not always 
serve to conceal events (cf. Schaeffer, 1966), rather it serves to dislocate the 
listener from their everyday affordances. The challenge for an aesthetic 
interpretation of such music is that whereas we are encouraged to regard 
traditional musical forms of Western art-music as being primarily self- 
referential (see Chapter 1) and hence autonomous, acousmatic music seems 
more to resemble representational art-forms such as pictorial art, photography 
and film in its reliance upon the extrinsic. However, the challenge is more 
than this: the context provided by the everyday environment suggests that 
even where the materials of a work are not derived from the listener's 
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surroundings directly, event perception may provide a meaningful and 
extrinsic basis for listener's interpretations of acoustic structure. To suggest an 
analogy with visual art, despite the supposedly abstract and non- 
representational nature of certain forms of painting, it is possible to `see' 
familiar forms and figures. Rather than seeing this as the projection of familiar 
visual forms onto the canvas it is suggested that such perceptions are 
accounted for by the pick-up of impoverished invariant structures which 
nonetheless contain sufficient structure to specify virtual objects. In the same 
way, acousmatic music may be interpreted within the context of event 
perception, structure being searched for and developed through familiarity 
with the sounding environment, rather than imposed. 
Thus, the following discussion will investigate the aesthetic 
implications of a reconsideration of what acousmatic music is. The previous 
two chapters redefine acousmatic music in relation to a realist view of 
perception, providing analytical descriptions which avoid the implicit or 
explicit reification of intrinsic structure. Although, as will be shown below, all 
musical works can be considered to mediate between external reality and their 
immanent structure, acousmatic works present this mediation in an extreme 
form. The extremity of this mediation between reality and the work itself will 
be shown to have more than just a neutral value. Acousmatic music, it will be 
argued, has a critical potential in relation to the world, not just an informative 
one. 
4.1.1 Aesthetic autonomy, listening and composition 
In section 1.3 of Chapter 1, attention was drawn to the need to address the 
conflict between the notion that music is primarily self-referential and the 
clearly mimetic aspects of acousmatic music. Similarly, the `metaphorical' 
approach to musical meaning, exemplified by Hanslick (1974), Langer (1953; 
1957) and Scruton (1983) was criticised and compared to both recent 
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developments in musicology (e. g. Agawu, 1991; Lidov, 1987) and the 
concerns of acousmatic practitioners, both of which present challenges to the 
ideology which underpins such approaches. 
However, the relationship between extrinsic reference and intrinsic 
structure was only touched upon. Here, the importance of understanding this 
relationship will be argued, concentrating upon both the practice of 
acousmatic music, expressed through the writings of composers, and the 
analytical object identified through the previous two chapters. Although, as 
noted in Chapter 1, the discourse of composers must always provide a 
functionally biased view of acousmatic music, many of the concerns 
expressed through this discourse will be shown to correlate with the listener- 
oriented approach to description developed above. This should not be taken as 
evidence that such functional analytical discourse has been in some way 
validated through a perceptual discourse (cf. Delalande, 1986). Rather, these 
two bodies of evidence should be taken to indicate quite separately how such a 
relationship reflects both compositional and interpretative concerns. 
In what way then, does the discourse of certain composers suggest a 
relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic concerns within their music and 
how is this relationship described? Wishart (1985; 1986) and Smalley (1986; 
1992; 1994) both regard the prevailing view of timbre as musical parameter 
with disdain (see esp. Wishart, 1985; Smalley, 1994), regarding it as having a 
clear relationship with sound sources. For Wishart, extrinsic reference is fully 
"compatible" with more intrinsically motivated structuring processes, indeed 
the two may be bound together inextricably: 
"I decided to attempt to set up a sonic architecture based on the 
relationship between the sound-images themselves. which 
would remain compatible with my feelings about musical 
structure" (Wishart, 1986, p. 55) 
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Smalley, similarly regards both abstract and concrete aspects of sound as 
compositionally important, as shown in his discussion of these terms in 
relation to the use of a `car' sound in an electroacoustic piece: 
"One can imagine a context where the spectral design of the 
car's sound could be associated with other sounds of related 
shape. In this way the composer could manipulate the context 
so that the listener is drawn into following abstract aspects of 
the sound's design rather than thinking about the significance 
of cars as objects. On the other hand a musical context could be 
created where the car's sound is used to make a statement 
about cars as cultural symbols. Ultimately, in explaining the 
role of the car's sound in its musical context, we should want to 
explore both aspects of its meaning... All sounds possess this 
dual potential-the abstract and concrete aspects of sound- 
and all musical structures are balanced somewhere between the 
two... " 
(Smalley, 1986, p. 64) 
Moreover, although Smalley concentrates in this and other writings upon the 
abstract pole of this axis (see also Smalley, 1992; 1994), his view of such 
matters also implies a duality between perceived causation ("surrogacy") and 
more traditional acoustic descriptions and their shared role in articulating 
intrinsic musical structures. Moreover, he also suggests that: 
"any extra-musical message conveyed in a strongly mimetic 
work is carried and articulated by spectro-morphology... " 
(Smalley, 1986, p. 92) 
The abstract structure of sounds is seen as being a carrier of extrinsic 
structure: 
"The power of a concrete sound-image to portray things, events 
or psychological circumstances, rests not just on the immediacy 
of the images themselves but on how the sounds are 
constructed and combined-their spectro-morphology-and 
that involves using reduced listening to investigate the more 
abstract dimension. " fl (Smalley, 1986, p. 64) 
For both Wishart and Smalley, sounds are seen as functioning both in intrinsic 
and extrinsic fashions. Moreover, both stress the compatibility of the two 
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functions, and the ways in which composers might relate one to another. 
Although Smalley still insists on using the term "extra-musical" (Smalley, 
1986, p. 92) and, in his concentration upon the abstract at the expense of the 
concrete, tends to suggest a more traditional divide between music and 
everyday concerns than Wishart (see e. g. Wishart, 1986), it is clear that such a 
distinction is becoming hard to maintain. Smalley notes that: 
"The range of sound sources available as materials for 
electroacoustic music, and the scope of spectro-morphology's 
influence demonstrate an unprecedented broadening of our 
conception of the nature of music, demanding of the composer 
a much deeper and broader understanding of the role of sound in human life... " 
(Smalley, 1986, p. 92) 
In the face of such an inclusive idea of music, retaining the notion of 
musical autonomy becomes a matter of some difficulty if one assumes that 
this autonomy refers to the separation of music from the everyday world. 
However, attempts are still made to maintain a division between the ` logic' of 
the work and the `logic' of our surroundings, if not between the musical and 
the extra-musical: Smalley's notion of abstract and concretes aspects of sound 
is one version of this division. 
A rather more sophisticated analysis of such matters is provided by 
Emmerson (1986): rather than a simple opposition between abstract and 
concrete, the material and `language' of electroacoustic music are here both 
shown to be articulated by a varying attention to structuring processes drawn 
from the material itself, or imposed upon this material. Since, in 
compositional terms, the material of electroacoustic music may be considered 
either `manufactured' or `found', and the techniques applied to this material 
may either be derived from some aspect of this material or independent of it, 
Emmerson suggests the following oppositional axes: one of syntax, between 
1 This opposition, as Smalley notes, is derived from the work of Schaeffer (1966). However, 
Smalley's theoretical work, although stressing the importance of reduced listening, presents a 
far less extreme concentration upon this concept in both listening and composition. 
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abstract and abstracted syntax, and one of discourse, between aural and 
mimetic discourse. The syntax of the work may, for example be abstracted 
from the material in some way, whether through reduced listening a la 
Schaeffer, or through attention to the organisation of sounds in the 
environment (Emmerson gives the example of Luc Ferrari's anecdotal 
montages), or imposed upon sounds, through, for example, serial techniques. 
Within this framework, the narrative `syntax' of Wishart's Red Bird is, in a 
sense to be regarded as abstract, as it is imposed upon material. Along the axis 
of discourse, attention may be drawn to the mimetic aspect of sounds, their 
pre-existing connections with reality, or removed from this reality by attention 
to their qualitative nature. 
Emmerson's analyses of a number of works illustrate the ways in 
which these axes are to be found in a cross-section of works, in all possible 
permutations. The analyses constantly stress the way in which compositional 
techniques may be viewed in relation to the materials employed. However, 
although Emmerson stresses the role of perception in defining whether syntax 
may be abstract or abstracted, and discourse mimetic or aural, his analysis 
remains firmly in the realm of function as opposed to perception. Although 
one can argue that the employment of a serial procedure or the imposition of a 
narrative is an abstract process in relation to composition there is no reason to 
assume that for the listener such a distinction will be applied in the same way. 
The perception of a narrative could occur whether or not serial techniques are 
used to organise the material, and the grounds for `imposing' a narrative must 
be considered, from the perspective developed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis, abstracted from our coevolution with a structured environment. 
Similarly, an aural practice may be heard mimetically, or vice versa. The 
contingency of interpretation makes any predictive relationship between 
function and perception extremely unlikely. Nonetheless, it is clear that in 
functional terms, the materials and techniques involved in an acousmatic piece 
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are described as interacting, as having a number of possible relationships, and 
recognition is made of the fact that in composing an acousmatic work, the 
materials and techniques applied to them may both reflect the structure of the 
world (mimesis) or be in some sense in contrast to this structure. For 
acousmatic music, it is clear that a simplistic distinction between form and 
content is inappropriate, since either may be drawn from attention to the 
environment. Moreover, the acousmatic work, viewed as it is by composers 
such as those cited here, can hardly be characterised as autonomous in any 
simplistic fashion: if both material and technique may as easily draw upon 
aspects of the world as impose upon them, then one cannot argue, for 
example, that despite the mimetic aspects of its material, compositional 
technique merely imposes unrelated and abstract structures upon such 
material. 
It is clear from the analyses presented in Chapter 3 that similar 
F 
relationships may play an important role in the interpretation of acousmatic 
works: the intrinsic structure of an acousmatic work, its virtual environment, 
despite its contingency upon extrinsic motivations, is contrasted with the real 
environment. The narrative that may develop from a sequence of events, for 
example, serves not only a narrative per se, but as the grounds for connecting 
elements within the piece. Hence, despite the challenge to musical autonomy 
that acousmatic music could be seen as providing, such a challenge does not 
provide grounds for rejecting autonomy out of hand. Similarly, although the 
functional concerns addressed above suggest that acousmatic works challenge 
a simplistic view of musical autonomy, certain aspects of a work's 
construction may be regarded as autonomous in relation to those aspects that 
are derived directly from the environment. In order to clarify the nature of any 
challenge to musical autonomy acousmatic music might represent, a thorough 
critique of musical autonomy is required. For the moment it will be assumed 
that such a challenge is present both in the discourse surrounding acousmatic 
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composition, and within its interpretative potential. From both functional and 
perceptual analyses of acousmatic music one can conclude that the autonomy 
of the musical work is under threat, through being encroached upon by an 
attention to the relationship between the work itself and its context, its 
mimetic aspect. As already argued in Chapter 1, such attention represents a 
challenge to the dominant ideologies of reduced listening where the composer 
is asked to place the everyday associations of sounds within 
phenomenological brackets (Schaeffer, 1966; Chion, 1983), and of abstract 
views of timbre which attempt to reduce complex sounds to a parameter of the 
same kind as pitch or time (e. g. Schoenberg, 1973; Wessel, 1979; McAdams, 
1994). Here however, it will be interpreted within a wider debate regarding the 
autonomous nature of the musical work. As will become clear, the acousmatic 
work is both an autonomous and a mediate form: it does challenge musical 
autonomy, but simultaneously redefines the nature of this autonomy in 
relation to the world in which it exists. 
The view of music as an autonomous form finds its apotheosis in the 
claims of Hanslick: 
"The ideas which a composer expresses are of a purely musical 
nature... " 
(Hanslick, 1974, p. 35; also see section 1.3, this thesis) 
Adorno, whose work will be used as a framework for discussing the aesthetic 
nature of acousmatic music, is another upholder of the autonomy of the art 
work and might seem an odd choice to form the basis for an aesthetic analysis 
appropriate to studying such an openly mimetic art-form. However, as will be 
argued below, Adorno's theories on the nature of art and its relationship to the 
world (e. g. Adorno, 1984) provide for an enlightening analysis of the critical 
potential of acousmatic music. 
For Adorno, the ability of the art work to separate itself from social 
forces through its autonomous, even monadic, character is of central 
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importance to aesthetics. The development of a culture industry, in which art 
works become commodities whose possession and exchange are definitive, 
and the related increase in the immediacy of cultural artefacts, necessary for 
their status as mere gratification (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973, pp. 120- 
167), deny such autonomy. The threat to the autonomy of the art work 
presented by the technology of mass production and the "psycho-technology" 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973, p. 163) of the gratifyingly familiar is more 
than just an attack on the art work itself. Such techniques are seen to reduce 
the art work to a socially defined and defining role, rather than a critique of 
society. The art work, through its loss of autonomy, becomes complicit in the 
"economic coercion" that is seen to characterise society (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 1973, p. 167). This context would suggest that the attention to 
mimesis in acousmatic music, and its reliance upon technological means to 
this end, would be anathema to an Adornian critique. Such reliance upon 
immediacy, familiarity and technology are the methods of the culture industry. 
Moreover, the ubiquity of such means across the supposed boundaries 
between `high' and `low' art, or between commercial and `cultural' interests, 
again suggests a collapse of distinctions necessary for the production of 
autonomous works, reminiscent of the conflation of culture and advertising 
seen by Adorno and Horkheimer (1973) as a primary symptom of the growth 
of culture as commodity. Paddison suggests that: 
"... the effects of the cultural pluralism and relativism which 
have come to characterize the period since the 1950s, and the 
`new simplicity' and accessibility which have become such a 
feature of the music of the later part of the twentieth century, 
can also be interpreted in terms of Adorno's theory. From 
Adorno's perspective, such developments could be seen only as 
regressive, the reversion of the elements of musical material to 
their pre-rational, pre-autonomous condition. " 
(Paddison, 1991, p. 279) 
However, through applying Adorno's methods anew, this regressive 
interpretation of contemporary musical culture can be seen to find a 
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redemptive complement in the attempts of musicians to grapple with the 
relationship between materials provided by the `real world' and their 
presentation as elements within musical works. Adorno "was no Luddite" in 
his attitude to technology (Levin, 1990, p. 24) and his dialectical approach to 
the musical work may provide a far less threatening understanding of mimesis 
than generally acknowledged. In order to show this, however, it is necessary 
to outline Adorno's conception of the dialectical nature of aesthetics. 
4.1.2 Mimesis and rationality 
Central to Adorno's view of aesthetics (e. g. Adorno, 1984) is the dialectic 
between mimesis and rationality; between the representation of reality and the 
abstract techniques through which such reality is mediated within the art 
work. Art, therefore provides an image of enlightenment: just as our rational 
endeavours provide us with means to exploit and control our surroundings 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1973), the artist is engaged in domination of his or 
her material. This image, for Adorno, contains redemptive possibilities, in that 
a particular art work may present a monadic, autonomous artefact which 
cannot be reduced to, or exchanged with another. Such an art work requires 
individual contemplation, and through such contemplation the relationship 
between mimesis and rationality within that work provides an instance where 
domination is divorced from its everyday consequences. For Adorno, 
individual art works may provide the only version of our rationality which 
refuses to engage with the world in a direct manner; an engagement which in 
normal circumstances has led to an alienation from both nature and our fellow 
human beings: 
"Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from 
that over which they exercise that power. Enlightenment 
behaves towards things as a dictator towards men. " 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973, p. 9) 
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Adorno's view of mimesis, as Paddison (1991) notes, is viewed in an 
anthropological light. Mimesis is not merely the re-presentation of nature. 
Instead, mimesis is that which precedes rationality, a state in which `primitive' 
man establishes power over things by imitation (Paddison, 1991, p. 272). This 
view is made explicit in the critical reading of the Odysseus myth provided by 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1973, pp. 43-80). In broader, aesthetic terms, this 
view of mimesis as a totemistic, shamanistic process leads Adorno to 
associate mimesis with `primitive' art. This view of mimesis as a primitive, or 
pre-rational, process is contrasted with the rational domination of things which 
demands objectivity, rather than shamanistic identification with objects. 
Adorno's aesthetic, in as much as it presents art works as the products of 
enlightened rationality, consistently implies the dialectical relationship of 
these primitive and enlightened forces. 
4.1.3 Material and technique 
Eschewing what he calls the "philistine" distinction between form and 
content, a decision quite in keeping with the perspective on acousmatic music 
developed in section 4.1.1, Adorno introduces the notions of material 
(Adorno, 1984, p. 213) and technique (Adorno, 1984, p. 303). These two 
notions and their dialectical relationship mirror the relationship between 
mimesis and rationality. Adorno describes material thus: 
"Material... is the stuff the artist controls and manipulates: 
words, colours, sounds-all the way up to connections of any 
kind and to the highly developed methods of integration he 
might use. Material, then, is all that the artist is confronted by, 
all that he must make a decision about, and that includes forms 
as well, for forms too can become materials. " 
(Adorno, 1984, p. 213) 
Here Adorno unifies form and content: for a composer, a stylistic convention, 
or a form, is as much material as a particular instrumental sound. Technique, 
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on the other hand can be described as the "mastery of materials" (Adorno, 
1984, p. 303); technique is the skill with which the artist "controls and 
manipulates" his or her materials. 
For Adorno, material and technique exist in a dialectical, rather than 
dichotomous relationship (Adorno, 1984, p. 213; p. 304). Just as techniques 
determine the way in which materials are mediated by the art work, so 
material itself determines the techniques which are appropriate. Adorno states 
of material: 
"Unreflective artists believe that they can choose materials as 
they please. This is of course completely wrong. There are 
inescapable constraints built into materials, constraints that 
change with the specific character of the material and which 
determine the evolution of methods. The state of the material 
largely also determines innovative expansion into unknown 
areas. " (Adorno, 1984, p. 213) 
Similarly, despite the constraints provided by material, the development of 
technique "is a growth of freedom and of conscious discretionary power over 
means" (Adorno, 1984, p. 303). The dialectic of material and technique is that 
of mimesis and rationality, mimesis being the domain of the pre-existent, 
rationality that of the enlightened conscious agent. One should not, however, 
mistake mimesis for the representation of nature; material in art is already 
contingent upon previous technical developments and is "formed" by such 
means: 
"Material is always historical, never natural... Materials are just 
as dependent upon technical changes as technique is on 
materials worked upon by it. Clearly, the composer who works 
with tonal material takes it over from tradition. " 
(Adorno, 1984, p. 214) 
This interdependence of material and technique motivates Adorno's 
attitudes to many compositional practices. His assessment of Schoenberg's 
adoption of atonal and then serial practices (Adorno, 1973) rests upon the 
notion that Schoenberg's material, that of late tonality, demanded new 
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techniques. That these techniques generated a new body of material for 
composers such as Boulez and Stockhausen, that of `serial technique', shows 
the peculiar way in which material and technique are dynamically entwined. 
This view of the relationship between material and technique, where 
mimesis is constrained to pre-existing musical artefacts, can be interpreted as 
being the defining principle of the autonomous work. A musical work retains 
autonomy from the world through its mediation of musical forms which are 
already mediate and autonomous. It is this which prevents the fetishistic and 
`regressive' nature of mimesis from threatening the work's monadic isolation, 
whilst maintaining a connection with social forces through its reproduction of 
enlightened domination: 
"It is the dynamic and oppositional relationship to received formal norms within the structure of the musical work which 
enables the work to speak. At the same time, however, the 
received norms, as musical material, also carry with them the 
`meanings' associated with their previous functionality... Thus, 
music is `meaningful' and `language-like' to the extent that this 
received, preformed musical content, already socially 
mediated, is recontextualised within the form and structure of 
the individual work. This process also serves to distance the 
material from its previous functionality, without, however, 
being able to destroy its associative residues. " 
(Paddison, 1991, p. 278) 
However, to suggest that the autonomy of the musical work relies upon this 
alone would be incorrect. It is not just the mediate nature of musical material 
that ensures the work's "distance from its previous functionality". Rather it is 
the "process" of mediation itself that provides such distance (Paddison, 1991). 
A more traditional view of mimesis as representation of reality can find a 
place in this formulation. Indeed, as will be argued below, the present state of 
musical material, its relationship to technique, and the form this dialectic takes 
within acousmatic music both in terms of its production and interpretation can 
be shown to demand closer attention to this `primitive' force and to the 
technical means by which it may be mediated. 
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4.1.4 Expanding mimesis 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno proposes that it is fallacious to propose that 
material can escape from its historical nature. Even when composers 
"ruthlessly extinguish all traces of tradition" by working with "autonomous 
material purged entirely of phenomena like consonance/dissonance, triad, 
diatonicism, etc.... " (Adorno, 1984, p. 214) material remains bound up in 
history by virtue of its concrete negation of that history. Merely by adopting 
non-traditional material, the musician affirms the historical nature of material, 
whether this is intentional or not. One can view Schaeffer's desire for a new 
"language" of music derived from the process of "reduced listening" 
(Schaeffer, 1966) as an attempt to extinguish tradition, the tradition of 
notational reification, of serialism, as indeed Schaeffer himself viewed his 
theoretical and practical experiments (Chion, 1983 p. 40). This view of 
material is as historically mediate as that of any composer attempting to 
develop the Viennese tradition; material in such an approach as Schaeffer's is 
bound up in the history of music by its very negation of historical linearity. 
Indeed it is pertinent to note that both the serial and acousmatic views of 
material originate in such apparent negations of tradition. Similarly, these 
apparent negations have led to the construction of bodies of theory that lead 
one to talk of the `serial' or `acousmatic' traditions. 
The usage of sounds for their everyday significance provides material 
that has a history, but one that is not necessarily musical. However, the 
relationship between material and technique is potentially of a different nature 
in the case of acousmatic music. Here, material has the potential for radical 
dislocation from the matrix of musical history, to be immediate rather than 
mediate. The world of everyday perception intrudes into the fabric of musical 
discourse. If, like Adorno, one wishes to speak here of the dialectic of 
mimesis and rationality, more specifically of material and construction, these 
changes in the nature of material are far from trivial. Rather than the 
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enlightened domination of musical material, a historically mediate construct, 
acousmatic works have the potential for exploiting auditory information for 
the raw, directly perceivable environment. In this sense, utilisation and 
interpretation of acoustic structures in acousmatic music may seem closer to 
the magical or "primitive" art defined by Adorno as pre-rational and 
unenlightened in its mimetic force-majeure (See Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1973). However, it is far from the "primitive art" described by Adorno, in that 
such material is subject to the rational domination, the technical articulation, 
that exemplifies enlightened artistic endeavour. The stuff of our everyday 
perceptions is dominated by every available technical means. As such the 
dialectic of mimesis and rationality is presented in its starkest form. Reality is 
subjected to manipulation, rather than the acculturated residue of reality that 
forms the material of instrumental and vocal composers. 
Nevertheless, despite the mediation of reality that occurs when 
identifiable sounds become material subject to manipulation, their immediacy 
does defy the autonomy of the art work. Through choosing a broader 
definition of mimesis, the musician implicitly or explicitly acknowledges the 
narrative and gestural qualities of sounds that are distanced through the 
mediate nature of conventional musical materials. What does this broader 
view of material lead one to say of the dialectic between autonomy and social 
commentary? It is suggested here that the obsessive technical domination of 
sound may be the strongest exemplar of the force field that lies between the 
social and autonomous in art. The dialectic of material and construction is 
here at once a mirror-image of enlightened barbarity towards things as they 
are and of this barbarity's negation in its avoidance of direct involvement in 
the social sphere. The musician, rather than directly manipulating the world, 
manipulates and represents its recorded image in a new form. In the classical 
musique concrete studio recorded tape is cut and spliced and the environment 
is left unblemished, yet the image of this razor-blade attitude towards the 
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environment remains. Simultaneously, material laden with immediate value is 
brought into the autonomous sphere by its removal from the everyday. 
In order to understand the historical context within which such un- 
mediate forces usurp conventional musical material, it is necessary to return to 
Adorno's own writings upon the avant-garde of the 1950s and the 
development of electronic music. Despite the potential for techniques to 
become materials through their historical sedimentation, Adorno stresses that 
a conflation of material and technique, a situation in which the composer 
blindly follows particular procedures, leads to stagnation and aesthetic 
impotence. It is in the non-identity of material and technique that aesthetic 
possibilities are held. Adorno's views upon integral serialism concentrate 
upon the way in which the blind application of serial procedures can become 
an end in itself: a work becomes validated by its correctness rather than its 
balance between material and technique. In a number of articles which discuss 
the increasingly "technical" nature of music in the 1950s and the "aging" of 
the avant-garde, its becoming a static, monolithic tradition, Adorno constantly 
stresses the need for composers to be critical of their materials, whether these 
are serial techniques or electronic media (Adorno, 1977a & b; 1988). This 
form of critique ensures that what Adorno prizes most highly, the immanent 
structures of individual works, contain within them both a knowledge of the 
implications of their materials and a technical mastery that is based upon the 
individual struggle of the artist against all that is seemingly pre-ordained by 
those implications. 
At first acquaintance, Adorno seems to associate electronic music with 
"reified consciousness"; just as the "new music" in its attempts to be ultra- 
rational thus becomes a static and inhuman, an almost industrial practice, the 
same critique is levelled at electronic music: 
"Hyper-modernism, including much of electronic music, 
prefers to join forces with reified consciousness rather than stay 
on the side of an ideology of illusory humanness. Dissonance 
thus congeals into an indifferent material, a new kind of 
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immediacy without memory trace of the past, without feeling, 
without an essence. " (Adorno, 1984, p. 22) 
Just as atonal music loses the shock of dissonance in its development into 
serialism, so electronic music attempts to make up for the mechanisation of 
music implied by integral serialism by further mechanisation. Adorno also 
notes the dangers of turning electronic music into a pseudo-science (Adorno, 
1984, p. 463); such a tendency would imply a similarly inappropriate 
validation of artistic methods and results as that of the technical correctness he 
criticises in the avant-garde. However, his criticisms of electronic music are 
just that, criticisms of electronic music. There are aspects of the technology 
involved in the production of electronic music that are to be viewed with 
cautious enthusiasm. Despite his belief that electronic music can accentuate 
the hyper-rational within music, Adorno argues that the technology of 
electronic music itself may form the basis for maintaining the dialectical 
relationship between the mastery of the composer and the demands of material 
(Adomo, 1977a). This argument, however, betrays a broader view of mimesis. 
He suggests that the tensions in the art work between technique and material, 
lost through the dominance of fixed and objective compositional techniques, 
can be regained through the replacement of the fragmentational forces of 
dissonance by using reference to the "technologized" world. Adorno here 
makes reference to Edgar Varese, whose work 
"... bears witness to the possibility of musically mastering the 
experience of a technologized world without resource to arts 
and crafts or to a blind faith in the scientization of art. Varese, 
an engineer who in fact really knows something about 
technology, has imported - technological elements into his 
compositions, not in order to make them some kind of childish 
science, but to make room for the expression of just those kinds 
of tension that the aged New Music forfeits. He uses 
technology for effects of panic that go far beyond run of the 
mill musical resources. " 
(Adorno, 1988, p. 109; emphasis added) 
210 
Chapter 4 
Adorno here suggests not only that "run of the mill musical resources" may no 
longer be sufficient to create tension within the work, but also that it is the 
more conventional reading of the term mimesis that is at work. Reference here 
to technology is seen as direct and a force outside the dominant musical 
tradition is called upon to restore aesthetic values. Despite Adorno's 
conflicting concern with maintaining the mediate nature of material, shown in 
his concern that electronic music fulfil a historical necessity (e. g. Adorno, 
1977a, p. 138), it is clear that he was aware of the challenges to such musical 
material inherent within its self-referentiality. It is in this sense that the threat 
of mimesis to autonomy must be balanced against the collapse of musical 
material into impotence. Far from being merely regressive, the enrichment of 
musical material can be viewed as a response to hyper-modernism that is quite 
in keeping with Adornian critique. Moreover, although the productive side of 
Adorno's critique has been concentrated upon up to this point, the 
interpretative consequences of the expansion of mimesis are just as great. The 
interpretation of works, not just in relation to a musical context, but in relation 
to the whole environment, have a similarly refreshing consequence: just as a 
composer's enrichment of the mimetic aspect of material provides a critique 
of traditional musical material's impotence, the listener, in attempting to 
interpret the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic, between real and 
virtual, is placed in a position between two dialectical forces. For the listener, 
the acousmatic piece provides a potential critique of his or her everyday 
engagement with the world, and all the consequences of this engagement. 
Adorno has little to say about the explicit use or interpretation of 
everyday events so important to acousmatic music. However, as has been 
argued, his views on contemporary music imply a far from dismissive attitude 
to the implications of such an expansion of mimesis. Before readdressing 
acousmatic more directly, Adorno's views on recording technology should be 
noted. Although Adorno seems largely unaware of the use of such technology 
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in the composition of music, and hence offers little of direct value to 
discussion of its critical potential in this form, his views on recorded music do 
provide additional context within which to address such matters. 
4.1.5 Technology and the musical work 
The phonograph, being one of the primary means by which culture becomes 
industrialised, would seem to demand Adorno's full polemic wrath. However, 
just as the technology of electronic music is only one aspect of its aesthetic 
status, phonographic technology itself is not the only issue here. Although the 
development of the recording industry facilitates mass production and 
distribution of art works and their subsequent reification as objects of 
exchange, the technology in question can also be seen as providing the means 
for combating such tendencies. Moreover, Adorno, despite his mistrust of 
mimesis, presents a view of the phonograph which is strangely constructive, 
rather than merely reproductive (Adorno, 1990a, b&c; Levin, 1990). This 
tendency, although far from explicitly calling for use of the phonograph and 
other recording technologies as musical instruments, suggests that as for film, 
where montage provides the means for escaping from unmediated mimesis 
(Adorno, 1981/2), it may be through montage techniques that the aesthetic 
value of the phonograph will be found (Levin, 1990). 
In his essay Opera and the Long-Playing Record, (Adorno, 1990c) as 
Levin (1990) correctly notes, use of the LP as the means for a montage-based 
listening technique is advocated. The possibility of repeated and fragmentary 
listening is represented as a method for avoiding. the "neutralization" of 
operatic works through their museum-like captivity in the opera-house 
(Adorno, 1990c). Levin (1990), in interpreting this approach as being parallel 
to Adorno's view of cinematic montage (see Adorno, 1981/82), fails however 
to note the significantly different natures of montage in these two domains. 
Whereas the events that make up a film montage may be from any source, and 
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hence run the risk of being mimetic in a traditional sense, the results of such a 
broad mimesis are not foreseen for music. Although Adorno claims that 
"The gramophone record becomes a form the moment it 
unintentionally approaches the requisite state of a 
compositional form" 
(1990c, p. 65) 
there is no discussion here of the consequences of presenting a montage of 
recordings of one or many works as a composition. Neither does Adorno give 
us any clue here as to the consequences of producing montages of so-called 
real-world, or everyday sounds. What is important here is that Adorno hints at 
the redeeming quality of recording technology, that it not only translates what 
is recorded into an item of exchange, but also provides a means for 
transformation. Through the fragmentation and repetition of a recording it is 
possible to transform a static and potentially lifeless artefact into a 
compositional and inherently critical form. Presenting such a montage as a 
composition, as an `autonomous' work is no more contradictory than the 
mediation of traditional musical materials in Adorno's conception of music. 
Moreover, taking into account the added transformational possibilities 
afforded by both analog and digital processing of sounds, technique as the 
"mastery of materials" (Adorno, 1984, p. 303) need not focus upon the 
recording in a one dimensional fashion. The musician may create a narrative 
structure, based upon the immediate force of sounds' everyday references, or 
focus upon the gestural qualities of sounds, but such mimetic approaches may 
be seamlessly combined with attention to the abstract, timbral connections 
between sounds. The technical aspect of the work becomes necessarily 
responsive to such decisions. Whether a composer wishes to acknowledge the 
direct significance of a recorded sound or not, such significance is at issue. 
Indeed, by avoiding recognisable sounds in the finished work, a musician 
silently acknowledges such sounds' force. Moreover, by acknowledging and 
responding to this force, the musician does not become a primitive. By 
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exploring the mimetic potential of sounds the critical nature of autonomous art 
is at work. The ubiquity of recorded music and sound finds its critical 
counterpart in such processes. Adorno apocalyptically describes recordings as: 
"The black seals on the missives that are rushing towards us from all sides in the traffic with technology; missives whose formulations capture the sounds of creation, the first and last 
sounds, judgement upon life and message about that which 
may come thereafter" 
(Adorno, 1990b, p. 61) 
Through the critical process of transformation, the creative supplement to such 
a reification of sounds brought about by recording technology is to be found. 
Just as the broadening of mimesis is at once a threat to the critical distance 
between musical work and reality and a reinvigoration of the potency of this 
distance, the technology of recording provides its own critique in its adoption 
as a creative potential. 
In relation to acousmatic music, Adorno's critique of recording 
technology serves the same purpose as his critique of electronic music. Just as 
an expansion of mimesis through the inclusion of non-musical materials can 
be justified in critical terms, recording technology utilised as a productive, 
transformational force, can be seen as critical of this technology's tendency to 
merely copy reality. Through combining these two tendencies, acousmatic 
music avoids both the hyper-rationality of the modernist conflation of material 
and technique, and the potentially `regressive' nature of audio technology. 
Domination of reality through technology is a characteristic of western 
society, just as is the tendency towards the self-sameness of western society's 
artefacts through mass production. Through subverting the use of technology, 
the acousmatic composer both reflects technology's dominating presence in 
society, yet uses such technology to aesthetic ends. The acousmatic work, due 
to its reliance on audio technology, may be seen as both a reflection of the 
industrial process, yet simultaneously shows how such a process may retain 
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autonomy through its response to the immanent demands of artistic 
production. 
4.1.6 Acousmatic music and the image of domination 
As noted in section 4.1.1, acousmatic music, for both listener and composer, 
can be seen to challenge the self-referential nature of music. In critical terms, 
this challenge is expressed through the relationship between material and 
technique: the demands placed upon technique by the new materials made 
available by electroacoustic technology, and the dialectical relationship 
between these demands and the actions of the composer. For the listener, 
although the distinction between material and technique may be less clear, the 
conflict between real and virtual environments provides a similar dialectic. 
The critical potential of this dialectic lies in the position of the listener in 
relation to the `work'. Adorno suggests that aesthetic experience relies upon a 
parallel dialectic to that of mimesis and rationality in the production of art 
works: the mimetic aspect of listening is the desire for undifferentiated 
identification with the work, the rational being expressed through the denial of 
this desire (Adorno, 1984 pp 343-348). The prototypical illustration of this 
dialectic is to be found in Horkheimer and Adorno's interpretation of the myth 
of Odysseus and the Sirens where Odysseus is bound to the mast of his ship, 
in order that he might listen to the Siren's song without being controlled by it. 
Odysseus places himself in a position where the desire to join the Sirens is 
counterbalanced by the decision to prevent such an occurrence. Odysseus 
places himself in a position where the desire is all too real, but cannot be 
gratified (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972 pp 3-80). In the case of acousmatic 
music, desire and its avoidance are in no way as extreme. However, the 
Adornian notion of the "tremor" which results from the holding back from the 
work (Adorno, 1984 pp 343-348), for which the Sirens myth provides the 
blueprint, is important here: events are perceived 
. 
which are normally laden 
215 
Chapter 4 
with affordances, affordances that invite and constrain action, whereas in the 
context in which they are perceived such affordances become transformed, 
dislocated, inappropriate. Interpretative action is here the counterpart of 
perception: events are perceived, yet our actions are deferred or exploratory. 
In a certain sense Gibson's entire ecological project (e. g. Gibson, 1966; 1979) 
is underpinned by the relationship between the needs of an organism and the 
potential of the environment to provide for these needs. In aesthetic terms the 
notion of desire and gratification is implicit within his approach: the organism 
perceives the world as it does because it requires food, water, sex, sunlight 
and so on. The acousmatic work makes available acoustic structures which 
specify events that might be `desired', or used directly by the listener in order 
to fulfil such `desires', but the actions that result from their perception are 
interpretative. The acousmatic work provides the opportunity for a critical 
attitude towards the everyday environment, one in which desire for an object 
or event can never be fulfilled. This `autonomy' only gains its critical power 
in relation to the everyday affordances of objects or events. Reality is not 
obscured by acousmatic music, but available in such a manner as to afford a 
different perspective upon our relationship to it. In Adornian terms, the 
acousmatic work presents a focus for domination of the world by the 
composer, yet a domination which is independent from direct intervention in 
the world. As such it provides an image of domination which, although 
resembling that which occurs in everyday life, is to be seen as providing the 
possibility that the process of domination need not be alienating (see section 
4.1.2). 
For the listener, this image of domination depends upon, " yet is 
simultaneously in opposition to, our direct relationship with the world, a 
relationship characterised by the constraints of survival value. Although the 
perception of cultural artefacts may be considered in the same light as any 
other kind of perception (see Chapter 2, section 2.2), as contingent upon a 
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shared yet human environment, such artefacts may also be considered the 
combined traces of individual interpretative actions. Such traces are the result 
not only of a direct relationship with the world, but of the ability of human 
beings to develop multiple interpretations in the face of impoverished 
information. In the case of acousmatic music, impoverished information is 
available within a context that affords a most extreme example of this process. 
Whereas explicitly musical events are already impoverished in relation to the 
everyday environment, acousmatic music retains invariant structures for 
events which are of everyday concern, intensifying their dialectical opposition 
to the immediate concerns of survival. Acousmatic music provides a critique 
of the links between action and perception, and at the same time provides a 
critique of the separation between music and the everyday. It directly 
challenges the listener to reassess both the relationship he or she may have 
with the world, and the relationship between musical and everyday structures 
which he or she may have perceived through familiarity with traditional 
western music. Just as a compositional attention to mimesis may be seen to 
refresh a musical culture in which material and technique have become 
undifferentiated, the differentiation of musical autonomy and mimesis 
becomes refreshed for the listener. 
Similarly, despite the close relationship between technology and 
technique in the development of acousmatic music, the listener is presented 
with a technological art-work which both reacts to technological 
developments yet shows how these developments may contain within them 
their own critique. Acousmatic works resemble recordings, yet show how 
recording may be more than pure mimesis. If, as Adorno argues, modernism 
has collapsed under the weight of its technical and technological resources, 
then for both listener and composer, the dialectical nature of acousmatic music 
provides one solution to this collapse. As will be shown in the next section, 
acousmatic music, although presenting particular challenges to the listener, 
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composer and theorist, reflects issues of importance both to musical culture 
and the relationship of this culture to the society in which it functions. 
4.2 Acousmatic music and contemporary musical culture 
4.2.1 Exclusion and inclusion: musical and social constraints 
Acousmatic music points toward a version of musical autonomy which is 
inclusive rather than exclusive. The autonomy of the acousmatic work, as 
argued above, does not rely upon its exclusion of non-musical material or the 
interpretation of acousmatic works within a purely `musical' context. Rather, 
the acousmatic work represents a dialectical relationship between its intrinsic 
and extrinsic aspects. Hence, it clarifies the distinction between autonomy and 
exclusivity: autonomy, in a dialectical sense, may be achieved without 
excluding the role of the everyday environment in composition, listening or 
theory. 
This inclusivity of the acousmatic work has social consequences. 
Wishart (1985) suggests that the development of western musical practice can 
be viewed not only as an ongoing process of excluding various kinds of 
material and technique but as an attempt to exclude sectors of society from 
musical involvement. He introduces the notion of a "scribe-culture" (Wishart, 
1985, pp. 7-28) in which only certain members of society, through their 
privileged knowledge of musical notation and theory, seek either implicitly or 
explicitly to prescribe musical practice. This scribe-culture is seen to prioritise 
certain notatable features of music, mainly discrete pitches and durations at 
the expense of continuous changes along acoustic continua. Electroacoustic 
techniques, as seen in acousmatic music, contain within them the potential to 
challenge notational and theoretical dogmas of this kind. Through its potential 
for musical inclusivity, music potentially becomes socially inclusive, through 
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presenting a practice within which the features of music excluded by this 
scribe-culture become increasingly important. This inclusivity does not just 
extend to attention to the qualitative aspects of timbre, but also to the 
expansion of the relevance of mimesis in both composition and listening, both 
in terms of articulating intrinsic aspects of the work and providing a greater 
role for extrinsic aspects of interpretation. 
The notion that acousmatic music provides for social inclusivity, 
however, is not an a priori feature of such immanent inclusivity. Its social 
potential is just this, a potential for change. In critical terms, the acousmatic 
work might provide a critique of social exclusion from the musical domain, 
but it does not in itself provide a panacea for such social exclusion. The 
practice of acousmatic music remains within a largely academic community, 
relies upon technological resources which are financially exclusive and still 
remains an art-form which is the preserve of a small sector of the community. 
Regardless of the challenge it may present to the ideologies underpinning and 
arising from traditional music theory and notation it does not provide a direct 
means for such change. Indeed, in Adornian terms, such change is not to be 
wished for: acousmatic music should not become directly involved in the 
social sphere if it is to retain its critical potential. 
Regardless of whether changes in the social aspect of musical practice 
should be generated through the practice of acousmatic music, a number of 
parallel changes in the relationship between technology, music and society 
may be observed. The ubiquity of the digital sampler and an inclusive attitude 
to musical discourse can be observed in musical practices which are widely 
distributed across social divides. Popular musical practice, whether integrated 
within instrumental and vocal forms through traditional studio techniques or 
more radically inclusive, for example in the use of samples, in 
electroacoustically produced dance music, seems to reflect a process parallel 
to that of so-called `serious' music. Although such practices are beyond the 
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scope of this thesis, the next two sections will examine the relationship 
between acousmatic music and other genres which might benefit from a more 
inclusive view of musical discourse. 
4.2.2 Quotation and sampling: 'noise' and the cultural scrapheap 
Despite the explicit exclusion of instrumental and vocal music from this 
thesis, it would be wrong to ignore the parallels between the inclusivity of 
acousmatic music and its manifestations in other genres. Critical responses to 
the processes of recording and mass production of music are not only to be 
found where musicians exploit these processes themselves through using such 
technologies. Although the technical processes afforded by audio technology 
show its role in providing the means to criticise itself, related technical 
developments can be observed in all kinds of music. Although quotation and 
montage have a long history in western musical culture, reaching an extreme 
in works such as the third movement of Berio's Sinfonia, the obsession with 
such techniques has become a defining characteristic of contemporary musical 
culture. The savage version of postmodern plurality presented by John Zorn 
through the sudden juxtaposition of stylistically unrelated music in an 
improvised setting is as much a comment upon the levelling nature of the 
recording industry as it is a response to intra-musical demands. Through such 
anti-contextual techniques one may appreciate the differences between 
elements of musical material garnered from what Paddison refers to as "the 
cultural scrap-heap" (1991, p. 279). Integrating references to a plurality of 
musics within a piece merely reproduces the deadening nature of the recording 
industry, where recordings are reduced to their exchange value alone; through 
refusing such integration the material takes on more than just its face value 
and becomes a critique of the self-sameness that threatens to associate 
plurality with identity. 
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Similarly, the widespread practice of sampling and the use of 
turntables to create new pieces in popular music is more than just a labour- 
saving tactic. The challenges to the ownership and financial value of material 
within the recycling and recontextualising of fragments that are regarded as 
representing valuable commodities again seem to strike at the culture industry 
from within. This is far more than just `theft' in the sense that bootleg 
recordings enable one to possess music without paying for it. If this were so, 
loss of revenue would be the main industrial fear. Here, however, it is the 
ownership of material itself that is at issue; it is difficult to argue that a 
sampled fragment from a record can be bought and sold in the same way that a 
complete bootleg could be. The originator of the sampled material invests 
time and effort and money that are `stolen' through sampling; and where 
samples are used by permission the ownership of the original material is just 
as fundamental a concern. It seems that musicians often forget the historically 
mediate nature of their own sources. The exploitation and appropriation of 
material does not require a sampler; this process is well known within jazz 
through the creation of new standards from the framework of older tunes. 
Musicians continually `steal' from one another; the difference here is that 
rather than merely copying, developing or arranging old material, the 
musician with a sampler may combine such materials in such a way as to 
ignore their traditional usage entirely. Samples may be used to refer to styles 
of music in a fetishistic manner, but such reference simultaneously reflects the 
moribund nature of recorded music, and as such should not be seen as merely 
invoking the ghosts of conventional musicians, but as part of a broader, 
critical phenomenon. Of course, such critique depends upon the manner in 
which sampling is employed, and it is not my intention to present the use of 
samples as a solution to aesthetic problems in itself. The practice of sampling 
is both symptomatic of the technological nature of contemporary music and 
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potentially critical of the commodification of music; as such one would be 
wrong to ignore the primary area in which it occurs, that of popular music. 
Sampling (including analog sampling) and quotation can be seen as 
directly analogous to processes relevant to acousmatic music. Just as 
acousmatic music's dialectic between inclusion and autonomy transforms 
musical listening through demanding attention to our everyday surroundings, 
so do these practices. Indeed, many aspects of these practices deny any real 
division between acousmatic music and the practices of many popular forms. 
Much contemporary dance music shares technological, material and technical 
resources with acousmatic music. Similarly, acousmatic compositions, such as 
Alvarez' Mambo a la Braque, use technology to draw upon, transform and 
recontextualise existing musical recordings. In a sense, much of contemporary 
music seems to demand of the listener a reversal of the traditional distinction 
between music and noise. Through montage techniques, musical material is 
juxtaposed with scant regard for its intrinsic structural features, treated as if it 
has the same status as any other extrinsically significant reference to our 
everyday surroundings. Conversely, through bringing into the sphere of music 
sounds of previously banal, everyday significance, the listener is made aware 
of the intrinsic `musical' potential of the sounds of everyday events. These 
parallels are not causative: it is not suggested that acousmatic music has 
caused changes in other musical practices, or vice-versa. Nor is it suggested 
that this reversal is a consequence of the ubiquity of audio technology either 
as a source for material (through recordings) or an influence upon musical 
techniques. However, it is suggested that acousmatic music shares aspects of 
its critical potential with a number of other musical practices. In the next 
section, the relationship between pure montage and transformational 
approaches to composition will be considered in relation to the listener. This 
analysis will reveal how divisions between `high' and `low' culture may be 
found in the different environments within which listeners might perceive the 
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extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of musical compositions, rather than in the 
immanent properties of works themselves. 
4.2.3 Intrinsic and extrinsic elitism: high and low art 
As argued in chapter 3, the interpretations which a listener might make of an 
acousmatic piece are contingent upon the particular environments available to 
that listener. This being the case, although no value judgement is proposed 
regarding the aesthetic merits of different music practices, the practices of 
montage and acoustic transformations can be shown to reflect different 
interpretative environments. Moreover, the particular `materials' utilised and a 
listener's interpretation of these materials will be shown to be equally 
contingent. 
If one aspect of the axis between inclusion and exclusion is to be found 
in the use of materials traditionally regarded as non-musical, and 
interpretations of musical works in relation to the everyday environment, 
another may be found in the division between so-called `high' and `low' art. 
According to simplistic views of musical autonomy (see Chapter 1), music 
should place priority upon the intrinsic consequences of its material, rather 
than upon its connections with the environment. If one superimposes this view 
upon acousmatic music, then regardless of the way in which pieces might 
inform us about the environment, extrinsic connections might be regarded as 
being most important in their creation of intrinsic structures, Hence, for 
example, the narrative use of sounds in a piece such as Wishart's Red Bird, 
might be regarded as important due to their value in forming intrinsic 
structures. Within this perspective, the autonomy of the piece is reified at the 
expense of its mimetic nature. Hence, one might concentrate upon the 
transformational nature of the acousmatic listening environment, its virtual 
aspect to the exclusion of its informative nature in relation to the real 
environment. Within a dialectical view, however, without mimesis, autonomy 
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has no value. Conversely, considering an acousmatic piece as pure montage, 
where sounds simply inform us about everyday or musical events, ignoring 
the intrinsic connections which may result from montage techniques is just as 
simplistic. 
Viewing intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the acousmatic piece as 
equally valuable to musical discourse suggests that any criticism of the 
perceived relationship between these aspects is equally simplistic. One might 
criticise the usage of sounds from the `cultural scrapheap', pre-existing 
fragments of music, as being overly dependent upon a listener's familiarity 
with their provenance. Such criticism is misplaced: a listener familiar with a 
particular musical environment, whether `serious' or `popular', may come to 
form different interpretations based upon this available information in relation 
to the quotation of particular musical events, but the precise identification of 
these fragments is not necessary to reach an interpretation. Indeed, acousmatic 
music has the potential to cross musical genres in such a way as to encourage 
the search for contextual information which might lead the listener into quite 
unfamiliar musical territory. For a listener familiar with the popular idiom the 
context in which interpretation occurs may afford interpretations of a 
particular piece which are unavailable to another, less experienced listener. 
Hence, what might be for an inexperienced listener a mere juxtaposition, may 
be for the more experienced listener an intrinsically structured set of 
relationships between events. However, such an interpretation merely draws 
upon a different environmental context. It may explain why a listener might 
find a work `difficult', but does not preclude interpretation based upon a 
search for contextual information in the face of impoverished information. 
High and low forms of music are defined not by their immanent 
properties but in relation to the environmental contexts in which they are 
interpreted. A simplistic value judgement is misplaced here: the intrinsic and 
extrinsic qualities of acousmatic works are of potentially equal importance to 
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interpretation, and different environmental contexts afford different 
interpretative actions. The same is true of the so-called `low art' use of 
sampling, musical quotation or indeed the direct employment of everyday 
sounds. The explicit transformation of sounds through analog or digital signal 
processing is no grounds for suggesting that low art music merely recycles 
found material, whereas high art music transforms it. Montage techniques may 
have intrinsic value for the listener, just as transformed and synthesised 
sounds may come to be interpreted as having extrinsic value. High and low 
distinctions cannot be made on the basis of technique or material, and are only 
relevant to the description of the different cultural environments drawn upon 
in interpretation. 
Failing to take this into account suggests two possible forms of elitism. 
In terms of material, a particular listener or group of listeners might criticise a 
work for drawing upon an unfamiliar environment. In terms of technique, one 
might favour music which seems to place more emphasis upon intrinsic 
structure. These forms of elitism are linked since both deny the contingency of 
interpretation. Neither concentrating upon the intrinsic, nor limiting the 
extrinsic can have predictable results for interpretation. For a listener 
experienced in the popular idiom a string quartet may simply be information 
for a particular type of culture, regardless of the intrinsic qualities a `classical' 
listener might ascribe to it. Similarly, an acousmatic piece which avoids the 
direct and recognisable use of everyday sounds may well be interpreted as a 
sequence of bangs, whoops and crashes caused by electronic or natural 
sources by a listener unfamiliar with the attempt of the musician to `limit' the 
extrinsic aspects of the work. Acousmatic music does not create such 
contingency, as it may occur in many different musical situations, yet it calls 
attention to it through emphasising the dialectic between extrinsic and 
intrinsic, and between mimesis and autonomy. 
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4.2.4 Technology and social perception 
The technological aspect of acousmatic music, more specifically its recorded 
format, requires comment in relation to the social and individual natures of 
musical experience. Although it is possible to hear acousmatic music in a 
concert hall setting, with other listeners, and one can consider the performance 
of acousmatic works in such a context a collaboration between the actions of 
composer and sound-projectionist, acousmatic music has a rather curious 
status as a social object. Due to its recorded and fixed form the acousmatic 
work need not be perceived within such an immediately social setting, nor is 
there any requirement for involvement by third parties in its performance. An 
acousmatic piece on a compact disk, analog record, or tape, listened to by an 
individual, has no lesser status than a concert performance: the context in 
which listening occurs may be different, but the piece remains essentially the 
same. A sound-projectionist may alter the acoustic structures available to a 
listener in many ways, especially through a multiple loudspeaker array, but 
these changes cannot be regarded as being of the same order as those 
pertaining to the expressive features of instrumental and vocal performance 
from a score. Hence, the acousmatic work seems to deny the social aspects of 
musical experience in two ways. First, the process of creating an acousmatic 
work is not necessarily a product of composer and performers, and may be 
entirely individual. Second, the listener's experience may occur in a socially 
impoverished context: one need not be amongst other human beings in order 
to perceive such music. 
For the listener, this first kind of social dislocation is indicative of the 
virtual nature of an acousmatic piece. Real musicians cannot be seen to 
produce the sounds that are heard, and the social interactions between these 
musicians cannot be observed. However, within the interpretative framework 
offered in Chapter 3, such impoverishment may be seen to be of value only in 
relation to the contextual information provided by the environment. Events 
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and `causes' may be heard, whether or not these are real or virtual. One would 
not argue that hearing a recording of an instrumental piece removes all the 
information one might pick-up which specifies the movements and 
interactions of and between performers and their instruments (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.2). Nonetheless, however well specified by acoustic information 
human activities may be, acousmatic music through its widespread avoidance 
of instrumental and vocal sounds may well not provide such clear information. 
Hence, acousmatic music does represent a socially impoverished source of 
information if we consider its acoustic structures alone. 
The virtual environment, however, is itself a product of human artifice: 
its contradiction of aspects of the real environment are a defining feature. To 
suggest that the actions of the composer are hidden by the acousmatic is as 
ridiculous as suggesting that the everyday environment has no role to play in a 
listener's interpretation. The real actions of the composer are not necessarily 
perceived, but a virtual composer may be assumed through the interpretations 
of the listener. It is not just sleeve notes or the labelling of acousmatic music 
as `music' that specifies intervention in the environment by some agency: one 
interpretation of the differences between real and virtual environment is that a 
human being intervenes in the real environment, interfering in its lawfulness. 
Of course, such an interpretation might be incorrect, but to use this to deny 
such an interpretation would fail to accept the implications of a contingent 
view of interpretation. Hence, in a limited sense, acousmatic music may be 
perceived as a social act, a relationship between composer and listener, despite 
the possibly virtual nature of this relationship. 
The second form of apparent social dislocation seems at first more 
extreme. However, far from being isolated to acousmatic music, a process of 
moving from participation in music, the rise of a division between musical 
performers and listeners and the development of the recording as an art-form 
of equal yet different status to the public performance can be observed across 
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music (see e. g. Eisenberg, 1987). However, to argue that this is a socially 
dislocating force ignores the social interactions which exist between listeners 
to recorded music. Although one can listen alone, listening in small groups, 
sharing interpretations through discourse, and using recordings as cultural or 
economic artefacts, keeps recorded music well within the province of the 
social. Acousmatic music is no more or less dislocated from society than any 
other late twentieth century art-form. Indeed, as has been argued in this 
chapter, acousmatic music provides a relevant critique of recorded music's 
socially mediate role as a token of exchange. If a dislocation exists here, it is 
not between music and society, but between music and the human body or 
bodies. Whereas bodily participation has remained a defining feature of many 
popular musical genres through dancing, acousmatic music shares with its 
`serious' traditional vocal and instrumental counterparts a resistance to bodily 
participation by the listener. Much of this resistance is socially mediate: 
dancing during a concert performance is deemed inappropriate even where the 
music listened to derives many of its structures from existing or historical 
dance music. One would not expect to find listeners dancing to Beethoven's 
Seventh Symphony, despite its invocation of dance related structures. 
Similarly it is considered inappropriate to join in with a musical performance 
of concert music. The reality of such social constraints is all too obvious: 
witness the reactions of fellow concert-goers the next time one attempts to 
involve oneself in a performance in anything but the most limited bodily 
fashion. Acousmatic music seems to be presented in such a way as to follow 
the same constraints upon bodily involvement, despite the shared usage of 
electroacoustic technologies by the `serious' tradition and the `popular' 
practitioners of dance music. In the next section some speculations will be 
offered regarding the passive, non-bodily nature of musical listening, and the 
ways in which acousmatic music need not remain within such a partitioned 
view of musical culture. 
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4.2.5 Technology and the body 
In both Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, attention was drawn to the different 
ways in which the perception of the human body might play a role in the 
experience of music. In Chapter 1 the increasing attention paid toward the 
effort of the body in producing music was noted (see section 1.3.4), and in 
Chapter 2, research was cited which suggested that such bodily involvement 
in musical performance was directly specified (see section 2.2.2). Barthes 
(1977b & c) argues that the `body', in terms both of its involvement in 
producing music and in its perception through listening, is a factor all too easy 
to overlook in the study of musical experience. Moreover, he distinguishes 
between two important bases for building an understanding of musical 
experience: 
"There are two musics (at least so I have always thought): the 
music one listens to, the music one plays. These two musics are 
two totally different arts, each with its own history, its own 
sociology, its own aesthetics, its own erotic; the same 
composer can be minor if you listen to him, tremendous if you 
play him (even badly) 
- 
such is Schumann. " 
(Barthes, 1977b, p. 149) 
He goes on to argue that the second `music', at least in terms of the art 
tradition, has largely disappeared to be replaced by 
"... passive, receptive, sound music... (that of concert, festival, 
record, radio): playing has ceased to exist; musical activity is 
no longer manual, muscular, kneadingly physical... So too has 
the performer changed... In short, there was first the actor of 
music, then the interpreter..., then finally the technician, who 
relieves the listener of all activity, even by procuration, and 
abolishes in the sphere of music the very notion of doing. " 
(Barthes, 1977b, pp. 149-50) 
Although Barthes (1977b) admits that one might look elsewhere for bodily 
involvement than the `classical' tradition, his pronouncements on the fate of 
`high art' music are tellingly accurate. However, Barthes' view of this shift 
from active to passive in musical experience is paradoxically seen as being the 
229 
Chapter 4 
defining factor in engendering a rather different view of interpretation. 
Through the process of removing music from the sensual the musical work 
becomes autonomous in a sense akin to that described by Adorno (see above). 
Music becomes something composed not to be played by the listener; but to 
be interpreted, not something merely to be received but to be perceived from 
the position of "... an operator, who knows how to displace, assemble, 
combine, fit together. " (Barthes, (1977b, p. 153). Through becoming opposed 
to the sensual, music thus becomes a matter of reading, and the listener 
becomes able to "read" the work, through "writing it anew" rather than merely 
receiving it through the body. In this way Barthes echoes Adorno's dialectic 
between the sensual, gratifying nature of mimesis, and the distancing 
mediation of rationality. 
Acousmatic music may be seen as a working part of this movement 
away from the body. The tape piece, unlike traditional instrumental or vocal 
music, loses the last vestige of bodily involvement on the part of the listener. 
In a sense it is the most technical of musical works, involving not performers 
and instruments but the technical manipulation by the composer of sounds 
themselves. The body is not involved in its performance, coming as it does 
from a fixed artefact. However, here too, the acousmatic work is paradoxical. 
It is both mimetic and autonomous, and we may interpret it according to its 
links to the sounding world of events as much as through its distance from this 
world. Moreover, the acousmatic work, through the precise nature of its 
technical aspect, hints at a bodily involvement beyond that provided by our 
perception of it in relation to the sounding environment. The recording, 
synthesis and transformation of sounds through technical means is becoming 
not a practice for a technological elite, but a potential practice, through the 
ubiquity of digital sound processing technology, for the `listener'. Despite the 
potential distance such technology places between the body and the sounds 
that are produced, the development of `virtual instruments' which model the 
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relationship between action and perception in the production of sounds (e. g. 
Cadoz, Luciani & Florens, 1984; Cadoz, Lisowski & Florens, 1990, see 
Chapter 2, section 2.1.2) suggests that within the audio technologies 
underlying the practice of acousmatic music there may be a movement 
towards a paradoxical re-integration of the body within musical activity. 
Although the ` real' links between sound and action may be denied or distorted 
through the means provided by conventional audio technology, ` virtual' links 
seem to be more and more in evidence through the efforts of interface 
designers. Such links are more than just solutions to problems pertaining to 
the human-computer interface; they provide a fundamental change in our 
attitude to the relationship between sound, event and action. Curiously, despite 
the abandonment of traditional instrumentation, the bodily aspect of music- 
making may be rediscovered through playing such virtual instruments. 
The impact of such technologies on music-making within society is yet 
to be assessed. Nonetheless, their critical potential, arising from the adoption 
and transformation of audio technology from a merely reproductive concern to 
a creative one, should not be ignored. Through the development of such 
technologies it becomes apparent that acousmatic music is not merely a music 
written "pour l'ecoute et par 1'ecoute" (Delalande, 1986, p. 158) but a music 
which constantly implies a critique of the ever present relationship between 
listening, events and actions. Indeed, the virtual instrument, although a 
potential compositional tool for the acousmatic composer, directly contradicts 
the fixed nature of the acousmatic work through its potential for the live 
manipulation of sounds through the actions of the musician. 
Just as in our interpretations of acousmatic music the links between 
events and acoustic structures deny the simplistic autonomy of music, so too 
do the technological developments noted here. Although Barthes (1977b) 
seems to revel in the dislocation of body and music, he too is aware that the 
body articulates an important aspect of musical experience. His analysis of 
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vocal expression (1977c) dwells upon the distinction between the 
"functionality" of vocal expression and its sensuous relation to its production 
through the body: 
"The `grain' is the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it 
writes, the limb as it performs. If I perceive the `grain' in a 
piece of music and accord this `grain' a theoretical value (the 
emergence of the text in the work), I inevitably set up a new 
scheme of evaluation which will certainly be individual- I am 
determined to listen to my relation with the body of the man or 
the woman singing or playing and that relation is erotic- but 
in no way subjective... " (Bartfies, 1977c, p. 188) 
In acousmatic music, such `grain', whether related to the bodies of listener, 
performer or composer, seems strangely absent, yet through the interpretative 
and technological aspects of such music the body is all too evident, whether 
explicitly, through the perception of a human source for a sound, or implicitly, 
through the traces of events' everyday affordances. The `virtual instrument' 
regains the notion of affordances in musical experience: just like a real 
instrument it presents the player with affordances, it is strikeable, blowable or 
bowable. Within such a technological framework the boundaries between 
player, composer and listener become blurred, especially if, like the home 
computer and sampler, the `virtual instrument' becomes widely available. Of 
course, such availability will be denied to many sectors of society through 
economic constraints, just as the piano, as an example of instrument 
technology, was and is beyond the financial means of many members of 
society. 
The virtual instrument provides a critique of technological music 
which cannot be found within any Luddite approach to musical practice. It 
provides not a return to some pre-technological music, but a critique of 
musical practice as it is. It is precisely because such instruments arise from 
changes within musical practice that they come to have a critical value in 
relation to that practice. In this sense they can be seen to provide a critique of 
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attempts by acousmatic music to separate sound from source, information 
from event and perception from action. 
4.3 General conclusions 
4.3.1 Perception, description and analysis 
This thesis has proposed that acousmatic music will benefit from a perceptual 
approach to its description, or more precisely that such an approach will be of 
benefit to developing analytical approaches appropriate to this genre (see 
Chapter 1). Such an approach was developed through the rejection of the 
notion that acousmatic music can be described without reference to the 
environment in which it exists, and the relationship of the listener not only to 
acousmatic music itself, but this environment as a whole. Through developing 
from an approach which takes into account the mutual relationship between 
organism and environment, that of ecological perception, acousmatic music 
was described in terms of the structured information it makes available to the 
listener, and analysed in terms of the interpretative actions one might make 
within such a perceptual context. The major conclusion to be drawn from this 
is that by describing acousmatic music as structured information, and 
assessing the interpretative consequences of such descriptions, an analytical 
approach develops which emphasises the nature of the acousmatic work not as 
an intrinsically structured, self-referential `object', but as a focus for 
interpretative actions in relation to the interplay between the real environment 
and the virtual environment of the piece. Moreover, such an approach reveals 
the fundamentally contingent nature of structure in acousmatic music. 
As seen in this chapter, acousmatic music, viewed in relationship to 
the environment, may be described as being critical. Such a critical aspect is 
shown not only to be in evidence in the production of acousmatic works, but 
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in their interpretation. Through taking a dialectical approach to the 
relationship between mimesis and rationality, the acousmatic work can be 
seen to take on a radical position in its relationship with technology and 
society. The autonomy of the acousmatic work is shown not only to be 
relevant to the composer, but to the listener, who is placed within a context in 
which a direct relationship with the everyday environment is simultaneously 
drawn upon yet contradicted. Through basing analyses upon the informational 
structures available to the listener, a description not only of the intrinsic, but 
also of the extrinsic aspects of the acousmatic work, an aesthetic emerges 
which revitalises the mimetic aspect of musical experience, but not at the 
expense of the interpretative. 
Through these means it has been demonstrated that finding a 
`language' within which to describe, analyse and evaluate acousmatic music 
need not founder upon the difficulties normally associated with the genre. 
Analytical pertinence is not seen as an absolute, but as a contingent notion, 
relative to the various kinds of information available to the analyst. In contrast 
to attempts to constrain the acousmatic work within a traditional theoretical 
and notational framework, bound up with a largely functional approach to 
musical structure and related prescriptive ideologies, a `language' of 
description has been used which is derived from everyday listening. Far from 
being inimical to musical issues, such an approach helps locate acousmatic 
music within experience without denying its peculiar status within that 
experience. Through this, it is hoped, the difference between analysing music 
in order to find out how it is made, and analysing music in order to discover 
how it might be interpreted may be found. Similarly, correspondences 
between, but not validations of, functional and perceptual approaches to 
acousmatic music may be discovered. Such correspondences, enable a 
dialogue between compositional and interpretative concerns which - is 
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impossible if the latter is reduced to the perception of those aspects deemed 
important by the former. 
4.3.2 Perceptual research and musical research 
In direct contrast to empirical studies of musical perception, the approach 
taken here has avoided any attempt to propose and test hypotheses within the 
framework of the scientific method. Similarly, in contrast to most music- 
theoretical research which draws upon such empirical work (e. g. Lerdahl, 
1988), no attempt has been made to validate aesthetic or theoretical claims 
with `hard' scientific evidence. Nonetheless, much of the research in auditory 
perception cited, and the theory of perception utilised in formulating the 
analytical approach taken is based upon psychological theory, whether 
empirically validated or not. Since the reasoning behind this approach has 
relevance not only to the study of acousmatic music (see Chapter 2) but to the 
relationship between psychology and music in general, this decision should be 
examined in more detail. 
It has been suggested that music and psychology have a mutual 
relationship, that just as music may provide insights into the workings of the 
mind, so may psychology provide insights into the workings of music (see e. g. 
McAdams, 1987). McAdams argues that the study of music and the study of 
psychological processes have a close historical relationship, and that the 
prevailing view of music psychology, one in which the mental representation 
of intrinsic musical structures predominates, can be seen to not only reflect the 
success of cognitive approaches to musical perception, but also to arise from 
music's own predominantly structural nature. However, such a mutually 
validating approach to research is hugely problematic. The assumptions made 
by music psychology about the nature of music are not free from ideological 
bias. The view of music as a predominantly structural domain, in which other 
factors may play a role but may be conveniently disregarded for empirical 
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purposes, is not one supported by either compositional or perceptual issues in 
acousmatic music, for example. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, many 
empirical studies of timbre implicitly or explicitly accept the assumption that 
timbre should be studied in the same way as pitch or rhythm, as a discrete 
parameter. It is not suggested that listeners cannot or do not hear timbre in this 
way, nor is it suggested that composers may not wish to embrace the 
application of such research in their work. However, as shown through the 
discussion of ecological acoustics in Chapter 2, this is a peculiarly biased view 
of timbre. Moreover, this bias is not just towards musical timbre as opposed to 
everyday timbre, but a view of timbre biased upon a highly traditional 
exclusion of the extrinsic aspects of music. 
Such prejudices are not inevitable, and this thesis is one attempt to 
show how the study of perception and the study of music may come to have a 
relationship which is not an attempt to validate or falsify existing assumptions 
about music, nor an attempt to construct a theory of music which complies 
with such empirical work. Empirical work requires hypotheses, and 
hypotheses are generated by our theories about the world, in this case the 
musical world. Empirical work on timbre has thus far only tested hypotheses 
generated by an impoverished view of timbre, one which is contradicted by 
the ways in which timbres are conceived of by many composers, and the ways 
in which they may be perceived. This thesis is thus as much an attempt to 
address the issues that might be relevant to future empirical work in the area 
of music perception, as it is an attempt to show how current approaches are 
inadequate to the issues raised by acousmatic music, in that it attempts to 
criticise the ideologies that relegate extrinsic or mimetic aspects of music to a 
supplementary role in musical experience. 
In itself, however, this thesis is not primarily concerned with a 
scientific approach to music. If it is concerned with science at all it is in the 
dialogue which might emerge between science and music. Rather than an 
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attempt to find "objective truth" such an approach is one in which "keeping 
the conversation going" between different discourses is the primary goal 
(Rorty, 1980, p. 377). By bringing together the different discourses of 
ecological perception and music theory in relation to a particular music- 
analytical problem a dialogue is produced which avoids the temptation to find 
one all-inclusive discourse which validates all others, a tacit assumption of the 
notion that the study of music perception might be carried out according to a 
paradigm which attempts to explain the "psychology of music" in its entirety 
(McAdams, 1987). The pragmatic result of seeking "truth" through a single 
discourse in such circumstances is to deny the legitimacy of contrasting 
discourses and run the risk of the kinds of tacit and inappropriate assumptions 
which one discourse invariably makes regarding another, such as a mistaken 
view that music is an essentially intrinsic form. In this way the legitimacy of 
music, or the discourse that surrounds it, can be brought into disrepute by the 
need to legitimate it through, for example, appeals to "psychologically real" 
artefacts (cf. Lerdahl, 1988) which may not correspond to the kinds of 
artefacts identified through contrasting discourses. Although McAdams 
(1987) does propose that music and psychology regard each other with a 
"mutual regard", such mutuality is specious unless one takes care not merely 
to accept the dominant musical ideology for reality. 
In response to this, the perceptual, analytical and critical components 
of this thesis are not reduced to one discourse, but shown for what they are: 
different views of the same phenomena. Discourses may be appropriate or 
inappropriate to particular circumstances, as ecological approaches and the 
methods of Adorno might be for acousmatic music, but they stand or fall in 
their own terms, not through their mutual validation. `Translation' is here the 
vital concept, not validation, and it is hoped that the dialogue attempted here 
reveals an alternative to conventional perspectives on the relationship between 
perception, interpretation and aesthetics. Proving that sounds provide 
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structured information and showing that such a perspective may produce 
enlightening analyses of musical works or an insight into their aesthetic nature 
are quite different things, and should not be confused. The ecological 
approach to perception is valuable in this case because it enables a critical 
dialogue to occur between musical practice and interpretation which has been 
conspicuously absent in writings on acousmatic music. Moreover, the 
dialogue between this approach to perception and conspicuously musical 
issues gains its value in the difficulties of reconciling such musical and hence 
aesthetic issues with the everyday concerns so close to the heart of the 
ecological approach to perception. This thesis proposes that acousmatic music 
cannot be reduced to everyday perception, but nonetheless benefits from 
coming into a dialogue with such concerns. Mimesis and rationality may be 
translated into the discourse of ecological perception, but cannot be reduced 
to such a discourse. The dialogue between ecological perception and music 
analysis is here left for what it is, a pragmatic attempt to find an enlightening 
translation between the discourses of perceptual science, musical analysis and 
aesthetics. 
4.3.3 Theory and practice in acousmatic music 
Lastly, some conclusions may be reached regarding the relationship between 
the theory and practice of acousmatic music. Although perception and 
description, rather than any prescriptive or functional bias, have been 
concentrated upon, the aesthetic conclusions reached in this chapter have at 
least introduced the notion of a correspondence between compositional and 
listening concerns. The inclusive nature of the acousmatic work has been 
shown to be of concern to both listener and composer through the challenges it 
presents as to music as an autonomous art-form. This potential common 
ground may have some implications for both the theory and practice of 
acousmatic music. Both theory and practice may attempt to avoid any 
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consideration of the listener. However, once theory attempts to consider 
perception, it becomes difficult to maintain such a monadic view, especially 
where listener and composer may be seen to share some common ground. In 
this situation one is led to ask: should practice reflect the concerns of the 
listener? 
Theories both arise from practice, and constrain practice. Schaeffer's 
approach to the acousmatic (Schaeffer, 1966) was to base his theoretical work 
on the experiences of "reduced listening" so appropriate to the changes in 
quality engendered by listening to a repeating record or tape-loop. The 
practice of composing with such means led to a theoretical construct which 
prioritised the disembodied nature of these sounds. Are such means 
appropriate after consideration of the contingency of interpretation identified 
here? In one sense, to criticise Schaeffer's theory would be quite wrong: it was 
matched to a particular practice of composition. However, such theories can 
take on a mythic status, quite separate from their original practical context. By 
considering listening from a context quite separate from that of composition it 
is possible to separate theory temporarily from musical practice itself, and 
hence to provide an alternate view of musical practice, side-stepping the 
dominance of functional aspects of theory. It is not suggested that such a 
process should alter our views on a particular approach to composition, but it 
has offered a theory which could temper certain compositional concerns with 
the knowledge that listener and composer do inhabit a largely similar 
environment. Exploiting this shared context through the exploitation of sound 
as information for events, perhaps through the exploitation of invariant 
acoustic structures, might provide a valuable supplement to the prevailingly 
abstract view of sound as pure'timbre. Listening itself is the practice which 
has been constrained by music theory for too long, whether linked to musical 
practices or merely imposed upon them. Music need not be a wholly intrinsic, 
contentless form, and if this approach to acousmatic music has achieved 
239 
Chapter 4 
anything, it is that it has shown how rich the content of acousmatic music may 
be, regardless of the practical and theoretical efforts that have been made to 
extinguish such content. In contrast, however, it has been shown that such 
content does not reduce acousmatic music to an impoverished record or 
simulacrum of the environment. An acousmatic piece is neither autonomous, 
nor mimetic, but exists in the dialectic between these two forces, and ignoring 
either side of this dialectic fails to do justice to its aesthetic potential. 
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